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Chapter 1
Introduction
To regulate or not to regulate  that is the question. In the midst of the
biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression, a great number of aca-
demics and policy-makers has been concerned with this question. Since
2007-2008 policy-makers have been arguing over pro and contra of financial
regulations. However, most of the academics agree that deregulated financial
markets are more welfare enhancing than regulated ones. Demyanyk et al.
(2007, p.) refer to the banking deregulation as an impetus for an economic
process with significant real effects at the macro level.
Although this thesis contains several lines of research and consists of
three independently written papers, the effects of banking deregulation on
the real economy are at the heart of it. Chapter two studies the dependence
of different channels of risk sharing on the business cycle and how banking
deregulation has affected the pattern of risk sharing and its dependence on
the business cycle. Portfolio holdings constitute one possibility of risk shar-
ing. The determinants of portfolio holdings across countries are analyzed in
chapter three. It is the only chapter that exploits the international dimen-
sion. In chapter four, I come back to banking deregulation and highlight the
implications of the US banking deregulation for capital income flows across
US states.
The introductory chapter is organized in the following way. In section
1.1, I give formal definitions of the main concepts and report some stylized
facts on them. Section 1.2 provides an overview of this thesis in more detail.
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1.1 Formal definitions and stylized facts
Consumption Risk Sharing
The existence of idiosyncratic income and output shocks explains the urge
to insure consumption, which is captured by the concept of consumption
risk sharing.1 The implication of full risk sharing has been known for many
decades since the seminal work of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959). Wilson
(1968) and Diamond (1967) derived the basic proposition that optimal allo-
cation of risk bearing implies that - under certain conditions - the household
changes in consumption should move one-for-one with aggregate changes
in consumption. Formally, in a world with complete markets and homoge-
neous agents with respect to preferences, growth in marginal utility should
be equated across agents, so that in all states of nature
u′(Ckt+1(s))
u′(Ckt (s))
= λ(s)
holds, where s indexes the state of nature and λ(s) is the growth in the
shadow-price of consumption. Thus, by pooling together their risk, agents
insure fully against non-aggregate uncertainty in their resources. Only dif-
ferences in preferences or measurement error can account for the dispersion
of consumption changes across households and not, for example, the current
change in household's income. Most findings in the empirical analysis based
on the micro-level data reject the theory.2
However, these studies served as a useful background for researchers in-
terested in modelling macro-economies, who have extended the approach
used to compare consumption and output changes across countries as well as
across regions within a single country. Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993a) reject
the hypothesis of full insurance in panels for the United States and OECD
countries. Canova and Ravn (1996) formally examine the implications of in-
ternational consumption risk sharing for a panel of industrialized countries.
The cross equation restrictions imposed by the theory are rejected. Obstfeld
(1994) shows that the coefficients in time-series regressions of each country
consumption growth rate on the world consumption growth rate are positive
1I use terms 'consumption risk sharing' and 'risk sharing' interchangeably.
2The first tests on consumption insurance were tests of market completeness proposed
by Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994), who used micro-data (person
or household data) from the United States and villages in India, respectively.
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but smaller than unity. This result indicates that there is only partial risk
sharing. Lewis (1996) finds an evidence that consumption growth rates in
countries with capital market restrictions covary more strongly with domestic
output variations relative to the world than unrestricted countries. However,
risk-sharing tests among countries with relatively unrestricted capital mar-
kets were also rejected. Taken together, these results present substantial
evidence against full risk sharing.
Recognizing that risk sharing may be imperfect, researchers suggested
to examine what the extent of consumption risk sharing is and whether
it differs across countries and regions. Crucini (1999) shows that there is
much more risk sharing across the Canadian provinces and the US states
than there is across G-7 countries. Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)
(henceforth, ASY) have developed an approach for measuring the degree of
risk sharing based on cross-sectional variance decomposition of shocks to
gross state product. According to their study, 25 percent of shock impact in
the United States remain uninsured in the period 1963-1990.
Another important feature of the framework proposed by ASY is its
ability to identify and analyze some exact mechanisms of risk sharing. ASY
developed a method integrating the major risk sharing mechanisms in a
unique framework. They considered three channels through which risk can
be shared. First, region specific risks can be shared via cross-ownership of
productive assets (portfolio diversification), facilitated by developed capital
markets. This channel is also called income smoothing channel. Second,
regions can smooth their consumption by adjusting their non-contingent as-
set holdings, for example through lending and borrowing at intranational
credit markets. This channel is often referred to as consumption smooth-
ing. Third, governments or international organizations can arrange a fiscal
transfer system that can serve as a mechanism for further income and con-
sumption smoothing. These channels of smoothing are often referred to as
capital market, credit market, and federal government smoothing. For the
period 1963-1990, ASY found that in the US states 39 percent of regional
income shocks are smoothed by capital markets, 23 percent are smoothed
by credit markets, and 13 percent are smoothed by the federal government.
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Altogether, although perfect insurance is not achieved, there is considerable
risk sharing among US states.
In fact, the variance decomposition method suggested by Asdrubali,
Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) has become the workhorse for most macroeco-
nomic studies on inter- and intranational risk sharing. Sørensen and Yosha
(1998) use this approach for a group of EC, as well as for a larger group
of OECD countries. For both groups of countries, the results reveal that a
large fraction of idiosyncratic output shocks (about 60-70 percent) remains
uninsured. In particular, unlike the interstate capital market in the US, inter-
national capital markets play a very small role for international consumption
risk sharing. The whole scope of international risk sharing  about 30 percent
of a shock to a country's output  takes place through credit markets. These
results are also consistent with the findings of Crucini (1999) and confirm
the home bias results of French and Poterba (1991).
Home Bias
Home bias refers to the feature of international portfolio allocation that
portfolio holdings are usually strongly skewed towards domestic assets. This
fact is also called 'international diversification puzzle'. It arises because
although the benefits of international portfolio diversification are significant,
investors continue to hold the majority of their equity portfolios in local
rather than foreign-based firms.
The degree of home bias hinges on the benchmark or optimal weighting
employed from which deviations can be established. There exist three mea-
sures that can be used for this purpose. The first is a nominal bias measured
with respect to the proportion a country's equity contributes to world equity
capitalization. The second measure is a normal bias, measured with respect
to normal or average industry allocations. The third measure is an optimal
bias, measured with respect to an optimal combination determined by risk
and return profiles using for example a mean-variance framework.
French and Poterba (1991) estimate the domestic ownership share of the
world's five largest stock markets to be 92.2% for the US, 95.7% for Japan,
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92% for the UK, 79% for Germany, and 89.4% for France. Moreover, home
bias also exists at the regional level: regions tend to hold the productive
assets of enterprises from its own regions. A more recent literature - see
Sørensen et al. (2007), Artis and Hoffmann (2007a, 2007b), Schoenmaker
and Bosch (2008) - provides evidence that home bias in assets has started
to decline in the last two decades.
The literature on home bias offers so many explanations with respect
to the reasons and causes for this phenomenon that it is impossible here to
give justice to all of them.3 The key explanations are (1) capital market
regulation and other restrictions for international investments, transaction
costs, difference in taxation; (2) asymmetric information; (3) insufficient
evidence of benefits, (4) behavioral and (5) trade costs in goods sector.4
Moreover, relative home bias can be an effect of individuals' different desires
to hedge against such types of risks as inflation or real exchange rate and
non-traded wealth, such as human capital. To date, no single of these reasons
has proven to be sufficient to fully explain a puzzle of home bias.
Furthermore, recent work by Sørensen et al. (2007) demonstrates that
the degree to which income smoothing through capital flows varies positively
with the share of foreign assets in country wealth. They argue that the lack
of international consumption risk sharing and the equity home bias are 'twin
puzzles separated at birth'.
US Banking Deregulation
The literature has distinguished between two dimension of state-level dereg-
ulation: intrastate deregulation removed branching and merger restrictions
for banks and bank holding companies that were domiciled in a state. Inter-
state deregulation allowed access to the local market by out-of state banks
3For excellent surveys see Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003).
4See e.g. Stulz (1981), Tesar and Werner (1995), Ahearne, Griever and Warnock
(2004); Gehrig (1993), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), Coval and Moskowitz
(1999), Hasan and Simaan (2000), Portes and Rey (2005); Hubermann (2001), Chan et
al. (2005); Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001); Adler and Dumas (1983), Cooper and Kaplanis
(1994).
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and bank holding companies (often on a reciprocal basis) thus making the
interstate pooling of bank funds possible.
Since the 1920s bank's ability to branch and form multi-bank holding
companies both within and across state borders has been subject to state
legislation. Although some states deregulated the branching restrictions in
the 1930s, most of them generally prohibited the operation of out-of-state
banks and also strongly limited bank branching within a state, to the point
that in some states banks where allowed to operate only a single branch. The
Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 gave states
the seigniorage to prohibit out-of-state banks from acquiring banks outside
the state where it was headquartered. All states exercised this privilege and
thus effectively preclude interstate banking.
Prior to the 1970s, almost all states had laws restricting within-state
branching. Statewide branching were allowed only in twelve states. Grad-
ual abolishment of these restrictions has started in the late 1970s, so that
all states, but Iowa, have deregulated their restrictions on branching within
states by 1994. Intrastate banking deregulation took place in two main
forms: First, states permitted branching through mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) and followingly allowed banks and bank holding companies to ac-
quire another bank and convert it into branch. Second, de novo branching
was permitted, whereby regulation prohibiting existing banks from entry by
outside banks was lifted. In most cases, branching by M&A occurred first,
then unrestricted branching deregulation occurred soon thereafter. So, in
the empirical analysis I will apply a single branching indicator based on the
date at which a state first permitted branching by M&A.
Interstate banking (as opposed to branching) through bank holding com-
panies was gradually permitted by each state during the 1980s. Maine was
the first to allow in 1978 entry by bank holding companies from any state
that allowed entry by Maine banks. It took 17 years till Hawaii had passed
reciprocal entry laws in 1995 as a last state. The deregulatory process was
completed with the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act, which became effective in 1997.
States deregulated in waves, or cohorts, rather than all at once. The stag-
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gered timing of both inter- and intrastate deregulations provides an ideal lab-
oratory to explore empirically how these regulatory changes affected banking
and the real economy.
1.2 Outline
It is important to emphasize that each of the three chapters represents a self-
contained paper. Each of the following chapters starts with an introduction
and ends with a conclusion. The summary in chapter five recapitulates the
main insights of this thesis. I use the remainder of this introduction to briefly
highlight the main results of the three central chapters.
Chapter two focuses on the implications of banking deregulation on
consumption risk sharing.5 First, this chapter demonstrates that consump-
tion risk sharing among US federal states increases in booms and decreases
in recessions. Second, we find that small firms' access to credit markets plays
an important role in explaining this stylized fact: business cycle fluctuations
in aggregate risk sharing are more pronounced in states in which small firms
account for a large share of income or employment. In addition, this chapter
documents the effects of banking deregulation on consumption risk sharing,
its pattern and its dependence on business cycle. We show that better access
of small firms to credit markets in the wake of state-level banking deregula-
tion during the 1980s seems to have loosened the dependence of aggregate
risk sharing on the business cycle. Not only do our results support that bet-
ter access to credit markets may have made it easier for the owners of small
firms to smooth income in the face of adverse cash-flows shocks to their busi-
ness. They suggest a major additional benefit from banking deregulation:
access to bank credit has become more reliable and is more easily available
when households and firms need it most urgently  in economic downturns.
Chapter three seeks for the determinants of equity home bias at in-
5This chapter is based on joint work with Mathias Hoffmann (Hoffmann and
Shcherbakova-Stewen (2010)).
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ternational level.6 Theoretical models that try to reconcile features of in-
ternational portfolio holdings in general equilibrium framework have not yet
reached a consensus on the mechanisms that explain home bias. However,
the commonality of the majority of these models is an real exchange rate
hedging term. This term captures the relationship between real exchange
rate changes of two countries and equity excess returns of a country relative
to another country. Using data on real exchange rates and equity returns for
industrial and emerging countries from 1982 to 2007, I estimate the correla-
tions of real exchange rate changes and excess returns. While the results for
industrial countries are mixed: only non-members of EMU exhibit positive
correlations that are significantly different from zero, all emerging countries
have positive and significant correlations of relative inflation and excess re-
turns. Moreover, these correlations help explain the observed share of home
equity in portfolio and are of more importance for countries that are more
open in trade and in the financial sector.
Chapter four focuses on the interaction of domestic financial develop-
ment and financial integration represented in this setup through intra- and
interstate deregulations, respectively.7 The way intra- and interstate dereg-
ulations have been implemented across US states offers a great opportunity
to use the experience of the United States as a natural laboratory to study
not only the accruement of global imbalances but also their implications.
The recent literature on global imbalances increasingly emphasizes the link
between domestic financial development and financial liberalization on the
one hand and the occurrence of global imbalances on the other hand. Several
recent prominent studies argue that financial integration of unequally devel-
oped financial markets may trigger both the large financial imbalances as
well as the composition of these imbalances. This chapter examines whether
the mechanism proposed by the theoretical literature could be observed at
the interstate level. In particular, we focus on the pattern and direction of
capital flows among US states following deregulation. This chapter illus-
trates that the predictions of the theoretical model of Mendoza et al. (2009)
6This chapter follows Stewen (2010a).
7This chapter is based on Stewen (2010b).
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are clearly confirmed in the US data: states with more developed finan-
cial markets experienced increase in the income/output ratio and decrease
in the income/consumption ratio following interstate banking deregulation.
These results suggest that more developed states invest rather in productive
(risky) assets but also accumulate foreign debt. Moreover, in less financially
developed states savings have increased after interstate banking deregulation
indicating positive holdings of riskless assets.

Chapter 2
Consumption Risk Sharing
over the Business Cycle: the
Role of Small Firms' Access to
Credit Markets8
2.1 Introduction
Consumption risk sharing among US federal states increases in booms and
decreases in recessions. We find that small firms play an important role
in explaining this stylized fact: business-cycle fluctuations in interstate risk
sharing are most pronounced in states in which small firms account for a large
share of income or employment. State-level banking deregulation during the
1980s has, however, dampened this dependence of aggregate risk sharing on
the business cycle. Our findings support the view that banking deregulation
has considerably improved credit market access for small firms, in particular
in recessions, when it is most urgently needed.
Our analysis places itself at the intersection of two important recent
strands of the literature. The first strand emphasizes that the degree to
which certain household groups and small firms have access to financial mar-
kets varies dramatically over the business cycle. In particular, a considerable
8This chapter is based on Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2010).
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body of theoretical and empirical work on the financial accelerator9 has ar-
gued that tightening collateral constraints in credit markets may act as a
potentially powerful amplification mechanism for aggregate shocks. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) were among the first to illustrate empirically that small
firms with their strong dependence on bank finance are particularly exposed
to such shocks.
We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of business-cycle variation in in-
terstate risk sharing. First, we show that the extent to which interstate risk
sharing varies with the aggregate output cycle is quantitatively important:
over our sample period, which ranges from 1963 to 2005, on average almost
80 percent of state-specific shocks to output are shared across state borders.
However, this average masks considerable variation over time: at the trough
of the typical NBER recession during that period, the fraction of risk shared
was almost 20 percentage points below this level. This dependence of aggre-
gate risk sharing on the business cycle is robust to controls for other factors
such as stock market and housing price fluctuations, which, as recently ar-
gued by Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005), may also affect the ability of
households to share risk across regional borders.
Secondly, we identify the sources of the procyclical variation in inter-
state risk sharing. Specifically, we ask through which channels risk is shared
and how the contribution of these channels varies over time. Following As-
drubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) we distinguish between three channels
of risk sharing: income smoothing (through interstate flows of capital and
labor income), fiscal transfers and consumption smoothing through personal
saving and dissaving. As the main source of the procyclicality in aggre-
gate consumption risk sharing, we identify strong procyclical fluctuations in
the extent to which a region's households can smooth consumption through
saving and dissaving. Importantly, this very characteristic pattern of risk
sharing over the business cycle is determined mainly by federal states where
small businesses are particularly prevalent as employers, or where the income
of small business owners accounts for a large share of state personal income.
9We will not attempt to survey this work here. Leading examples include Bernanke
(1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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To shed more light on the role of small businesses in the time variation
in aggregate risk sharing, we connect to a second strand of the literature.
Starting with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), a series of studies has exploited
the experience of US state-level banking deregulation during the 1970s and
1980s as a natural laboratory in which to study the effect of liberalization
on growth, the comovement of regional business cycles (Morgan, Rime and
Strahan (2004)) and, more recently, risk sharing (Demyanyk, Ostergaard
and Sørensen (2007), Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess (2007)). We build on
these papers in arguing that this wave of deregulation has had a significant
impact on small firm access to credit: small firms typically cannot issue
stocks or bonds, and therefore rely heavily on bank finance. The key aspect
we emphasize here is that this makes them vulnerable to changes in local
credit market conditions that tend to worsen in downturns and to improve in
booms. At the same time, the business and private finance of small business
owners are closely intertwined, so that fluctuations in the access to business
credit are also likely to affect the ability to smooth personal consumption
over time. State-level banking deregulation transformed a highly fragmented,
localized banking system into a system with larger banks that can pool
funds across local and state boundaries. We conjecture that this makes the
availability of credit less dependent on the phase of the business cycle, and
that small firms would be prime beneficiaries of such a development.
Our results provide strong support for this hypothesis. We document that
intrastate banking deregulation has dramatically lowered the variability of
risk sharing over the cycle: before deregulation, each additional percentage
point of GDP growth increased aggregate risk sharing by around 34 percent-
age points. This variability in the extent to which state-level idiosyncratic
risks can be shared across the nation has almost vanished as a result of the
abolition of intrastate bank branching and merger restrictions. Again, small
firms seem to have played an important role in transmitting the effects of
this deregulation to the real economy: the procyclical pattern in risk sharing
is reduced most strongly in those states where small businesses account for
a large share of income or employment.
This chapter is probably most closely related to Demyanyk, Ostergaard
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and Sørensen (2007), who showed that interstate income smoothing increased
by around 15 percentage points on average following banking deregulation.
Our results here suggest that the impact of banking deregulation on the vari-
ability of risk sharing is easily of equal importance quantitatively: banking
deregulation has made consumption risk sharing much steadier over the cy-
cle. Consumption risk is almost 20 percentage points higher than it used to
be before deregulation in the average recession.
The reduction in the variability of interstate risk sharing that we docu-
ment here is a potentially important source of the aggregate benefits from
banking deregulation. Small firms are especially exposed to aggregate shocks
(Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)) and it is therefore particularly important that
they can borrow in recessions. Our findings support the view that banking
deregulation has generally improved credit market access for small firms in
recessions. There is a range of possible mechanisms through which these
improvements could have been brought about. For example, banks could
have extended credit lines (or modified credit contracts) for existing firms.
Furthermore, they could have more readily provided credit to new firms, or
they may have become more inclined to engage in relationship lending by
not taking action against delinquent borrowers during recessions in the hope
of being compensated in the next economic upswing.10 We do not attempt
to distinguish between these mechanisms in detail because we believe them
to be complementary. All are consistent with our findings here.
This chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, we introduce
the empirical framework and use it to document the procyclical nature of
aggregate risk sharing. We also present our data and the details of the
empirical implementation. In section 2.3, we discuss our empirical results.
Section 2.4 concludes.
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these examples.
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2.2 Consumption risk sharing over the business cy-
cle
We measure consumption risk sharing through panel regressions of the form:
∆ log
Ckt
C∗t
= βU
[
∆ log
GSP kt
GSP ∗t
]
+ τUt + δ
k
U + αU + ε
k
Ut, (2.1)
where Ckt is per capita consumption in federal state k in period t, GSP
k
t is
state output ('gross state product') per head and the asterisk denotes the
national per capita average of the respective variable. The terms τUt, δ
k
U , αU
and εkUt stand for the time and state fixed effect, a constant and the error
term respectively. In such a regression, we can think of the estimate of βU
as the amount of uninsured idiosyncratic output risk.
Regressions such as (2.1) by now have some tradition in both the micro-
and the macroeconomic literature. Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and Townsend
(1994) were the first to suggest regressions similar to (2.1) on household-level
data as a test of the null of complete markets. Assume that each state is
represented by a stand-in consumer and that we can associate changes in
marginal utility with consumption growth (as is the case under constant rel-
ative risk aversion). Then, consumption growth should be independent of a
region's business-cycle risks if financial markets are completeregressions of
the form (2.1) should yield a coefficient of zero. More recently, Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996) have argued that the estimate of βU may be more
generally informative even if markets are incomplete: in panel regressions,
βU is regularly between 0 and unity, so that 1−βU can straightforwardly be
interpreted as the share of the average region's idiosyncratic output risk that
gets laid off in financial markets, whereas βU is the portion of nondiversified
idiosyncratic risk faced by the average region.
Estimates of βU based on regional data reported in the literature tend
to fall into the range between 0.20.3, therefore roughly a quarter to a third
of a region's idiosyncratic output risk remains uninsured.11 Based on our
US state-level data set here, we obtain an estimate of just below 0.2. Such
11See Asdrubali et al. (1996), Crucini (1999).
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estimates are typically based on panel regressions such as (2.1) and they do
not generally allow for the possibility that the amount of risk sharing that a
group of regions achieves may actually be varying over time.
Here, we argue that aggregate risk sharing varies over the business cycle.
This could be because certain groups of households may find it harder to
obtain consumption insurance in financial markets during recessions than
during booms. In particular, many small firms rely heavily on access to
bank loans, i.e. to credit markets, to smooth fluctuations in business cash
flow.12 Fluctuations in the availability of credit over the business cycle may
therefore affect the degree of consumption risk sharing that the proprietors
of small businesses and possibly also their employees can achieve. In this
way, credit market restrictions may translate into fluctuations in aggregate
risk sharing across regions.
Figure 2.1 presents the first evidence of business-cycle variation in inter-
state risk sharing: the figure plots a sequence of cross-sectional estimates of
the coefficient βU . To obtain this sequence, we run the regression (2.1) as
a cross-sectional regression for each year in our sample period that ranges
from 1964 to 2005:13
∆c˜kt = βU (t)∆g˜sp
k
t + τUt + ε
k
Ut, (2.2)
where t = 1964, ..., 2005, τUt is the constant of the time t cross-sectional re-
gression and εkUt is again the disturbance term. Here, and in the remainder
of the chapter, we use lower-case letters with a tilde to denote logarith-
mic deviations from the US aggregate, so that ∆c˜kt = ∆ log
[
Ckt /C
∗
t
]
and
∆g˜spkt = ∆ log
[
GSP kt /GSP
∗
t
]
. The solid line in Figure 2.1 represents the
sequence {βU (t)}, the dashed line is aggregate US real GDP growth. The se-
quence of risk-sharing coefficients has a mean of roughly 0.2 but it fluctuates
12It is well documented that credit market frictions tend to hit small firms harder than
bigger firms that can issue their own bonds or may even be able to raise equity in stock
markets. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) showed that the credit channel of monetary policy
has a much stronger impact on small firms than on bigger firms.
13Cross-sectional risk-sharing regressions go back to Cochrane (1991). Sequences of such
regressions have previously been used by, e.g. Sørensen et al. (2007) to study the impact
of financial globalization on international risk sharing.
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dramatically over the cycle: βU (t) displays a negative correlation (−0.3) with
aggregate GDP growththe share of nondiversified state-level idiosyncratic
risk increases in recessions and decreases in booms.
Closer inspection of Figure 2.1 reveals that the negative correlation be-
tween βU (t) and GDP growth is stronger in the first half of the sample
period: for the period until 1984 it is −0.44, thereafter it drops to −0.13.
We argue that this decline in the comovement of βU (t) with the business
cycle is the result of banking deregulation at the state level during the 1970s
and 1980s.14 Figure 2.2 illustrates this point. It provides a BurnsMitchell-
type diagram that shows the typical behavior of βU (t) around the trough of
an NBER recession, distinguishing between states that had already deregu-
lated their bank branching restrictions and those that had not. The impact
of deregulation is clearly visible: the behavior of βU (t) for the deregulated
states is flat around recession events at a value of around 0.2. This value is
almost identical to the estimate for the representative state when we esti-
mate βU from a panel regression such as (2.1). Conversely, for the group of
states that are still regulating bank branching, the estimate of the fraction of
unshared risk rises and peaks at 0.36 in the year of the business-cycle trough.
Only a year after risk sharing increases again, βU (t) falls back to the nation-
wide long-term average of around 0.2. Hence, at the trough of the average
NBER recession risk sharing was almost 20 (exactly: 16 = (0.36−0.2)×100)
percentage points below its long-run mean for those states that had not yet
deregulated their bank branching restrictions.
The fact that business-cycle variation in risk sharing is dampened by bank
deregulation may suggest that certain groups of firms and households that
were previously unable to obtain credit in recessions may now have obtained
better access to finance. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the
cycle in interstate risk sharing is driven mainly by those states where small
businesses are particularly important. Figure 2.3 plots the sequence of βU (t),
estimated once from the group of states with above-median incidence of small
businesses and once from the lower half of the distribution. Over the period
14Note that 1984 not only marks the mid-point of our sample but also the year in which
exactly half of all states had deregulated.
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before the majority of states deregulated (196483) there is a pronounced
negative correlation with GDP mainly for the group of states with lots of
small businesses (−0.47), whereas for the other group this correlation was
close to zero (−0.09).
2.2.1 Capturing time and state variations in interstate risk
sharing
We now model business-cycle variation in interstate risk sharing more for-
mally. To this end, we augment the basic panel regression (2.1) to include
an interaction with aggregate, US-wide GDP growth:
∆c˜kt = aU ×∆g˜spkt + bU∆gdpt ×∆g˜spkt + dk′Ut1+ εkUt, (2.3)
so that βU (t) = aU + bU × ∆gdpt can be interpreted as the fraction of
unshared risk that now varies over time. Here, to save space, we have col-
lected time and state fixed effects and the constant into the vector dk′Ut =[
τUt δ
k
U αU
]
and 1 is a vector of ones. Regressions of this form are
our main tool of analysis in the remainder of the chapter. If risk sharing
increases in booms and decreases in recessions, we would expect bU < 0.
We pursue two specific hypotheses concerning the strength of this cyclical
pattern in interstate risk sharing, i.e. on the magnitude of bU : we argue
that the procyclical pattern in risk sharing occurs mainly in states where
small businesses are important. Second, we show that this cyclical pattern
is dampenedin fact it almost vanishesonce a federal state liberalizes its
bank branching laws.
To document these facts, we adopt two different approaches. A directly
intuitive one is to split our sample by time (before/after deregulation) and
into groups of states that differ by small business importance. A second, more
formal approach augments equation (2.3) to allow risk sharing to vary across
federal states and across time as a function of small business prevalence or
deregulation as well as other characteristics. To capture this variation, we
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generalize the parameterization in (2.3) above:
βkU (t) = ∆gdpt
[
zk′t bU
]
+ zk′t aU , (2.4)
where bU , aU are now coefficient vectors that load on the vector of state
time characteristics zkt . The term z
k′
t bU corresponds to bU above in that
it captures the cross-state and time variation in the sensitivity of inter-
state risk sharing to aggregate business-cycle fluctuations. Conversely, the
term zk′t aU is analogous to aU and captures the effect of the state-time
characteristics on the long-term average level of risk sharing. We partition
zk′t =
[
1,x′t,u′k,y′kt
]
, where x′t is a vector of common time-varying char-
acteristics and u′k is a vector of time-invariant state-specific characteristics
whereas y′kt collects all characteristics that vary across both time and state.
Plugging the specification for βkU (t) into the basic panel risk-sharing re-
gression (2.1), we obtain a set of interaction terms, ∆gdpt
[
zk′t bU
] ×∆g˜spkt
and zk′t aU ×∆g˜spkt respectively. The equation we effectively estimate then
has the form:
∆c˜kt = ∆gdpt
[
zk′t bU
]
× g˜spkt + zk′t aU × g˜spkt + yk′t cU + dk′Ut1+ εkUt (2.5)
To avoid spurious effects on the higher order interaction terms between zkt
and ∆g˜spkt this specification also includes first-order terms of those charac-
teristics in zkt that vary both across time and state (i.e. y
k
t ). The vector cU
contains the associated regression coefficients.15
We now illustrate how we make use of this general framework. For ex-
ample, to measure the impact of state deregulation on risk sharing we use
dummy variables, SDkt , that are zero before and unity after a federal state
has deregulated. Then letting zk′t =
[
1, SDkt
]
and recognizing that SDkt
15Potential first-order effects of the time-invariant regional (uk) and the common but
time-varying elements (xt) in z
k
t will be picked up by the regional fixed effects (δ
k
U ) and
the time effects (τUt) respectively, which we include in all regressions. Because our interest
here is in the higher-order terms, i.e. in the impact of the characteristics zk′t on the slope
coefficient on state output growth, this setup allows us to keep our regressions relatively
parsimonious.
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varies across time and states we obtain the following estimation equation:
∆c˜kt =
[
bU0∆gdpt + bU1∆gdpt × SDkt + aU0 + aU1SDkt
]
×g˜spkt+cUSDkt +dk′Ut1+εkUt.
(2.6)
This particular equation is a differences-in-differences regression where dereg-
ulation is the treatment. As we will argue, deregulation weakens the covari-
ation of risk sharing with GDP growth. In the above equation, this means
that bU0 < 0 and bU1 > 0.
2.2.2 Channels of risk sharing
The coefficient βU in (2.2) tells us how much of the idiosyncratic risk faced by
the average federal state remains uninsured at time t. To better understand
the nature of the frictions that drive time variation in βU (t), we also want
to know how risk sharing is achieved. Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)
have proposed a framework that allows us to explicitly identify three such
channels of interstate risk sharing. Here we refer to these channels as income
smoothing, fiscal transfers and consumption smoothing. The method by
Asdrubali et al. (1996) is based on a decomposition of the cross-sectional
variance of state output growth. To derive this decomposition, we rewrite
state output growth tautologically as
∆g˜spkt =
[
∆g˜spkt −∆s˜i
k
t
]
+
[
∆s˜i
k
t −∆d˜si
k
t
]
+
[
∆d˜si
k
t −∆c˜kt
]
+ ∆c˜kt ,
where si and dsi denote the logarithms of state-level income and disposable
income respectively. We will discuss these income concepts shortly. Because
all states face aggregate US-wide shocks that cannot be insured by definition,
we again focus on the idiosyncratic, state-specific component of all variables
and again denote it with a tilde. Taking the covariance with ∆g˜spkt on both
sides and rearranging, we get
βI + βF + βC = 1− βU ,
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where
βI = cov(∆g˜sp
k
t −∆s˜i
k
t ,∆g˜sp
k
t )/var(∆g˜sp
k
t ),
βF = cov(∆s˜i
k
t −∆d˜si
k
t ,∆g˜sp
k
t )/var(∆g˜sp
k
t ),
βC = cov(∆d˜si
k
t −∆c˜kt ,∆g˜spkt )/var(∆g˜spkt ),
βU = cov(∆c˜
k
t ,∆g˜sp
k
t )/var(∆g˜sp
k
t ).
The four coefficients βI , βF , βC and βU provide us with a decomposition
of the cross-sectional variance of state-specific output growth. The coeffi-
cient βU is the same as in the basic regression (2.1) above and measures the
fraction of a typical state output shock that remains unshared. Conversely,
the coefficients βI , βF and βC provide a breakdown into the contribution of
the different channels to aggregate risk sharing.
We refer to the first channel, captured by βI , as income smoothing.
Whereas state output measures the quantity of goods and services produced
in the state, state income captures the value of goods and services owned
by the state's residents. The wedge between the two variables is therefore a
measure of net factor income flows16 and βI measures to what extent these
cross-state income flows systematically buffer a state's income against fluc-
tuations in its output.
Fiscal transfers are a second channel that may provide risk sharing, e.g.
through the progressivity of the tax system, through the social security sys-
tem or through other direct payments. Net fiscal transfers account for the
difference between state income (SI) and state disposable income (DSI). The
coefficient βF therefore indicates to what extent fiscal transfers allow resi-
dents of a federal state to smooth disposable income after a shock to state
output.
16This is analogous to the difference between GDP and GNP in national income ac-
counting. However, unlike GNP, state income does not reflect all income flows to a state.
Specifically, it excludes income flows to legal entities (such as incorporated firms) if this
income is not eventually disbursed to private households. Because GNP data is not avail-
able at the state level, it is therefore not possible to disentangle risk sharing through net
interstate factor income flows from the intrastate income smoothing achieved through the
balance sheets of legal entities.
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Finally, a state's residents may save or dissave after observing their (dis-
posable) income. We refer to this third channel as consumption smoothing,
and we denote its contribution to overall risk sharing with βC .
We call the vector β= [βI , βF , βC , βU ] the pattern of risk sharing. At a
practical level, this pattern can easily be estimated from the four regressions
∆g˜spkt −∆s˜i
k
t = αI + βI∆g˜sp
k
t + δ
k
I + ε
k
It, (2.7)
∆s˜i
k
t −∆d˜si
k
t = αF + βF∆g˜sp
k
t + δ
k
F + ε
k
Ft,
∆d˜si
k
t −∆c˜kt = αC + βC∆g˜spkt + δkC + εkCt,
∆c˜kt = αU + βU∆g˜sp
k
t + δ
k
U + ε
k
Ut,
where the coefficients δkX capture state-specific fixed effects. Note that
the last equation is just the basic risk-sharing regression (2.1). The set
of regressions (2.7) assumes that β is time-invariant. However, it is now
straightforward to extend our setup from the previous subsection to allow
the whole pattern of risk sharing (and not only the amount of unshared risk,
βU (t)) to vary over time. Specifically, for any of the channels X = I, F, C
we can estimate equations of the form (2.3) or (2.5) in the same way as we
do for X = U . All we have to do is replace consumption growth (∆c˜kt ) as
a regressand with, in turn, ∆g˜spkt −∆s˜i
k
t , ∆s˜i
k
t −∆d˜si
k
t , and ∆d˜si
k
t −∆c˜kt
to characterize how the entire pattern of risk sharing varies across time and
state.
2.2.3 Data
We use annual panel data for the 50 US states and for Washington DC for the
period 19632005. To measure regional risk sharing on each level we employ
an updated version of the data set compiled by Asdrubali et al. (1996).
These data are compiled as follows.
State Output (GSP ). Our measure of state-level output is state
Risk Sharing over the Business Cycle 23
gross domestic product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
A conceptually very similar series was formerly published as gross state
product (GSP) but has been discontinued. To avoid confusion between
state-level and aggregate (US) variables, we nonetheless continue to
refer to state-level output as GSP in this chapter, and reserve the
acronym GDP for US aggregate output.
State Income (SI). We use state personal income from the BEA,
which is defined as the sum of earnings (wages and proprietors' in-
come), profits (including interest and rent) distributed to the state's
residents and state and federal nonpersonal taxes (including corporate
taxes and indirect business taxes).
Disposable State Income (DSI). Disposable income is defined as
state personal income plus federal transfers to individuals and federal
grants to state governments minus federal nonpersonal taxes and con-
tributions and federal personal taxes. Federal grants are provided by
the United States Statistical Abstract, while federal personal taxes and
transfers are available by state from the BEA.
State Consumption (C). State consumption is defined as the sum
of private consumption and consumption by the state government. We
follow Asdrubali et al. (1996) in constructing these data: state gov-
ernment consumption is state and local government expenditure less
state and local transfers. Because private consumption at the state
level is not available, we proxy it by retail sales, which we rescale by
the ratio of aggregate US private consumption to aggregate US retail
sales. Retail sales data by state have been updated from Asdrubali
et al. (1996), and are available from the Statistical Abstract for the
United States. They are sourced to Nielsen Claritas. For the years
1999 and 2003, however, these data are not available. We therefore
proceed as follows: we obtain shopping center retail sales by state,
which are available from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
from 1990 to 2005. We then calculate the share of shopping center re-
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tail sales in total retail sales and interpolate this share (which is quite
stable over time for individual states) for the two years in which no
observations of total state retail sales were available. We then multiply
shopping center retail sales for these years with the interpolated share
to obtain total retail sales by state. Total retail sales by state are then
rescaled uniformly across states so as to make sure that the sum across
states complies with the US-wide total retail sales as published by the
BEA.17
All these variables are turned into real per capita variables using popula-
tion data by state deflated with the Price Index of Personal Consumption
Expenditure (PCE).
We consider two measures of small business importance in a federal state.
Share of Proprietary Income (shapi). This is our primary mea-
sure. We calculate the share of proprietary income as the ratio of state
proprietary income to state personal income. The data for both per-
sonal and proprietary income are from the BEA. Proprietary income
is defined by the BEA as current-production income of sole propri-
etorships, partnerships, and tax-exempt cooperatives. It excludes div-
idends, monetary interest received by nonfinancial business, and rental
income received by persons not primarily engaged in the real estate
business.
Small Business Employment (SBEk). This is the measure also
used by Demyanyk et al. (2007). Small businesses are establishments
with less than 100 employees. We measure small business employment
as the number of people employed in small business establishments
relative to total employment in a state in 1977. Unfortunately, this
17The adjustment factor is generally very close to one, suggesting that the approximation
is quite reasonable. To check that none of our results depended on this interpolation, we
also estimate all results in the chapter including a year dummy for 1999 and 2003 in our
regressions. This does not make a noticeable difference to our results.
Risk Sharing over the Business Cycle 25
is the earliest date for which these data are available. The data were
obtained from the Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, University
of Virginia Library.
To model the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the state of the busi-
ness cycle we use the official real GDP growth series from the BEA and the
peak and trough dates from the NBER business-cycle database. The impact
of deregulation is proxied by an indicator variable. Specifically, we use data
on intrastate banking deregulation from Demyanyk et al. (2007), Table 1.
These go back to Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for the years after 1978 and
Amel (1993) for the years before. Our state deregulation dummy SDkt is
zero before deregulation and is one from the year in which intrastate deregu-
lation took place in state k onwards, i.e. when the state permitted statewide
branching by mergers and acquisitions.
2.2.4 Estimation issues
We estimate all of our specifications by both OLS and GLS. In the latter
case, we first estimate the respective equation for the entire panel by OLS.
Then we estimate the residual variance for each state. In a second step,
we correct for heteroskedasticity by weighting observations with the inverse
of this state-specific variance. Though our main results generally come out
more strongly under GLS, we mainly present OLS results in the chapter,
which give slightly higher weight to smaller states.
As a first guard against serial and cross-sectional dependence, all our
specifications contain both time and region fixed effects. However, region
fixed effects may be insufficient to control for more general forms of serial
correlation at the regional level. As has been argued by Bertrand et al.
(2004), the impact of serial correlation on the size of standard errors may be
compounded in differences-in-differences specifications such as (2.6), where
the regressands and the intervention dummy are often very persistent vari-
ables. As discussed in Petersen (2009), clustering is a quite general remedy
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in this setting because it does not require any specific assumptions about the
functional form of serial dependence. Throughout the chapter, we therefore
report standard errors clustered by state to control for serial dependence at
the state level.18
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Cyclical patterns of interstate consumption risk shar-
ing
Table 2.1 provides the results of the channels decomposition (2.7) where
we parameterize the risk-sharing pattern β(t) =
[
βI(t), βF (t), βC(t), βU (t)
]′
as:
βX(t) = aX + bX∆gdpt, (2.8)
for X = I, F, C, U . As Figure 2.1 suggested, risk sharing is much less de-
pendent on GDP in the second half of our sample period. We therefore split
our sample into pre- and post-1984 subperiods and report results for these
subperiods separately.
Confirming the intuition from Figure 2.1, we find that interstate con-
sumption risk sharing increases in booms and decreases in recessions (i.e.
βU (t) is countercyclical): in the early period, a one percentage point in-
crease in aggregate GDP growth would have led to an almost 4 percentage
point increase in interstate consumption risk sharing (bU = −3.7). However,
we also find that this business-cycle dependence is limited mainly to the
first period; in the second period, the estimate of bU is much closer to zero
(−0.98), and insignificant.
Turning to the patterns of risk sharing, we see that the main source
of the procyclicality in risk sharing during the early period is consumption
smoothingour estimate of bC is positive and significant. This procyclical-
ity in consumption smoothing is partly offset by income smoothing (βI(t)),
18We use an adaptation of the MATLAB routine `cluster-
reg.m', which is kindly made available on Ian Gow's web page:
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/gow/htm/GOT/matlab_routines.html.
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which, interestingly, decreases in booms and rises in recessions.19
However, overall consumption smoothing (βC(t)) is much more strongly
procyclical than income smoothing (βI(t)) is countercyclical. This impact on
the procyclicality in aggregate risk sharing (1 − βU (t)) is further reinforced
through the fiscal channel, even though this effect is rather small and ap-
pears insignificant. Hence, fluctuations in access to consumption-smoothing
possibilities are the main driver of the variation in interstate consumption
risk sharing over the business cycle that we observe for the early period. In
the second period, however, the cyclical pattern of income and consumption
smoothingthough qualitatively similaris much less pronounced: the as-
sociated coefficients bC and bI are now much closer to zero, and insignificant
for both channels.
These findings are robust to alternative measures of the business cycle.
In Panel B, we capture the business cycle using the official NBER peak
and trough dates, again for the pre-1984 and post-1984 periods. Here, we
also distinguish between recessions and booms to check for the possibility
of asymmetries in the dependence of risk sharing on the cycle. The impact
of the business cycle on interstate risk sharing is again only significant for
the first period. It also seems somewhat stronger in recessions: the point
estimate on the recession dummy suggests that, at the trough of the av-
erage recession in our sample, risk sharing was 20 percentage points below
its long-run mean. Conversely, the peak indicator has a coefficient of only
−0.12 and appears insignificant. Turning to the channels, we find that it is,
again, the consumption-smoothing channel that accounts for this pattern:
consumption smoothing seems to drop markedly in recessions. However, the
evidence in favor of asymmetries is not overly strong: for both the unshared
component and the consumption-smoothing channel, the coefficients on the
19Countercyclical income smoothing has also been observed by Agronin (2003), who
suggested that the explanation might be purely mechanical: the share of small business
owners' income (proprietary income) in US output is strongly procyclical. Because income
from small businesses is not generally disbursed across state boundaries, say through profit
or dividend payments (because the owner of a typical small business is likely to reside in
the state), the share of income that flows across state borders to provide income smoothing
decreases in booms.
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expansion and recession indicators have absolute values that are not very
far apart, and are oppositely signed throughout. Based on F -tests, we can-
not reject the hypothesis that bX0 + bX1 = 0 for X = U,C. We return to
the potential role of asymmetries when we discuss the impact of state-level
banking deregulation below.
2.3.2 Importance of small businesses
We show next that the cyclical pattern of interstate risk sharing is de-
termined mainly by those states where small firms are important.
As discussed in the data description, we employ two measures of small
firm importance in a state (which we denote µ throughout). First, we use
the share of proprietary income in state personal income (µ = shapi). This
measure specifically focuses on the importance for the regional economy of
those households that actually own small businesses. Second, we use the
share of total employment in small businesses of less than 100 employees (µ =
SBE). This measure emphasizes the role of small businesses as employers,
and therefore in the local economy at large. One drawback here is that
state-level time series for small business employment are only available from
1977.
For both the employment- (SBE) and income- (shapi) based measures,
we split our sample of states into three equal-sized groups based on the
importance of small businesses: high, middle or low.20 We conduct this
sample split based on pre-1975 sample averages (by state) for the proprietors'
income measure, whereas we use the earliest available observation (1977) for
the employment-based measure of small business importance. 21
20This follows Demyanyk et al. (2007). We refer to these groups as high-, middle- and
low-µ groups.
21We checked that it is indeed mainly the cross-sectional dispersion (and not time vari-
ation) in µk that drives the results. We parameterized many of the regressions below in
a way that allows µ1 to vary across both time and state. Our results are robust to these
changes. We focus on pre-1975 (or in the case of small business employment, the earliest
available, i.e. 1977) observations for two reasons. First, because, as we argue below, the
dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the business cycle (and the role of small business
importance for the strength of this dependence) is weaker after the deregulation wave of
the mid 1980s. Secondly, the recession of the early 1980s has had a major impact on the
ranking of some big states in terms of small business importance.
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We then rerun the regression specification (2.8) for the unsmoothed com-
ponent, βU (t), on each of these groups, again based on two subperiods. The
results are in Panel A of Table 2.2: in the first period, the coefficient on the
interaction term between aggregate GDP, ∆gdpt, and the growth of gross
state product, ∆g˜spkt , is significantly negative for those states where small
businesses are important. For the other two groups of states, aggregate risk
sharing does not seem to covary significantly with the business cycle. The
results are qualitatively the same, irrespective of whether we use the income-
or the employment-based measure of small business importance.22
Turning to the second period, however, we see that the cyclicality in
risk sharing also vanishes for the high-µ states very much as it did when we
considered all states.
We then explore to what extent the entire pattern of risk sharing is
sensitive to the aggregate business cycle. We do so by parameterizing βX(t)
as a function of the share of proprietary income in state personal income:
βX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt ×
(
µk − µ¯
)
+ aX0 + aX1
(
µk − µ¯
)
,
where µk is the pre-1975 sample average of the share of proprietary income
for state k and µ¯ stands for the cross-sectional mean of µk. Panel B of Table
2.2 presents the results for this specification. Again, the cyclical dependence
of interstate risk sharing overall (i.e. of 1 − βU (t)) is stronger where small
firms account for a large share of state income. Inspecting the channels
of risk sharing, we see that this feature can again primarily be explained
by the fact that the consumption-smoothing channel, βC(t), is particularly
procyclical in states where µ1 is high.
22The coefficient aU may decline as we move from the low- to the high-µ group, but this
does not necessarily mean that the high-µ group shares more risk on average. The reason
for this variation in aU between the groups is mainly mechanical. We could equivalently
estimate the specification βU (t) = a
i
U + b
i
U (∆gdpt − ∆gdp), where ∆gdp is the sample
mean of aggregate GDP growth and i stands for the low-, middle- and high-µ groups
respectively. Then aiU = a
i
U − biU∆gdp is the average amount of risk shared by group i.
It is apparent that the group with the higher business-cycle sensitivity (lower biU ) to risk
sharing will necessarily have a lower aiU , if the average amount of risk shared, a
i
U , does
not vary across groups. We do not report the demeaned specification, because this would
make the interpretation of the coefficients on ∆gdp less intuitive.
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We conclude from these findings that the business-cycle dependence of
interstate risk sharing is driven by the incidence of small businesses: not
only is this dependence visible mainly in high-µ states. As the comparison
over subperiods reveals, the dependence also disappears at roughly the same
time, irrespective of whether we consider all states or just the high-µ states.
These stylized facts might, however, not be the result of a particular
state having lots of small firms per se, but rather the outcome of small firms
being concentrated in particular sectors of the economy. Furthermore, the
importance of small firms in a state could itself be endogenously determined
by risk-sharing opportunities. We address these issues in turn.
Robustness: controls for industrial structure, trends, etc.
In Table 2.3A, we repeat our regressions for βU (t), but now we also
include a number of controls to check for robustness. Specifically, we control
for a state's industrial structure through a sectoral specialization index of
the form
ISk =
S∑
s=1
GSP skGSPk − 1K − 1
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
GSP sj
GSPj

2
,
where GSP sk/GSPk is the share of value-added in sector s in the total value-
added of state k. In our regressions, we use the estimates of ISk provided
in Table 1 of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001) for both the one-
and the two-digit industry classification levels. In our specification for βU (t)
we then include both ISk and its interaction with ∆gdp. We also add a
linear trend in the specification for βU (t) to control for the effect of other,
gradual developments that could have affected interstate risk sharing over
the sample period. We present the results obtained from both the OLS- and
the GLS-based specifications.
Table 2.3A provides the findings for the two sub-periods 196384 and
19852005. More specialized regions tend to be better insured, a stylized
fact first established by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001, 2003).
However, our finding that risk sharing fluctuates significantly with GDP, and
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that it does so more strongly in states with many small businesses, remains
unaffected. Furthermore, again, this pattern is no longer significant in the
second part of the sample.
Endogeneity of small business importance
The importance of small businesses could be simultaneously determined with
risk-sharing opportunities in a state. In principle, the impact of risk sharing
on small firms could work either way: good risk-sharing opportunities (in-
cluding in particular the continued access to financial markets in bad times)
may foster the creation and survival of small firms, implying that better risk
sharing might lead to a higher incidence of small firms in a state. If this
was the case, any potential simultaneity bias would work against us in the
regressions we have presented in this chapter. We would then tend to under-
estimate any causal impact of small firms on the cyclicality of risk sharing.
In principle, it is, however, also conceivable that small firms are most im-
portant in those states where risk sharing is lowest and most volatile. The
reason might be that poor risk-sharing opportunities restrain firm growth,
leading to a relatively high share of small firms in the state's economy.23
To ensure that our results are not unduly affected by endogeneity, we
proxy small business importance using a remote lag of that variable. Plau-
sibly, small business importance in the remote past is predetermined with
respect to today's aggregate business-cycle shocks and, hence, with respect
to current fluctuations in risk-sharing opportunities. We therefore rerun our
previous specifications from Table 2.2 based on time averages by state of
µ = shapi based on a period that ends well before our sample (the years
23We also attempted to gauge which of the two sources of bias, if any, would dominate
in the data. To this end, we make use of our result, presented in the next subsection, that
banking deregulation improves risk sharing by removing its cyclicality. Because banking
deregulation can be thought of as an exogenous improvement in risk sharing, we can
ask whether it increases or lowers the importance of small businesses in a state. We
ran regressions of the long-term change of small firm importance in a state on the year in
which the state deregulated. Though insignificant for most specifications, these regressions
suggest that states that deregulated earlier tended to experience larger increases in small
firm importance over the sample period. We conclude from this that if any significant
simultaneity bias was present, it would lead us to underestimate the effect of small business
importance on the cyclicality of risk sharing.
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195055). Our results (presented in Table 2.3B) stay qualitatively the same.
In the sample split, the coefficient on GDP growth is still much higher in the
high-µ group than in the other two groups, and significant, though only at
the 10 percent level. In the specification where the sensitivity of risk sharing
to GDP growth is a linear function of µ, the interaction between GDP and µ
remains clearly significant and correctly signed in the specification for βU (t),
for both the income- and consumption-smoothing channels. Accounting for
potential endogeneity of small firm importance does not affect our conclu-
sion that risk sharing is more cyclical in high-µ states. And again, for both
specifications, risk sharing varies significantly with the cycle only in the first
half of the sample period.
2.3.3 The role of banking deregulation
We have shown that business-cycle fluctuations in risk sharing are much
stronger in the first half of our sample than in the second. Our maintained
hypothesis is that small firms' access to credit markets, particularly to bank
loans, is a key determinant of the extent to which interstate risk sharing
fluctuates over the aggregate business cycle. A major development that
could have affected the availability of credit to small firms in our sample
period is the gradual deregulation of the US banking market during the
1970s and 1980s. Until then, the US had a highly fragmented, localized
banking system. State regulation generally prohibited the operation of out-
of-state banks and also strongly limited bank branching within a state. In
some states, banks were only allowed to operate a single branch.24 From
the point of view of economic theory, one would expect that the gradual
lifting of this regulation would lead to considerable welfare gains through the
formation of bigger banks and a better inter- and intrastate pooling of credit
risk. Indeed, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) showed that federal states that
deregulated their banking markets earlier did eventually grow faster. They
24See Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for a succinct overview of the historical origins of
this regulation and for a detailed account of the political and economic determinants of
deregulation.
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ascribed much of this growth gain to better access by small firms to credit.
Morgan et al. (2004) found that deregulation has lowered the volatility of
US state business cycles. In a recent important contribution, Demyanyk et
al. (2007) demonstrated that income risk sharing increased because of state-
level banking deregulation, and they also showed that this increase was more
pronounced in states with many small businesses. While our work is related
to Demyanyk et al.'s, our analysis differs in scope. We focus on the role
of proprietary businesses and state-level banking deregulation for business-
cycle variability in risk sharing rather than on the effect of deregulation on
the average level of risk sharing. Specifically, we investigate to what extent
banking deregulation has steadied interstate risk sharing.
The literature distinguishes between two dimensions of state-level dereg-
ulation: intrastate deregulation removed branching and merger restrictions
for banks and bank holding companies that were domiciled in a state, while
interstate deregulation allowed access to the local market by out-of-state
banks and bank holding companies (often on a reciprocal basis) thus making
the interstate pooling of bank funds possible. Our focus in this chapter is
on intrastate deregulation.25
As explained in the data section, we exploit both the cross-sectional and
intertemporal dimensions of deregulation by using a dummy variable SDkt ,
which becomes one from the year in which a state deregulates.
Table 2.4, Panel A shows the impact of banking deregulation on the
cyclical pattern of risk sharing. Our specification for the risk-sharing pattern
βk(t), which we now estimate for the entire sample (19642005), is:
βkX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt × SDkt + aX0 + aX1SDkt . (2.9)
25Below we show that this focus on intrastate deregulation is justified: we run the
regressions in this subsection based on the interstate deregulation indicator, finding that
it is generally insignificant. We also ran a horse race between the intra- and interstate
deregulation indicators, allowing both indicators to affect the cyclical dependence of risk
sharing on GDP growth. Here, only intrastate deregulation had a significant impact on
the variability of risk sharing over the cycle. Our results in this respect clearly tie in with
the findings of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Morgan et al. (2004) and Demyanyk et al.
(2007).
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For both the income- and consumption-smoothing channels, the coeffi-
cients bX0 and bX1 have opposite signs and are significant. For both channels,
we cannot reject the hypothesis bX0 + bX1 = 0 at conventional significance
levels. For βU (t) we can equally not reject bU0 + bU1 = 0, even though
bU1 taken alone would just come close to the 10 percent significance level.
26
These findings suggest that banking deregulation has virtually eliminated
the business-cycle variation in aggregate risk sharing.
We again examine the robustness of our findings to alternative measures
of the business cycle. Specifically, using the NBER peaks and troughs also
allows us to investigate whether deregulation has had an asymmetric effect on
risk sharing in booms and recessions. We estimate the following specification
for the pattern of risk sharing:
βkX(t) = bX0Pt+bX1Tt+bX2Pt×SDkt +bX3Tt×SDkt +aX0+aX1SDkt , (2.10)
where Pt and Tt are dummies indicating the NBER business cycle peaks and
troughs respectively. The main feature of the results, presented in Panel B of
Table 2.4, is that the deregulation dummy is strongly significant and negative
in the interaction with the trough indicator. Conversely, the point estimate
of the effect of deregulation at the peak of the business cycle is clearly in-
significant. Deregulation seems to improve risk sharing mainly in recessions.
In fact, the F-test that bU1 + bU3 = 0 does not reject the null. Hence, dereg-
ulation virtually eliminates the large fall in interstate risk sharing that was
characteristic of recessions before deregulation.27
As we documented earlier, business-cycle variation in interstate risk shar-
ing is driven by states where small firms are particularly important. There-
26In a GLS specification with clustered standard errors, bU1 is also significant at the 5
percent level. (t-stat of 2.6).
27The results in Table 4 do not generally indicate that banking deregulation increases
consumption risk sharing on average: the coefficient aU1 is insignificant in both Panel A
and Panel B. According to the results in Panel B, income risk sharing increases (aI1 > 0),
which is consistent with Demyanyk et al. (2007), but consumption smoothing seems to
decrease (aC1 < 0). This could suggest that there is a potentially interesting shift in the
long-term pattern of risk sharing following banking deregulation. Our focus here is on the
effect of deregulation on the cyclicality in risk sharing, and we do not explore this issue
further.
Results 35
fore, we would expect that banking deregulation removed the business-cycle
sensitivity of risk sharing in these `high-µ' states. This is exactly what we
saw in Table 2.2: in the early part of the sample, the high-µ group is strongly
exposed to fluctuations in GDP, whereas the low- and middle-µ groups are
not. However in the later subsample, i.e. when most states had eventually
deregulated, risk sharing no longer depended on GDP, even for the high-µ
group.
In principle, it is conceivable that this pattern could be driven by other
developments that coincided with the deregulation of bank branching re-
strictions. Not so: Table 2.5 shows that it is indeed the impact of banking
deregulation that drives these results. We run the same regressions as in Ta-
ble 2.2 A for the period 196484, but now we sort states into four categories:
above/below median small business importance (high/low µ) and whether
the state had deregulated by 1984 or not (late/early deregulation). Risk
sharing fluctuated significantly with GDP growth only in high-µ states that
were late deregulators. For all other groups, in particular for the high-µ/
early deregulation group, there is no significant link of βU (t) with aggregate
GDP. Again, this holds true for both measures of small business importance.
Intra- vs. interstate banking deregulation28
The measure of deregulation we use in our analysis is the date of intrastate
deregulation of banking services in a given state. Here, we examine whether
this focus is justified: we compare to what extent intra- or interstate dereg-
ulation respectively have contributed to the shifting patterns of interstate
risk sharing and, in particular, to what extent the two forms of deregulation
have changed the variability of risk sharing over the cycle.
Table 2.6 displays results for each deregulation measure separately and
for both measures together including both long-term (average level) and
business-cycle effects on risk sharing. It is apparent that whilst interstate
deregulation has mainly affected the average level of income and consumption
28This subsection is taken from Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2009).
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smoothing, only intrastate deregulation has had a significant impact on the
variability of risk sharing over the cycle. Again, this is true for all individual
channels as it is for aggregate risk sharing, 1 − βU (t). We think that these
results have a highly intuitive interpretation: We would expect that longer-
term improvements in interstate risk sharing for the average household can
only be brought about by better access to credit from out-of-state. Allowing
the formation of banks that operate and provide credit across state borders
was exactly a key feature of interstate deregulation. Intrastate deregulation,
on the other hand, has permitted banks to branch into other counties within
the same state which is likely to have led to a cross-county, state-wide diver-
sification of banks' credit risks. Such better pooling of credit risks may in
turn have allowed to extend lines of credit to certain household groups and
in particular to small firms whose cash flows and collateral value are highly
correlated with local (county-specific) economic conditions. In particular,
such a development may have improved small firms' ability to smooth con-
sumption and income, in particular in aggregate cyclical downturns, when
collateral values are low. Our results in this respect clearly tie in with the
findings of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Morgan et al. (2004) and De-
myanyk et al. (2007) who also ascribe the importance of deregulation for
small businesses rather to the intrastate than to the interstate dimension.
2.3.4 Risk sharing, asset prices and collateral constraints29
As both an extension and robustness check we examine to what extent our
results concerning the fluctuation of risk sharing with aggregate GDP could
actually be driven by fluctuations in asset prices. Asset prices are highly
correlated with the business cycle and the relation between bU (t) and aggre-
gate GDP growth could just reflect what is actually a direct effect of asset
prices on risk sharing. There are at least two channels through which as-
set prices could account for time-variation in the extent to which risk can
be shared across state borders. First, asset prices fluctuations affect the
29This section draws on Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2009).
Results 37
value of collateral and may therefore have an impact on credit market ac-
cess. Secondly, asset price fluctuations, in particular of stock prices, could
affect risk sharing over the cycle because they directly change the degree
of interregional portfolio diversification: household holdings of the national
stock market (e.g. through retirement savings plans) represent a claim to
output in other federal states so that stock ownership brings interregional
diversification.30 When stock prices rise, the value of this diversified compo-
nent of wealth increases relative to that of interregionally non-diversifiable
components, such as labour income, housing or proprietary wealth. There-
fore, interstate risk sharing could fluctuate with stock market valuations. To
assess to what extent our results interact with time variation in collateral
values, we turn to the recent study by Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2006)
who have argued that the availability of housing collateral constrains inter-
state risk sharing in the United States. Possibly, the availability of housing
collateral could also help explain why risk sharing fluctuates with aggregate
GDP. In addition, given that small businesses face high non-insurable risk
and may therefore face particularly severe credit constraints, the availability
of housing collateral may be especially important for small business owners
for whom personal and business finance are closely intertwined. To explore
this nexus, we parametrize bkU (t) as a function not only of Dgdpt but also
Lustig's and van Nieuwerburgh's indicator of housing collateral scarcity, the
so-called my-residual31 , and of various other controls, including interac-
tions between Dgdp and µ, my and µ, as well as of a linear trend. Table
2.7 reveals that the business cycle dependence of risk sharing remains highly
significant in all these specifications. As found by Lustig and van Nieuwer-
burgh (2006), housing collateral scarcity clearly matters for risk sharing, but
30This is certainly true if a household holds a diversified claim on the entire national
stock market portfolio. But it is also possible if the household holds shares only of a
limited number of companies. Provided these companies have operations outside the state
of residence of the household, their stock is likely to represent claims to profits from many
different federal states, thus providing interstate diversification to the household.
31Housing collateral scarcity, myt, is the residual of a cointegrating relationship between
housing wealth and income, rescaled to the interval between zero and one, with unity
indicating highest scarcity (lowest availability of collateral). Further details are given in
the data appendix.
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it cannot explain away the dependence of interstate risk sharing on aggregate
GDP growth. Interestingly, the effect of collateral scarcity on risk sharing is
amplified in states with a high share of proprietary income, the interaction
between µ and my has a large positive coefficient and is also significant in
two specifications. Note also that once we consider the interaction of pro-
prietorship with housing collateral scarcity, the aggregate housing collateral
factor alone switches sign and generally ceases to have a significant impact
on aggregate risk sharing. This result again suggests that small firms' access
to credit seems to be crucial in understanding why risk sharing fluctuates
over the business cycle. But the fact that the cyclical dependence of risk
sharing holds up even once we control for a measure of collateral scarcity
also underscores our point that housing collateral constraints are likely to
be only one aspect of the story we focus on here. Table 2.8 explores the im-
pact of stock market valuations on interregional diversification. To this end,
we include a measure of asset price cycles as an additional interaction term
in our regressions. We use Lettau's and Ludvigson's (2001) cay-residual,
an econometric proxy of the consumption-wealth ratio that, as Lettau and
Ludvigson have shown, is a very good indicator of the cyclical component
in US stock markets. As is apparent from columns II-IV of Table 2.8, cay
indeed helps explain fluctuations in aggregate risk sharing: risk sharing sig-
nificantly increases when asset prices are high (cay is low) and decreases,
when asset prices are low (cay is high). We think this is an interesting result
in its own right, though we do not aim to explore it further in this chapter.
Again, the inclusion of cay does not change our results with respect to the
variation of risk sharing as a function of aggregate GDP, though. Another
interesting feature that is noteworthy from Table 2.8 is that the interaction
of Dgdp with a deregulation trend variable, CumDt  the cumulative frac-
tion of states that had deregulated at a given date  is generally positive
and significant, once again suggesting that the dependence of aggregate risk
sharing on the GDP-cycle has decreased as deregulation has progressed. In-
terestingly enough, this very same trend does not seem to have changed the
role of asset prices for fluctuations in risk sharing  the interaction between
CumDt and cayt is insignificant.
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2.3.5 Monte Carlo evidence32
In this final subsection, we illustrate the robustness of our main results fur-
ther by way of a Monte Carlo simulation: first, interstate risk sharing fluctu-
ates more with the aggregate business cycle in states where small businesses
account for a large share of economic activity. Secondly, intrastate bank
branching deregulation has considerably weakened this business cycle de-
pendence of risk sharing, presumably through its impact on small business
access to finance. We ask whether the specific incidence of small businesses
in a state and the specific date at which intrastate deregulation took place
have a direct bearing on our results or whether these results could have been
obtained by chance e.g. because they are driven by other developments that
more or less coincided with the unfolding of deregulation across time and
states.33 We follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and Aghion et al. (2008) and
randomly assign `placebo' measures of small business importance (µk) and
deregulation dates (SDkt ) to each state by sampling 1000 draws from the
empirical distribution of these variables. For both small business impor-
tance and deregulation dates, we then run two different exercises: in the
first exercise, we run our specification on the placebo variable alone, asking
in what percentage of cases it is more significant than the true variable. In
the second exercise, we include both the placebo and the actual variable and
we investigate in how many of our simulations the placebo and the actual
variable respectively are individually significant. Panel A of Table 2.9 illus-
trates that the strength of the cyclical variation in bU (t) depends on small
business prevalence. As is apparent, the interaction between the placebo
measure of µ1 (the share of proprietary income in state personal income)
and aggregate GDP growth is more significant than in the real data in less
than 3 percent of all cases. Conversely, if both the placebo and the actual
measure are included, the interaction between GDP and the real measure is
32This section is based on Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2009).
33 We thank Fabrizio Zilibotti for suggesting this exercise.
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always significant, whereas it is only significant in around 10 percent of all
cases for the placebo.
Panel B gives the corresponding results for intrastate deregulation: the
interaction between the placebo deregulation date and aggregate GDP growth
is more significant than between GDP and the real deregulation date in just
10 percent of cases. If the interactions of GDP with both the true and the
placebo deregulation date are included, the coefficient on the true interac-
tion is significant in 84 percent of all simulations, but only in 12 percent for
the placebos. Note also that SDkt when not interacted with GDP, is almost
never significant and only 12 percent of the placebo draws in the placebo-only
specification would yield a t-statistics that is higher than the (insignificant)
t-statistics on the true deregulation date. This once again highlights the rel-
ative importance of deregulation for the variability of interstate risk sharing:
whereas, as we have seen above, deregulation seems to have had a major
effect on the patterns of risk sharing (more income smoothing, as shown by
Demyanyk et al. (2007) but also less consumption smoothing), its impact
on the average level of aggregate consumption risk sharing appears insignifi-
cant. In as far as consumption risk sharing is concerned, the main impact of
deregulation seems to have been to make risk sharing less variable over the
business cycle.
The simulations in Panel C further illustrate that it is truly the inter-
action between small business importance and intrastate bank deregulation
that is responsible for the reduced variability of risk sharing. Here, we sample
from the joint distribution of µ and SD.34 We then repeat the exercise from
Table 2.5, panel B: based on their placebo assignments, we sort all states
into four groups: high/low µ and early/late deregulation. The estimation
period is again 1963-83. For the high-µ/late deregulation group we report
the percentage of cases in which the respective coefficients are significant and
34 As shown in Kroszner and Strahan (1999), deregulation did not occur randomly.
Rather, states whith lots of small businesses tended to deregulate earlier. To account for
this correlation, we do not draw µ and SD independently but from their joint distribution.
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correctly signed. As is apparent the coefficients is almost never significant
when based on the placebo: in only 0.3% and 0.2% of all cases for the in-
come and employment based measures respectively. This underscores that
business cycle fluctuations in a state's ability to share risk with other states
are clearly not random but explained by the interaction of the two particular
characteristics we focus on: the prevalence of small businesses and whether
a state had deregulated its banking market or not.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we established that interstate risk sharing in the United
States varies over the business cycle, with risk sharing increasing in booms
and decreasing during downturns. This variation in aggregate risk sharing is
quantitatively important. Over our sample period, the average state would
share almost 80 percent of its business-cycle risk with other states. However,
every percentage point increase in US-wide GDP growth increases interstate
risk sharing by almost four percentage points, and in the trough of the av-
erage recession in our sample period, risk sharing was almost 20 percentage
points below its mean.
We also identified a distinct pattern in how risk is shared over the business
cycle. Interestingly, we find that income smoothing through capital income
flows is countercyclical, whereas consumption smoothing through saving and
dissaving at the household level is strongly procyclical. It is the latter effect
that dominates, so that aggregate risk sharing is also strongly procyclical.
We conjecture that these patterns of risk sharing are determined by time
variation in the ability of small firms to obtain credit. First, we demonstrate
that the business-cycle dependence of risk sharing is much more pronounced
in states where small firms are particularly prevalent. Second, we show that
the liberalization of state-level bank branching and holding legislation in the
US has significantly affected this pattern: banking deregulation virtually
removed the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the business cycle,
and this reduction in cyclical dependence occurred primarily in states where
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small businesses account for a large share of income or employment.
At a theoretical level, banking deregulation may affect risk sharing in
two ways: first, better interstate pooling of credit risk may lead to more
risk sharing on average. Second, if firms and households face collateral and
borrowing constraints, the extent to which consumption risk sharing is pos-
sible may be sensitive to the phase of the business cycle. Our results are
consistent with the view that this second effect is particularly important:
banking deregulation seems to have improved credit market access for small
firms most when it is most neededin cyclical downturns.
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Appendix
Table 2.1: Risk Sharing and the Business Cycle
The table reports the results of the panel OLS regressions ∆xt = βX(t)∆g˜sp
k
t +
dk′Xt1 + εkXt with xt = g˜sp
k
t − s˜i
k
t , s˜i
k
t − d˜si
k
t , d˜si
k
t − c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C,
U respectively. βX(t) is defined as indicated in the panel headings. Pt and
Tt denote the peak and trough dates from the NBER business cycle database.
dkXt contains time and state fixed effects and a constant (estimates not re-
ported). The data are annual from 1963 to 2005. T-statistics in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗). Standard errors are
based on clustering by state.
(I) (F ) (C) (U)
Panel A: βX(t) = aX + bX∆gdpt
1964-1984
aX 0.54** 0.02 0.19** 0.25**
(9.38) (0.39) (2.11) (3.35)
bX -2.91** 0.49 6.13** -3.70**
(-2.66) (1.15) (2.33) (-2.12)
1985-2005
aX 0.67** 0.21** -0.07 0.19**
(5.23) (2.12) (-0.64) (2.07)
bX 0.57 -3.42 3.83 -0.98
(0.25) (-1.11) (1.07) (-0.49)
Panel B: βX(t) = aX + bX0Pt + bX1Tt
1964-1984
aX 0.41** 0.07** 0.40** 0.12**
(5.79) (3.28) (5.23) (2.26)
bX0 0.01 -0.12 0.23) -0.12
(0.04) (-1.15) (1.67 (-1.11)
bX1 0.13 0.00 -0.33** 0.20**
(1.17) (0.06) (-1.98) (2.36)
1985-2005
aX 0.70** 0.08** 0.06 0.16**
(9.03) (3.07) (0.68) (3.64)
bX0 -0.30** 0.05 0.08 0.18
(-3.72) (0.34) (0.46) (1.06)
bX1 0.12** 0.14 -0.09 -0.17
(2.00) (1.00) (-0.40) (-1.54)
F-Test (p-value) of H0: Symmetry of expansion and recession (1964-1984)
H0 :
bX0+bX1= 0
F-Test=1.58
(0.21)
F-Test=0.86
(0.36)
F-Test=0.49
(0.48)
F-Test=0.80
(0.37)
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Table 2.2: Risk Sharing and Small Business Importance
Panel A reports the results of the panel OLS regression ∆c˜k,t = βU (t)∆g˜sp
k
t +
dk′Ut1 + εkUt for two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βU (t) is defined as βU (t) =
aU + bU∆gdpt. The states are split into groups according to the importance of small
businesses ("low", "middle", "high") µk. Panel B reports the results of the panel
OLS regressions ∆xt = β
k
X(t)∆g˜sp
k
t + d
k′
Xt1+ ε
k
Xt with xt = g˜sp
k
t − s˜i
k
t , s˜i
k
t − d˜si
k
t ,
d˜si
k
t −c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C, U respectively for two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984.
βkX(t) is defined as indicated in the panel heading. µ
k denotes time-series means of
the share of proprietary income for every state k in the period from 1964 to 1975
and µ¯ is the cross-sectional mean of µk. dkXt contains time and state fixed effects
and the constant (estimates not reported). The data are annual from 1963 to 2005.
T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗).
In both panels standard errors are based on clustering by state.
Panel A
µk = shapi (share of proprietary income 1964-1975)
1964-1984 1985-2005
low middle high low middle high
aU 0.16* 0.36** 0.29** 0.09 0.17 0.16
(1.92) (3.55) (3.97) (0.57) (1.53) (1.00)
bU -0.70 -1.52 -6.39** 2.37 0.87 -3.41
(-0.43) (-0.67) (-2.56) (0.82) (0.25) (-0.84)
µk = SBE (Small Business Employment in 1977)
aU 0.49** 0.20** 0.15* 0.36 0.31 0.08
(5.47) (2.08) (1.95) (1.27) (1.64) (1.60)
bU -4.65 1.05 -3.40 -2.00 -3.60 -0.29
(-1.44) (0.62) (-1.62) (-0.23) (-0.69) (-0.14)
Panel B
βkX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt(µ
k − µ¯) + aX0 + aX1(µk − µ¯)
1964-1984 1985-2005
(I) (F ) (C) (U) (I) (F ) (C) (U)
bX0 -0.88 0.09 3.17** -2.38** 1.33 -3.24 2.66 -0.75
(-0.94) (0.29) (2.07) (-2.14) (0.56) (-1.16) (0.85) (-0.38)
bX1 -0.01 -3.28 67.01** -63.71** -189.08** -95.11 299.52** -15.33
(-0.00) (-0.59) (2.45) (-3.16) (-3.02) (-1.09) (3.66) (-0.28)
aX0 0.54** 0.02 0.20* 0.24** 0.66** 0.20** -0.06 0.19**
(16.49) (0.46) (1.88) (3.71) (4.83) (2.24) (-0.51) (1.98)
aX1 -3.96** 0.97 1.87 1.12 2.46 3.71 -4.33 -1.84
(-4.91) (1.58) (1.22) (1.11) (0.99) (1.34) (-1.30) (-0.72)
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Table 2.3B: Robustness II - Lagged Small Business Importance
Panel A reports the results of the panel OLS regression ∆c˜k,t = βU (t)∆g˜sp
k
t +d
k′
Ut1+ε
k
Ut
for two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βU (t) is defined as βU (t) = aU + bU∆gdpt.
The states are split into groups according to the importance of small businesses ("low",
"middle", "high") µk. Panel B reports the results of the panel OLS regressions ∆xt =
βkX(t)∆g˜sp
k
t +d
k′
Xt1+ε
k
Xt with xt = g˜sp
k
t − s˜i
k
t , s˜i
k
t − d˜si
k
t , d˜si
k
t − c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C,
U respectively for two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βkX(t) is defined as indicated
in the panel heading. µk denotes time-series means of the share of proprietary income
for every state k in the period from 1950 to 1955 and µ¯ is the cross-sectional mean of
µk. dkXt contains time and state fixed effects and the constant (estimates not reported).
The data are annual from 1963 to 2005. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at
the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗). In both panels standard errors are based on
clustering by state.
Panel A
µk = shapi (share of proprietary income 1950-1955)
1964-1984 1985-2005
low middle high low middle high
aU 0.15* 0.38** 0.28** 0.10 0.20* 0.14
(1.87) (3.81) (3.39) (0.63) (1.71) (1.21)
bU 0.09 -4.00 -5.22* 2.05 1.34 -4.01
(0.06) (-1.53) (-1.73) (0.69) (0.42) (-1.14)
Panel B
βkX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt × (µk − µ¯) + aX0 + aX1(µk − µ¯)
1964-1984 1985-2005
(I) (F ) (C) (U) (I) (F ) (C) (U)
bX0 -0.86 -0.12 4.14** -3.15** 0.28 -3.92 4.91 -1.27
(-0.94) (-0.36) (3.19) (-2.70) (0.12) (-1.14) (1.28) (-0.76)
bX1 -7.03 -2.38 44.95** -35.54** -36.09 -23.20 80.84** -21.56
(-0.81) (-0.81) (3.05) (-2.89) (-0.97) (-1.00) (2.10) (-1.21)
aX0 0.50** 0.04 0.21** 0.26** 0.65** 0.23** -0.07 0.19**
(12.52) (1.14) (2.25) (4.82) (6.36) (2.05) (-0.60) (2.43)
aX1 -1.93** 0.73** 0.49 0.70 -0.45 0.81 -0.50 0.14
(-3.97) (1.96) (0.45) (1.11) (-0.30) (1.09) (-0.36) (0.15)
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Table 2.4: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and the Business Cycle (OLS)
The table reports the results of the panel OLS regressions∆xt = β
k
X(t)∆g˜sp
k
t + cXSD
k
t +d
k′
Xt1+
εkXt with xt = g˜sp
k
t − s˜i
k
t , s˜i
k
t − d˜si
k
t , d˜si
k
t − c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C, U respectively. βX(t) is
defined as indicated in the panel heading. SDkt is the intrastate deregulation dummy, which is 1
from the year of state k's intrastate deregulation onwards. Pt and Tt are dummies for the peak
and trough dates from the NBER business cycle database. dkXt contains time and state fixed
effects and the constant (estimate not reported). cX is not reported. The data are annual from
1963 to 2005. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by
∗(∗∗). In both panels standard errors are based on clustering by state.
(I) (F ) (C) (U)
Panel A: βkX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt × SDkt + aX0 + aX1SDkt
bX0 -4.29** 0.30 10.07** -6.08**
(-3.59) (1.06) (3.90) (-3.08)
bX1 4.44** 0.59 -9.24** 4.21
(2.56) (0.71) (-2.31) (1.53)
aX0 0.55** 0.09** 0.01 0.35**
(9.74) (6.17) (0.09) (5.90)
aX1 0.08 -0.08 0.13 -0.13
(1.32) (-1.57) (1.30) (-1.44)
Panel B: βkX(t) = bX0Pt + bX1Tt + bX2Pt × SDkt + bX3Tt × SDkt + aX0 + aX1SDkt
bX0 -0.15 -0.00 0.29** -0.13
(-1.47) (-0.16) (2.03) (-1.59)
bX1 0.24** -0.00 -0.53** 0.30**
(2.76) (-0.23) (-3.65) (3.46)
bX2 0.16 -0.21 -0.04 0.09
(0.82) (-1.29) (-0.21) (0.53)
bX3 -0.29** 0.01 0.53** -0.25**
(-2.74) (0.29) (3.02) (-2.40)
aX0 0.41** 0.10** 0.35** 0.14**
(7.95) (9.07) (3.84) (2.93)
aX1 0.24** -0.03 -0.24** 0.03
(3.26) (-1.10) (-3.10) (0.54)
F-Test (p-value) of H0: Deregulation removes cyclicality in risk sharing ...
in booms
H0: bX0+bX2= 0 F-Test=0.08 (0.78) F-Test=0.08 (0.77) F-Test=0.08 (0.78) F-Test=0.10
(0.75)
in recessions
H0: bX1+bX3= 0 F-Test=0.29 (0.59) F-Test=1.12 (0.29) F-Test=0.11 (0.74) F-Test=0.48
(0.49)
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Table 2.5: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and Small Businesses
The table reports the results of the panel OLS regression for the period
1964-1984 ∆c˜k,t = βU (t)∆g˜sp
k
t + d
k′
Ut1+ ε
k
Ut, where βU (t) = aU + bU∆gdpt.
The states are split into four categories: above/below median small business
importance and whether the state had already deregulated by 1984 or not
(early/late deregulation). dkXt contains time and state fixed effects and the
constant (estimates not reported). The data are annual from 1963 to 1984.
T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated
by ∗(∗∗). Standard errors are based on clustering by state. "Obs." denotes
the number of observations in the respective category.
µk = shapi (share of proprietary income 1964-1975)
early deregulation late deregulation
low µk high µk low µk high µk
aU 0.14* 0.37** 0.42** 0.26**
(1.82) (2.44) (4.58) (3.63)
bU -0.82 -6.69 -2.42 -6.38**
(-0.53) (-1.55) (-1.11) (-2.91)
Obs. 378 126 147 420
µk = SBE (Small Business Employment in 1977)
early deregulation late deregulation
low µk high µk low µk high µk
aU 0.47** 0.12* 0.30** 0.23**
(4.47) (1.85) (3.04) (3.19)
bU -2.15 -1.97 -3.03 -5.41**
(-0.46) (-0.89) (-1.58) (-2.30)
Obs. 315 189 210 357
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Table 2.6: Risk Sharing, Intra- and Interstate Banking Deregulation
The table reports the results of the panel OLS regressions∆xt = β
k
X(t)∆g˜sp
k
t + cXSDk,t +
dk′Xt1+ εkXt with xt = g˜sp
k
t − s˜i
k
t , s˜i
k
t − d˜si
k
t , d˜si
k
t − c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C, U respectively.
βX(t) is defined as indicated in the panel heading. SDk,t is the intra- (SD
1
k,t) or interstate
(SD2k,t) deregulation dummy, which is 1 from the year of state k's intra- or interstate
deregulation onwards. SDkt d
k
Xt contains time and state fixed effects and the constant
(estimate not reported). cX is not reported. The data are annual from 1963 to 2005.
T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗).
(I) (F ) (C) (U) (I) (F ) (C) (U)
βkX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt × SDk,t + aX0 + aX1SDk,t
(SDk,t)=(SD
1
k,t) (SDk,t)=(SD
2
k,t)
bX0 -4.71** 0.37 10.97** -6.63** -3.55** 1.11** 6.63** -4.18**
(-8.24) (0.76) (7.62) (-4.99) (-8.55) (3.12) (6.30) (-4.29)
bX1 3.25** 1.14* -9.13** 4.74** 0.12 -0.27 1.01 -0.85
(4.10) (1.71) (-4.57) (2.57) (0.09) (-0.26) (0.32) (-0.29)
aX0 0.49** 0.09** 0.18** 0.25** 0.51** 0.03** 0.28** 0.19**
(25.18) (5.24) (3.62) (5.45) (36.58) (2.40) (7.86) (5.83)
aX1 0.15** -0.09** -0.01 -0.05 0.26** 0.01 -0.37** 0.10
(5.92) (-4.27) (-0.08) (-0.91) (8.43) (0.45) (-4.77) (1.39)
βkX(t) = bX0∆gdpt + bX1∆gdpt × SD2k,t + bX2∆gdpt × SD1k,t + aX0 + aX1SD2k,t + aX2SD1k,t
(I) (F ) (C) (U)
bX0 -4.72** 0.36 10.97** -6.61**
(-8.38) (0.76) (7.67) (-4.98)
bX1 -1.57 -0.69 5.71* -3.46
(-1.20) (-0.61) (1.72) (-1.12)
bX2 3.05** 1.12 -9.37** 5.20**
(3.68) (1.58) (-4.46) (2.66)
aX0 0.48** 0.08** 0.19** 0.24**
(25.23) (5.13) (3.85) (5.39)
aX1 0.22** 0.07** -0.43** 0.14*
(6.69) (2.36) (-5.11) (1.81)
aX2 0.06** -0.11** 0.15** -0.10
(2.25) (-4.94) (2.19) (-1.52)
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Table 2.9: Robustness check: Monte Carlo Simulations
Table reports results from the Monte Carlo simulations for the share of proprietary income µk
(Panel A), intrastate banking deregulation SDkt (Panel B), and both the share of proprietary
income µk and intrastate banking deregulation SD
k
t (Panel C). We take 1000 random draws from
the empirical distribution of these variables for each specification. In panels A and B the first
row presents the percentage of cases where estimated coefficients in the regressions with 'placebo'
variable are more significant than true ones. The second row reports the percentage of cases where
estimated coefficients are individually significant. Superscript ·P denotes a 'placebo' variable and
its associated coefficient. Panel C reports the percentage of cases for which the coefficient on
∆gdp × ∆g˜spkt is significant and correctly signed for the high µ/late deregulation group. See
notes to table 2.5 for details on how these groups are formed.
Panel A: Simulated µk
βkU (t) = bU0∆gdpt + b
P
U1∆gdpt × µPk + aU0 + aPU1µPk
Percentage of simulated t-stats larger than t-stats from real data
b̂U0 100% b̂PU1 3% â
P
U1 50%
βkU (t) = bU0∆gdpt + bU1∆gdpt × µk + bPU1∆gdpt × µPk + aU0 + aU1µk + aPU1µPk
Percentage of significant t-stats
b̂U1 100% b̂PU1 10% âU1 0% â
P
U1 28%
Panel B: Simulated SDkt
βkU (t) = bU0∆gdpt + b
P
U1∆gdpt × SDPk,t + aU0 + aPU1SDPk,t
Percentage of simulated t-stats larger than t-stats from real data
b̂U0 14% b̂PU1 10% â
P
U1 12%
βkU (t) = bU0∆gdpt + bU1∆gdpt × SDk,t + bPU1∆gdpt × SDPk,t + aU0 + aU1SDk,t + aPU1SDPk,t
Percentage of significant t-stats
b̂U1 85% b̂PU1 12% âU1 0.5% â
P
U1 23%
Panel C: Simulated µk and SD
k
t
βkU (t) = bU0∆gdpt + aU0 for states with high µk and late deregulation
Percentage of cases for which coefficient on ∆gdpt negatively signed and more significant
µk = Share of proprietary income µk = Small Business Employment
b̂U0 0.3% b̂U0 0.2%
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FIGURE 2.1: The blue, solid line is the coefficient βU (t) of the sequence of cross-sectional
regressions ∆c˜kt = βU (t)∆g˜sp
k
t + τt + ε
k
t for t = 1964...2005. The red, dashed line is US
GDP growth. Vertical lines indicate NBER business cycle troughs.
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FIGURE 2.2: Burns-Mitchell diagram of the fraction of unshared risk around NBER re-
cession troughs, distinguishing between states that have not yet (blue, solid line) and those
that have already (red, dashed line) deregulated. This fraction was estimated as follows:
Let Itrough =
{
t1trough....t
N
trough
}
define the set of NBER trough dates. Altogether, our
sample contains N = 6 NBER recession troughs that define a total of 306 = 6 × 51 (50
states+ Washington D.C.) state-recession events. At each trough date, we split the 51
state-recession events into two groups, according to whether state k had deregulated at
that trough t ∈ Itrough or not. We then pool state-recession events (by group) across all
troughs and run the cross-sectional regressions ∆c˜kt+l = βU (l)∆g˜sp
k
t+l + τt+l + ε
k
t+l for
l = −1, 0, 1 and t ∈ Itrough, once for deregulated and once for not-yet-deregulated state-
recession events. In this way, we obtain the typical time profile of risk sharing for each
group one year before a trough (l = −1), in the year of trough itself (l = 0) and one year
after (l = 1) . The plot gives the estimated βU (l) for the two groups.
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Chapter 3
Determination of Equity Home
Bias: An Empirical Analysis35
3.1 Introduction
The feature of international diversification behavior that investors allocate
most of their portfolios to domestic securities when investing into the inter-
national markets is well-known and widely-documented. There are numerous
theoretical models that attempt to find the determinants of the home bias
in equities. This literature can be partitioned into two broad strands: the
first one applies a portfolio-balance approach using international CAPM. It
is, however, by its nature a partial equilibrium approach, with the limita-
tions that this entails. This literature suggests that international portfolio
choice is determined by costs associated with cross-border investment36 or by
the allocation of consumption expenditures across countries due to different
consumer preferences, inflation risks and deviations from purchasing power
parity (PPP). This heterogeneity in individuals' consumption allocation and
evaluation of returns gives rise to real exchange rate (RER) fluctuations.
Thus, the portfolio theory literature suggests home bias in asset market to
be a result of the hedging motive against RER fluctuations.
The second, more recent, strand of the literature exploits general equilib-
35This chapter draws on Stewen (2010a).
36See e.g. Tesar and Werner (1995), Hasan and Simaan (2000), Mussa and Goldstein
(1993)
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rium (GE) models and, thus, chooses equilibrium portfolio endogenously. For
a considerable bulk of this literature the main source of the portfolio home
bias is given by non-tradability in the goods sector.37 The GE literature
suggests trade costs as another potential source for the lack of international
diversification.38 However, there is still no consensus among the theoretical
models that try to reconcile features of international portfolio holdings in
a general equilibrium framework. The models differ in the modeling proce-
dures, specifications, parameter values and consequently in the mechanisms
that explain home bias. Though, the commonality of them is their disability
to reconcile the shares of home equity holdings observed in the real world.
However, a considerable number of these models - mainly partial equi-
librium models - ascertain inflation hedging or RER hedging term as an
inherent determining part of the equilibrium portfolio holding. This term
captures the relationship between RER changes of two countries (or, if there
is no nominal exchange rate changes, relative inflation), and equity excess
returns of a country relative to another country, i.e. relative returns. The
idea of the inflation hedging motive as a source of observed home bias was
initiated by Adler and Dumas (1983), who argued that "every investor in
the world holds a combination of the universal logarithmic portfolio..." and
"his personalized hedge portfolio which constitutes the best protection against
inflation" (p.21). Then, according to the partial equilibrium portfolio choice
literature, every investor would invest into the asset that gives him the high-
est return when domestic inflation is high. Given the striking feature of
domestically concentrated portfolio investment, we then should expect home
assets to be the best hedge against domestic inflation, which would be the
37Dellas and Stockman (1989), Baxter, Jerman and King (1998) and others.
38There is a large literature that tries to rationalize the portfolio home bias through a
variety of frictions aside from frictions on the goods market both in partial and general
equilibrium frameworks: costs in financial markets (Lewis (1996), Amadi and Bergin
(2006), Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2006)), price stickiness in product markets (Engel and
Matsumoto (2006, 2009a, 2009b)), asymmetric information in financial markets (Gehrig
(1993), Jeske (2001), Hatchondo (2005) and van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007)),
liquidity or short sales constraints (Michaelides (2003), DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer
(2004), Julliard (2004)) and weak investor rights concentrating ownership among insiders
(Kho et. al. (2006)).
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case when domestic returns and domestic inflation are positively correlated.
Or in other words, when comparing home to foreign country, positive RER
changes should be accompanied by positive domestic excess returns relative
to foreign ones.
In contrast, the aforementioned GE models have still not reached a
consensus on the sign of the correlation of domestic returns and inflation.
Though, the sign of this correlation is essential for the computation of equi-
librium portfolio holdings because it can result in home or foreign equity
bias. Nevertheless, while testing and/or calibrating their models, the GE
literature does not generally take into account, if at all, asset pricing im-
plications of the model and also - even more important - the correlation of
exchange rate changes and excess returns that could well be observed em-
pirically. The sign of RER hedging term depends rather on the nature of
underlying shocks or parameter values.
Given the importance of RER hedging in the portfolio determination and
certain inattentiveness of recent theoretical models with regard to it, the
main purpose of this chapter is to provide a robust empirical evidence on
the correlations of RER changes and excess returns. In so doing, I estimate
these correlations for industrial and emerging countries for the period 1982-
2007 and sub-periods. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first attempt
to compute correlation coefficients for a comprehensive number of countries
for different recent time periods.
The only related empirical work so far is the paper by van Wincoop
and Warnock (2010) (thereafter, VWW) which seeks to reconcile empirical
regularities on home bias in the GE approach. They explicitly calculate
the correlation of asset returns with RER fluctuations for the United States
versus the rest of the world. VWW argue that the computed RER hedging
term is very low and would in turn imply portfolio home bias close to zero.
In contrast, my results for industrial countries are rather mixed. While
for non-EMU countries inflation differentials and excess returns are positively
and highly significantly correlated, the EMU members exhibit correlation
coefficients that are not significantly different from nil. This result suggests
that RER hedging motive should not play any role in portfolio composition
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of EMU investors and vice versa for other industrial investors.39 Including
emerging countries into the sample does not change the picture a lot with
respect to industrial countries.40 Moreover, nearly all emerging countries
exhibit a positive and significant correlation of RER changes and relative
returns. This is an interesting and appealing result. It reveals that if in-
vestors beyond the EMU care about RER hedging, they may act differently
(compared to EMU investors) when investing into equities. Then, one of
the reasons for the observed home bias in equities should be - at least for
non-EMU countries - the demand for RER hedging.
This chapter makes two further important contributions. First, I ask the
question whether these estimated correlations of RER changes and excess
returns, that are supposed to be a good measure for RER hedge, are able
to explain the observed home equity holdings. The answer to this ques-
tion is an unambiguous yes: I find a very robust and significant effect of
RER hedging motive on domestic equity holdings. On the one hand, pos-
itive correlation of excess returns with RER changes increases holdings of
domestic equities. The effect of RER hedging on domestic equity holdings is
more pronounced among emerging countries in a longer-run perspective. On
the other hand, domestic equity holdings of industrial non-EMU countries
depends negatively on RER hedging term in the short-run.
According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) and Coeurdacier (2009), trade
costs, or trade barriers, in goods market can explain home bias in equity
holdings. Consequently, we should expect trade openness, that is an inverse
of trade costs, to be one of the determinants for the domestic equity hold-
ings: with higher trade costs in goods markets domestic markets are more
sheltered from competition with foreign countries which makes their returns
less volatile and domestic investors are more eager to hold domestic assets.
39This highly significant correlation for non-EMU and the lack of significance for EMU
countries could be driven by nominal exchange rate fluctuations. It might also be the case
that being in a monetary union does not force investors to care about RER hedging and
rather concentrate on returns volatility.
40Correlations are computed for each country k relative to the rest of the world (RoW),
where RoW consists of all countries in the sample exept of country k. Including emerg-
ing countries into the sample changes RoW, and thus, could also change the correlation
coefficient of each country with RoW.
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Thus, higher trade openness should induce lower domestic equity holdings. I
pursue this hypothesis in my work here and find that trade openness is more
important in the determination of domestic equity holdings in the short-run
than in the longer-run and especially for industrial countries. Furthermore,
my results from panel regression analysis reveal that RER hedging motive is
more pronounced in the countries that are more open to trade. Thus, we may
suggest that when economy becomes more open to trade and competition
with other countries increases, risk sharing through terms of trade decreases
so that incentive to share risk via foreign ownerships increases and the share
of domestic equities in portfolio falls.
Finally, I analyze how important financial openness is in the portfolio
formation. My last contribution is to show that there is a substantial het-
erogeneity in the role of financial openness in explaining the variation in
domestic equity holdings: in particular, EMU countries feature to some ex-
tent unexpected relation between financial openness and home equity hold-
ings. More financially open economies within the EMU hold more domestic
equities. This result contradicts the prevailing reasoning line.
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 lays out
the conceptual framework for the study, while section 3 addresses empirical
issues. So in section 3.1, I describe the data sources and how the main
variables are constructed. The analysis of the computed RER hedging terms
is presented in section 3.2. In section 3.3, I examine the central empirical
question of the chapter and ask whether computed RER hedging terms help
to explain home bias. This examination is conducted in two ways: cross-
sectional and panel estimations. Section 3.4 provides the insight on the
impact of trade and financial openness on portfolio determination. Section
4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The van Wincoop and Warnock model
The theoretical motivation for this chapter draws heavily on the model pro-
posed by van Wincoop and Warnock (2008) who develop a partial equilib-
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rium portfolio choice model. The distinctive feature of their model is that
it could be easily nested within GE models. But the rest of a GE model is
not relevant here because RERs and asset returns are observed and taken
directly from the data. Therefore they do not need to be determined by
market clearing conditions and any other optimality conditions.
Consider a static one-period framework, in which the only assets are
equities issued in both countries with nominal gross returns Rj , j = 1, 2.
The countries are identical and there is no differentiation between different
types of equity within a country. All asset returns, prices and inflation rates
are denoted in terms of the currency of country 1. The initial wealth of
country n's investors W¯ (n) can be invested with a fraction µj(n) in country
j's equity. Given inflation rate epi(n), the real portfolio return in country n
is then
Rp(n) = (µ1(n)R1 + (1− µ1(n))R2)e−pi(n) .
Country n's investors maximize the expected CRRA consumption utility
from the end of period wealth C(n) = Rp(n) · W¯ (n)
E
[
C(n)1−γ
1−γ
]
with respect to the share of portfolio invested at home,µj . The first order
condition for this optimal portfolio is given by
E(Rp(n))−γ(R1 −R2)e−pi(n) = 0 .
Taking logs and adopting a first-order log-lionization of the real portfolio
return yields41
rp(n) = µ1(n)r1 + (1− µ1(n))r2 − pi(n) .
41Lower-case letters denote log variables.
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After assuming normality of log returns and inflation and making some re-
arrangements we obtain the following optimal portfolio:
µ1(n) = λ+
γ−1
γ
cov(r1−r2,pi(n))
var(r1−r2)
It is obvious that the share of domestic equities in the optimal portfolio is
determined by two terms. The first λ = E(r1−r2)+0.5(var(r1)−var(r2))+γcov(r2−r1,r2)γvar(r1−r2)
is the "world market portfolio" or logarithmic portfolio according to the di-
versification motive, which depends on first and second moments of asset
returns. The second term describes the hedging motive against domestic in-
flation fluctuations. When g=1, investors have logarithmic preferences and
are not concerned about domestic inflation, so that the optimal portfolio is
given by λ. The share of domestic assets in portfolio would increase only
if domestic inflation and the relative domestic returns are positively corre-
lated. That would mean that domestic investors prefer domestic assets since
they give higher returns when the domestic inflation is higher and the RER
appreciates.
The optimal portfolio derived by VWW in a partial equilibrium frame-
work bears a striking resemblance to the equilibrium equity portfolio origi-
nated from Coeurdacier's (2009) general equilibrium model. In his specific
model domestic home equity holdings depend on the market portfolio (which
is 12 in his case) and on the hedging component due to RER fluctuations:
µ = 12
[
1 + γ−1γ
cov(Rˆ, ˆRER)
var(Rˆ)
]
,
where Rˆ denotes excess of home returns over foreign ones, ˆRER is real
exchange rate changes.
Both models suggest that covariance of RER changes and excess returns
is the key determinant of domestic equity holdings in the absence of PPP.
That is why I concentrate here on the computation of this covariance term for
a wide range of countries, and thus provide a basis for the parameterization
in GE models. This in turn will allow the GE literature to verify whether
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their models are consistent with the evidence on the properties of RERs and
excess returns. These new insights may point to potential adjustments to be
made in order to better explain home bias.
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Data
To compute the correlation of RER changes and excess return I use monthly
data for the period 1982-2007. Equity indexes converted into dollars include
capital gains and dividends as of month end and are from MSCI Barra. Con-
sumption price index (CPI) and nominal exchange rate (NER) are mea-
sured in national currency and national currency per US dollar respectively
and are from the IMF's IFS database. Stock market capitalization (SMC)
for a country is measured as the value of publicly traded equity listed on the
stock market exchanges and the data are from Standard & Poor's Global
Stock Markets Factbook 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005, 2006.
The excess return for country k, erk is calculated as the difference be-
tween the equity return in country k and the rest of the world (RoW ) equity
return. Formally,
erk = r
NCk
k − rNCkRoW,k ,
where rNCkk is the return on country k's equity expressed in currency of
country k. rNCkRoW,k is the RoW 's equity return in terms of national currency
of country k and is computed as a weighted sum of returns in the sample
except of return of country k. The weights (wj) are given by the relative stock
market capitalization of each country in the total stock market capitalization
of the given sample. Finally, to obtain the returns in the national currency
of country k, I multiply the dollar equity indexes (P $k ) of each country by
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the nominal exchange rate (national currency per US dollar) and then take
the first difference of their logs. So that
rNCkRoW,k =
∑N
j 6=k r
NCk
j · wj ,
wj =
SMCj∑N
j 6=kSMCj
,
rNCkj = Dlog(P
$
j ·NERj,$) .
The RER change of country k is given by country k's relative inflation,
i.e. inflation of country k minus inflation of the RoW (i.e. relative inflation),
both expressed in currency of country k,
Dqk = pi
NCk
k − piNCkRoW,k .
Inflation is calculated as a log first difference of CPI. To obtain CPI in
country j in terms of country k's currency I convert it first to US dollar by
dividing it by nominal exchange rate of country j and then multiply it by
nominal exchange rate of country k. The weighting scheme is identical to
the scheme used for returns.
piNCki = Dlog(CPI
NCk
k ) ,
CPINCkj = CPI
NCj
j
NERk,$
NERj,$
,
CPINCkRoW,k =
∑N
j 6=k CPI
NCk
j · wj .
As a measure for the share of domestic assets in portfolio I use the share
of domestic equity in portfolio (µ). The data on foreign equity holdings,
domestic equity held by foreigners are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
that have been updated up to 2007. "World market capitalization" is the
sum of the stock market capitalizations of the developed and emerging stock
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markets. The total equity portfolio of country k is market capitalization plus
foreign equity held minus the amount of country k's equity held by foreigners
calculated as the sum of country k's equity owned by other countries. The
share of domestic equity in portfolio (µ) is 1 minus the share of foreign equity
in portfolio calculated as a ratio of total foreign equity held by country over
the country's total equity portfolio
µk = 1− foreign equity held by k
k´s total equity in portfolio
,
= 1− foreign equity held by k
SMCk+foreign equity held by k− k´s equity held by foreigners ,
= 1− foreign equity held by k
SMCk+ k's assets− k´s liabilities .
As an indicator for trade openness I apply two different measures: the
first measure is trade shares in GDP (the sum of imports and exports over
GDP), that is a traditional and widely used concept in the empirical liter-
ature. The crucial shortcoming of this measure is based on the fact that it
is an outcome based measure that entails potential biased results. That is
why I use as an alternative a rule-based measure of trade openness, which is
Trade Freedom Index provided by the Heritage Foundation. Both measures
are denominated as TOo and TOr respectively. TOo is openness in constant
prices from Penn World Tables 6.3 and ranges from 1982 to 2007. TOr is
only available for the period 1995-2008. Trade Freedom Index is a composite
measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports
and exports of goods and services. Trade Freedom (as well as Financial
Freedom) is graded using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the
maximum freedom. A score of 100 signifies an economic environment or set
of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom.
The measurement of the extent of financial openness is a difficult and
challenging enterprise. There is a number of studies that have tried to cap-
ture the complexity of real world capital controls with varying degrees of
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success.42 While it is ambitious to say anything decisive about the actual
degree of financial openness for most countries, these indicators do share
some common features. First, all of them show a decreasing trend in fi-
nancial restrictions over the years, consistent with the belief of increased
globalization seen in the surge of cross-border financial flows. They also
suggest that more developed countries have been more financially open, con-
sistent with the belief that industrial countries interact more with the rest
of the world.
Here, I focus on two alternative measures FO1 and FO2 for financial
openness. FO2 is Heritage Foundation's Financial Freedom Index, available
from 1995 to 2008. Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well
as a measure of independence from government control. Heritage Foundation
scores Financial Freedom by determining the extent of government regulation
of financial services; the extent of state intervention in banks and other
financial services; the difficulty of opening and operating financial services
firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals); and government influence
on the allocation of credit.
FO1 is Chinn and Ito's (2006) "KAOPEN" index of "capital openness".
Chinn and Ito (2006) have standardized principal components of the major
categories of AREAER (presence of multiple exchange rates, current account
restrictions, capital account restrictions and requirement of the surrender of
export proceeds). This index is available for 181 countries from 1970 to 2007.
It takes on higher values the more open the country is to cross-border capital
transactions. The series has a mean of zero by construction.43
42Widely available measure of capital restrictions is IMF Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictons (AREAER). Though it is available for a large
set of countries since 1966, this is a dummy indicator and does not provide any informa-
tion about the intensity of the capital controls. Quinn (1997, 2003), Miniane (2004) and
Brune et. al. (2001) have modified IMF's AREAER. But these indices either have limited
coverage or are not publicly available. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) have con-
structed an index based on the data of equity market liberalization that is a 0/1 indicator.
Chinn and Ito (2006) have created an index measuring the extensity of capital controls
based on the IMF's AREAER. This index covers the largest available set of countries
and years. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) have developed an index based on domestic
financial sector liberalization, openness of the equity markets to foreign investment and
capital account restrictions. It is provided for 28 countries and ranges from 1973 to 2005.
43 Measures of de facto financial openness, like LaneMilesi-Ferretti data, are deliber-
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3.3.2 Real exchange rate hedging
I define the RER hedging term twofoldly. The first, more easily inter-
pretable, definition is a correlation of RER changes and excess returns. This
first measure is scale-invariant. The second one, acquired from GE models
of Coeurdacier (2009) and van Wincoop and Warnock (2008), is given by a
covariance-variance ratio: the covariance between the RER and the excess re-
turn on home relative to foreign equity, divided by the variance of the excess
return. I denote this term as beta further on. Both terms are computed for
every country k in my sample relative to the rest of the world. The rest of the
world is composed of an equity-market-capitalization-weighted combination
of countries in the sample except of country k. I conduct these computations
for two samples of countries. While the first sample consists only of indus-
trial countries for which the data are available from 1982,44 the second one
comprises industrial and emerging countries.45 By adopting different coun-
try samples I pursue two objectives. First, comparing RER hedging terms
for industrial countries in both samples I can appraise if including emerging
countries' equities into the portfolio of industrial countries significantly af-
fects the results. Second, I obtain the correlations and betas for an extended
sample of emerging countries, that - to the best of my knowledge - has not
been done before.
Table 3.1A gives the first insight how RER hedging terms for industrial
countries look like. Almost all of the estimated coefficients are positive. Sig-
nificant beta-coefficients vary between 0.05 for Hong Kong and 0.30 for the
UK. 46 Only 5 countries out of 17 exhibit negative correlation coefficients,
ately not employed in this analysis in order to avoid any bias in results.
44Industrial countries in the first sample are AUT, BEL, CAN, DNK, FRA, GER, HKG,
ITA, JPN, NLD, NOR, SGP, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR, USA. FIN, GRC and PRT are not
included in the first sample because the data for them are only available from 1988.
45Industrial countries are those mentioned in footnote 9 plus FIN, GRC and PRT.
Emerging countries are ARG, BRA, CHL, COL, CZE, EGY, HUN, IND, IDN, ISR, JOR,
KOR, MYS, MEX, MAR, PAK, PER, PHL, POL, RUS, ZAF, THA, TUR, VEN. However
the data for COL, CZE, EGY, HUN, IND, ISR, MAR, PAK, PER, POL, RUS, ZAF and
VEN are only available for 1995-2006.
46These results are consistent with VWW, who calculated the beta-coefficient only for
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though they are barely different from zero. This result contradicts the sug-
gestion made by Coeurdacier (2009) that this term should be negative in
standard cases. Moreover, he argues that, due to his calibration, the RER
hedging term could be positive but only for trade costs higher than 142%.
Such high trade costs can only be generated by a very high risk aversion or
by an elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods that is
lower than unity. Thus, given my estimations of the correlation of exchange
rate changes and excess returns, we should either assume that prevailing risk
aversion is high and/or elasticity of substitution is very low47 or make at-
tempt to modify the theoretical models in the way that they are consistent
with the empirical evidence.
The first row of Table 3.1A reveals another striking feature of the esti-
mated RER hedging terms: only non-EMU countries have statistically highly
significant correlation coefficients while for EMU countries these coefficients
are not significant. This result may be driven by the absence of nominal
exchange rate volatility across the EMU.
From Table 3.1B we obtain a flavor how the correlation of interest evolves
over time in five years intervals. For the period 1982-2002 I obtain very
similar results: almost all EMU countries have insignificant RER hedging
terms with few exceptions like Spain (1982-1987, 1993-1997), Italy (1982-
1987, 1993-1997) and France (1982-1987). However, in the period 2002-
2007 nearly all countries in this sample have positive and highly significant
correlations of RER changes and excess returns. It is noteworthy that in the
period 1997-2002 the variance of excess returns is significantly higher for the
majority of countries. This result is probably driven by the crisis that hit
industrial countries at the beginning of the 2000s.
The data for emerging countries is not complete. For some countries data
is available from 1988, for other it starts only with 1995. According to the
data availability, there are two samples of countries expanded with emerging
the US. Their coefficient is somewhat higher (0.3172) than mine (0.242). The difference in
time periods and countries sample(VWW 1988-2005, my 1982-2007) may be the reasons
for the discrepancy.
47Heathcote and Perri (2002) argue that this elasticity is slightly lower than one in
short-run estimates for the United States relative to the rest of the world.
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market countries. First, I add only countries for which the data is available
from 1988. I refer to this sample as "short" sample because it consists of
20 industrial and 11 emerging countries. This sample ranges from 1988 to
2007. The second sample is referred to as "full" sample and consists of 20
industrial and 24 emerging countries for the period 1995-2006. From Tables
3.2 A-C it is apparent that including emerging countries into the sample does
not change the results for industrial countries. It is still true irrespective of
countries and/or period sample that EMU countries feature insignificant
correlation coefficients of RER changes and excess returns. Notably, in the
short sample I obtain positive and highly significant results suggesting that
emerging countries do care about RER hedging. However, there are some
countries in the full sample which exhibit insignificant correlation coefficient.
The reason for this result might be due to the nature of shocks that these
countries have experienced or due to the quality of available data on equity
returns. Quinquennial analysis of the correlations for emerging countries
reveals that in the first five-years period only few countries-with only 10%
p-value-have statistically significant correlations. Emerging countries have
experienced the highest RER hedging term between 1998 and 2002.
In addition, since I use monthly data I also compute RER hedging terms
for every year, which will allow further panel data application. The annual
computed coefficients are not reported. Instead, I present the summary of
descriptive statistics of the results in Table 3.3. It is obvious that the coeffi-
cients of all but two countries could take both negative and positive values.
The largest negative values of the correlation lie between -0.8 and -0.7 for
HKG, POL, EGY, HUN, RUS and USA and the largest positive - around
0.9 for BRA, PHL, IND, SGP, TUR and COL. The results also reveal that
within 12 years between 1995 and 2006 there is no country that has correla-
tion coefficients that were continuously significant at least at the 10% level.
Countries whose correlation coefficient has never been statistically significant
are Germany and Finland. The volatility of the computed correlations is a
little bit higher for emerging markets.48 All in all, we see a lot of variability
in correlations between exchange rate changes and excess returns both across
48Two exceptions among industrial countries are the United States and Hong Kong.
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countries and across time.
3.3.3 Home bias and real exchange rate hedging
Given my estimated RER hedging terms, I ask the question whether
they can explain observed domestic equity holdings. In so doing, I run a
regression of domestic equity holdings on the computed RER hedging terms.
Since I have two different measures of RER hedging term - ρ(∆q, er) and
beta - I apply both of them in separate regressions. In addition, I also
run a regression where I include both ρ(∆q, er) and σer, which are the two
components of my second RER hedging term. This allows me to distinguish
between these two terms that may differently affect domestic equity holdings.
Whereas the first one measures the tendency of exchange rate changes and
excess returns to vary in the same direction and is supposed to have a positive
impact on domestic equity holdings, the second one captures the degree
of risk associated with holding domestic equities which increases with the
variances of both domestic and foreign equities and decreases with their
covariance.
I conduct my analysis in two steps: first I employ cross-country estima-
tions that will shed light on rather a long-run link between equity holdings
and RER hedging. Second, I also use panel estimations that helps underline
a short-run perspective of the relationship analyzed in this section.
Due to the data availability on equity holdings, I employ the RER hedging
terms computed in the short sample mentioned above - consisting of 20
industrial countries and 10 emerging countries.
Cross-country estimations
Table 3.4A and 3.4B provide the results of cross-country regressions of an
average of domestic equity holdings on the RER hedging term computed for
a particular time period. To see the development of this relationship I also
split the sample according to the country type and different sub-periods.
While Table 3.4 contains the results for the whole time period 1988-2007
and two sub-periods 1988-1997 and 1998-2007, Table 3.5 displays the results
for the 5-years-averages  1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1997-2002, 2003-2007. The
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regressions run for each particular specification is parametrized as follows
µ¯k = α0 + α1ρ
k + k ,
µ¯k = α0 + α1β
k + k ,
or
µ¯k = α0 + α1ρ
k + α2σ
k
er + 
k ,
where ρk is a correlation of exchange rate changes and excess returns, βk is a
covariance-variance ratio, i.e. cov(∆q,er)var(er) , σ
k
er is a variance of excess returns, µ¯
k
is a demeaned average of country k domestic equity holdings over a specified
time range, defined as
µ¯k = 1T
∑T
t=1 µ
k
t − 1K 1T
∑K
k=1
∑T
t=1 µ
k
t ,
with K and T number of countries and years in a sample respectively.
Panel A of Table 3.4A reveals that for all countries in the sample the
correlation of relative inflation and excess return seems to be a good deter-
minant of domestic equity holdings: higher correlation, i.e. high inflation in
country i implies high excess returns in this country, leads to higher domes-
tic equity holdings in the long perspective. This result is in line with Adler
and Dumas (1983), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2007) who suggested that RER hedging motive might be one of the poten-
tial explanations for home equity bias. Moreover, the higher volatility of
excess returns turns out to lead to higher domestic equity holdings, that is
a rather unexpected result. However, splitting the sample into sub-periods
reveals that in the period 1988-1997 only the riskiness of domestic returns,
σer, plays a significant role in the determination of domestic equity portfolio
suggesting that the results for the whole period are mainly driven by the
second sub-period.
Panels B and C reveal that the dependence of domestic equity holdings on
the volatility of returns is more pronounced in industrial countries, whereas
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for emerging countries the RER hedging motive plays a much more important
role in domestic holdings determination than the risk of holding domestic
equity.
The results presented in Table 3.4A are illustrated in Figure 3, which
displays the corresponding scatter plots.
Panel estimations
In this section I exploit the panel dimension of the data. The goal is to
better understand the short-run determinants by studying higher-frequency
shifts in domestic equity holdings. By controlling for country- and time-fixed
effects, I remove unobservable country and time characteristics to see which
of the determinants affect within-country shifts in µ.49
Table 3.5 provides the results. The panel dimension provides some new
insights. The most striking finding is that, the correlation term now exhibits
a negative coefficient. Holding fixed other factors, the value of µ decreases for
those countries that have experienced an increase in the correlation between
excess returns and exchange rate changes. Thus, in a short-run, investors do
not tend to care about RER hedging. It is also apparent, that for industrial
countries, and in particular for industrial non-EMU countries, this effect
is the strongest and highly significant. However, for emerging countries,
positive ρ increases domestic equity holdings, even in the short-run. Though,
this result is borderline insignificant.
In contrast to cross-sectional analysis, we see here that higher volatility
of domestic excess returns is clearly associated with less domestic equity in
portfolio. This is very intuitive result: short-run portfolio movements are in
fact mainly driven by the volatility of equity returns, i.e. equity's exposure to
risk. And again, this effect is more pronounced among industrial non-EMU
countries.
In addition, splitting the sample in two sub-periods reveals that, in the
all countries sample, the results with respect to ρ are rather driven by the
49To control for country- and time-fixed effects I remove cross-country and time means.
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second sub-period and with respect to σer in the first sub-period, where these
terms exhibits much more significant coefficients.
3.3.4 Introducing trade openness and financial openness
Cross-country estimations
According to the theory, trade openness should negatively affect domestic
equity holdings: falling trade barriers, i.e. progressing trade openness, is
supposed to reduce domestic equity holdings, because low trade barriers
imply higher competition for domestic firms which in turn increases volatility
of domestic equities returns. Thus, due to the risk aversion of domestic
investors, they would incline to hold more foreign and less home equities.
Table 3.6 provides the results after introducing trade openness into the
regression run above. The coefficient of both trade openness measures are
signed as expected: the more open is a country for trade, the less are holdings
in domestic equity. It is apparent that only rule based measure of trade
openness significantly affects the domestic equity holdings when used as the
only determinant. It is true for both measures of trade openness, though the
coefficient of the rule-based measure is much more statistically significant.
Adding the RER hedging term in form of correlation of RER changes and
excess returns into the regression does not change the effect of outcome-based
trade openness a lot, but it reduces the effect of rule-based measure of trade
openness. The effect of RER hedging terms remains significant throughout
all specifications.
The theoretical mechanism of the effect of trade openness on domes-
tic equity holdings works through volatility of cash-flows: since more open
countries are less sheltered from competition, they have more volatile cash-
flows, and thus their equity returns are also more volatile. This intuition
is supported by the next results where I also include the variance of excess
returns into the regression: the impact of trade openness on domestic equity
holdings becomes considerably reduced while variance of excess returns still
significantly bears on domestic equity in portfolio.
It is beyond dispute that financial openness negatively affects domestic
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equity holdings. Opening financial markets incites domestic investors to
invest abroad due to the enhanced investment possibilities and in search for
higher and less risky returns that induces more diversified portfolios.
I have repeated similar regressions for the financial openness measures,
FO1 and FO2. Table 3.7 reproduces all specifications from Table 3.6 but
with FO1 and FO2 as the independent variable. The results reveal that
both measures of financial openness indeed imply lower holdings of domestic
equities in portfolio in a cross-section analysis over the whole period between
1988 and 2007. Again, the inclusion of the measure of financial openness does
not change my results with respect to variation of domestic equity holdings
as a function of correlation of excess returns and exchange rate changes,
though. Moreover, adding volatility of excess returns into regression does
not affect significantly the explanatory power of financial openness.
Panel estimations
This section considers the impact of trade and financial openness on
domestic equity holdings in the panel estimation scope. To this end, it has
to be mentioned that the extent of time variation in the openness measures
is very limited. This problem especially affects the Economic Freedom Data
provided by Heritage Foundation. Thus, while interpreting the results in
this section we should take into account this drawback of the openness data.
Table 3.8A confirms that also in a shorter-run trade openness negatively
affects domestic equity holdings: countries that are more open to trade hold
less domestic equities. The results for outcome-based measure are more
significant in panel estimation procedure than in cross-section. In contrast to
cross-section, outcome-based measure of trade openness remains still highly
significant after introducing the variance of excess returns into regression.
However, the RER hedging term is not significant in all specifications. This
result may just reflect the fact, that in the panel estimations ρ(er,∆q) and
β have never been significant in the full sample of countries.
As presumed before, the rule-based measure of trade openness is likely
to be a bad determinant of domestic equity holdings in a shorter-run. Ta-
ble 3.8A also displays the results of the panel regression estimates without
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country fixed-effect. The regressions with country fixed effects are more
interpretable as reflecting year-by-year holding of home equities while the
results from regressions without country fixed effects are partly supposed
to reflect long-run portfolio holdings. Based on the results above, the in-
terpretation is that trade openness plays a much more important role as a
determinant of portfolio allocation in a longer run than in the short run.
Table 3.8B demonstrates the difference of the impact of trade openness on
industrial and emerging countries. It is obvious that for industrial countries
being more open to trade is much more important than for emerging coun-
tries. The effect of trade openness on equity holdings is borderline significant
at the conventional 5 percent level and of the same order of magnitude as it
was in the cross-section analysis. RER hedging and variance of excess returns
remain good predictors for domestic equity holdings only in a specification
with an outcome-based measure of trade openness. However, the most strik-
ing result concerns emerging countries. There is not any good determinant
of equity holdings in emerging countries in the short-run perspective.
To explore further the effect of trade openness on domestic equity hold-
ings, I add an interaction term of trade openness with RER hedging into
the panel regressions. The results of these estimations are summarized in
Tables 3.9A, 3.9B and 3.9C. The impact of trade openness on domestic eq-
uity holdings is amplified in countries where RER changes and excess returns
are positively correlated. Moreover, it is apparent from Table 3.9A that in
more open economies the effect of variance of excess return on the share of
domestic equity in portfolio is dampened. Tables 3.9B and 3.9C show that
regardless the country group the effect of RER hedging on equity holdings is
more pronounced in economies that are more open to trade. For industrial
countries both coefficients on ρ and ρ ∗ TO are positive. After becoming
more open, industrial countries, and in particular non-EMU countries, start
to take into account fluctuations in the real exchange rate when determin-
ing their portfolio holdings. These results may suggest that there are less
risk sharing possibilities through terms of trade when countries become more
open, so that they are forced to invest into foreign equity in order to achieve
a certain degree of risk sharing.
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Tables 3.10A, 3.10B and 3.10C consider the impact of financial openness
on holdings of domestic equity in portfolio. In the sample with all countries,
Table 3.10A, the estimated impact of FO1 on domestic equity holdings is
negative and significant in all specifications. For FO2, I find a significant
effect on equity holdings only when country fixed effects are not included. In
the specification with σer, we see some remarkable outcomes: the coefficient
on σer is negative and significant in the regression with FO1 and country
fixed effects, but surprisingly high and positive when country fixed effects
are not controlled for and FO2 is included.
In addition, it is noteworthy to examine if there are any differences in the
impact of financial openness on domestic equity holdings in emerging and
industrial countries. Table 3.10B uncovers that only in emerging countries
financial openness coherently and significantly determines domestic equity
holdings: the more open the country, the less domestic equity it holds. In
the industrial countries sample the results are rather odd: the coefficient
on FO2 is barely different from zero and the coefficient on FO1 is insignif-
icant but it is positively signed. Trying to explain this results, I split the
sample of industrial countries into two groups - see Table 3.10C - depending
on the membership in the EMU. Financial openness in these two groups af-
fects domestic equity holdings in two opposite directions: while in non-EMU
countries the effect is consistent with our reasoning, EMU countries exhibit
a positive and highly significant coefficient on FO1 which probably drives
the results for the whole sample of industrial countries. This is an inter-
esting and somewhat peculiar result. However, I do not attempt to more
systematically trace this question and give any interpretation to it.
Overall, the results for the impact of financial openness in the panel
estimations are roughly similar to those found in the cross-section. There
seems to be some tendency for financial openness to have quite different
effects within the EMU in comparison to other countries. Moreover, financial
openness is likely to be the only determinant of domestic equity holdings for
emerging countries in the shorter-run perspective.
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3.3.5 Home bias and labour income
There is a large literature focusing on the role of uninsurable idiosyncratic
risks for the portfolio composition.50 It emphasizes that in the presence of
background risksfrom labour income, proprietary income or real estate
individuals hold assets that provide them insurance. Building on this litera-
ture, several recent papers have argued that a large degree of observed home
bias is generated by non-tradeable income risk. Since labour income seems
to be "the most obvious source of background risk that is large and difficult
to insure or diversify",51 it affects the portfolio decision of workers/investors
because they seek to hedge it, and thus tend to hold assets that provide high
returns, when domestic non-tradeable assets (labour income) yield low re-
turns. Therefore, home bias or portfolio holdings depend on the correlation
between returns on domestic assets and payoffs on domestic non-tradeable
assets. And again, the sign of this correlation is crucial here: whereas do-
mestic labour earnings that are negatively correlated with domestic returns
offer a good hedge against labour income risk and imply home bias, positive
correlation results in foreign bias.52
These theoretical predictions have been repeatedly analyzed by diverse
studies both at the international and intranational levels. Bottazzi et al.
(1996) document negative correlation between wage and profit rates in most
OECD countries. Abowd (1989) finds a negative correlation using bargaining
unit wage data and NYSE stock returns. Davis and Willen (2000) estimate
the correlation between financial asset returns and labour income shocks
50see e.g. Heaton and Lucas (2000), Bottazzi, Pesenti and vanWincoop (1996), Palacios-
Huerta (2001), Julliard (2003 and 2004), Engel and Matsumoto (2006), Coeurdacier, Mar-
tin and Kollmann (2010).
51Heaton and Lucas (2000), p.5.
52However, there also exists another line of reasoning that assert exactly converse in-
tuition: if labour income is more correlated with domestic equity returns than with the
foreign ones, then foreign equities provide better insurance against labour income risk and
negative correlation of domestic returns and domestic wages entails foreign bias. Cole
(1988), Brainard and Tobin (1992), Baxter and Jermann (1997) suggest this mechanism.
This financial risk hedging motive becomes more important than the income risk hedging
motive only when the ratio of liquid wealth to labour income is sufficiently high. But, this
rationale has not found any strong support from the empirical studies on labour income
and asset returns. That is why I do not track this intuition.
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for various sex-education groups. This correlation ranges from -0.25 for the
least educated men to 0.25 for college-educated women. For men with less
than a college education and certain educational groups of women, labor in-
come shocks covary negatively with own-industry equity returns. Moreover,
Gali (1999), Rotemberg (2003) and Francis and Ramsey (2004) also find a
negative correlation between labour hours and productivity.
To explore this additional source of home bias emanating from the labour
income risk hedging motive, I estimate correlation coefficients between real-
tive wages and excess returns (ρ(ω, σer) . I refer to this correlation as labour
income hedging term. The computational procedure is similar to that on in-
flation hedging term. The relative wage in country k, ωk is calculated as the
difference between the wage in country k and the rest of the world (RoW )
wage ωk = w
NCk
k − wNCkRoW,k ,where wNCkk is the horly compensation costs of
production worker in country k expressed in currency of country k.
Using data for 16 industrial countries from 1982 to 2006,53 I found that
for ten countries this correlation is negative. However, there is no coefficient
significant at least at the 10% level.54 However, it should be mentioned at
this point that the data on wages by its nature is much less volatile than
the data on equity returns and even the data on prices. Thus, measuring
correlation of wages with returns captures long run co-movements.
That is why it is only reasonable to examine the role of labour income
hedge on home bias in the cross-sectional analysis. In so doing, I estimate a
cross-section OLS regression
53The same data sample as it was used for the estimation of inflation hedging across
industrial countries except of Germany. Data on wages for Germany is only available from
1993. The data on wages is comparative hourly compensation costs in national currencies
for production workers in manufacturing and is from the International Labor Comparisons.
54For the period 1982-2006 the correlation coefficients are -0.01 (AUT) , -0.02 (BEL),
-0.00 (CAN), -0.10 (DNK), 0.26 (FRA), -0.03 (HKG), -0.16 (ITA), -0.16 (JPN), -0.06
(NLD), 0.08 (NOR), -0.07 (SGP), 0.00 (ESP), 0.18 (SWE), 0.08 (CHE), 0.19 (GBR), -0.23
(USA). The correlation coefficients are estimated relative to the RoW . The correlations
computed for the period 1988-2006 and employed in the cross-section analysis are -0.00
(AUT) , 0.27 (BEL), 0.11 (CAN), 0.13 (DNK), -0.39 (FIN), 0.23 (FRA), 0.25 (GRC),
-0.24 (HKG), -0.10 (ITA), 0.19 (JPN), 0.36 (NLD), 0.29 (NOR), 0.41 (PRT), -0.47 (SGP),
0.22 (ESP), 0.20 (SWE), 0.29 (CHE), 0.19 (GBR), 0.07 (USA). The amendment of the
country sample is made in order to obtain comparable results in the cross-section.
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µ¯k = α0 + α1ρ
k(ω, σer) + 
k .
For the period 1988-2006, I found that α1is -0.04 but not statistically sig-
nificant55. This result is consistent with the theory predictions: countries,
where labour income negatively co-varies with equity returns, hold more do-
mestic equities, because they potentially provide better hedge aginst labour
income risk.
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this section I compute two alternative RER hedging terms proposed
by the theoretical literature for an extended sample of countries. Correlation
coefficients of exchange rate changes and excess returns seem to be positive
and highly significant for the majority of countries in the sample. The only
exception are EMU-countries that exhibit correlation coefficients that are
not significantly different from nil.
Moreover, estimated RER hedging terms have proven to be a good de-
terminant of domestic equity holdings. This result corroborates Obstfeld
and Rogoff's (2006) suggestion, though it is at odds with Cooper and Ka-
planis (1994) and van Wincoop and Warnock (2008) outcomes. Thus, the
results point out that the RER hedging motive does matter for investors
while building their portfolios.
On the one hand, a higher correlation of RER changes with excess re-
turns implies higher holdings of domestic equity in the long run. Whereas
RER hedging is especially important for emerging countries, for industrial
countries volatility of returns does matter for equity holdings determination.
On the other hand, in the short run RER hedging motive lowers domestic
equity holdings, and this effect plays a significant role solely in industrial
non-EMU countries.
In addition, I have also examined whether trade openness and financial
55I obtained the results of the same magnitude for the period 1982-2006 and also using
correlation coefficients estimated by Bottazzi et al. (1996).
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openness help explain home equity bias. As expected, trade openness de-
creases holdings of domestic equities in portfolio. Moreover, trade openness
amplifies the incentive to hedge against RER fluctuations. Though financial
openness lowers domestic equity holdings, it does not affect the impact of
RER hedging on portfolio determination.
This chapter focuses on macro-level covariations and their role in the
portfolio determination. I believe that this contributes to many theoretical
papers that aim at identifying the underlying structural determinants of
home bias.
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Appendix
Table 3.1A: Real Exchange Rate Hedging Term: Industrial Countries, 1982-2007
Country ρ(∆q, er) β σer
AUT -0.061 -0.141 0.0210
BEL -0.045 -0.202 0.0425
CAN 0.263*** 0.189*** 0.0007
DNK 0.166*** 0.118*** 0.0010
FRA 0.070 0.192 0.0114
GER 0.066 0.062 0.0021
HKG 0.158*** 0.048*** 0.0006
ITA -0.060 -0.453 0.1813
JPN 0.489*** 0.247*** 0.0010
NLD -0.028 -0.039 0.0026
NOR 0.136** 0.076** 0.0010
SGP 0.241*** 0.094*** 0.0006
ESP -0.015 -0.067 0.0822
SWE 0.087 0.053 0.0011
CHE 0.248*** 0.224*** 0.0012
GBR 0.296*** 0.304*** 0.0013
USA 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.0017
corr(∆q, er) denotes a correlation of real exchange rate changes and excess returns. β is a
beta-coefficient of the time-series OLS regression of real exchange rate changes on excess
returns, that formally equals to cov(er,∆q)
σer
. σer is a variance of excess returns. All terms
are computed for every country k in the sample relative to the rest of the world. The
rest of the world is composed of an equity-market-capitalization-weighted combination of
countries in the sample except of country k.
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Table 3.2A: Real Exchange Rate Hedging Term: All Countries
1988-2007 1995-2006
Country ρ(∆q, er) β σer ρ(∆q, er) β σer
AUT -0.077 -0.214 0.0035 -0.105 -0.449 0.0023
BEL -0.054 -0.323 0.0015 -0.080 -0.568 0.0016
CAN 0.306*** 0.237*** 0.0012 0.293*** 0.208*** 0.0010
DNK 0.175*** 0.126*** 0.0016 0.188** 0.134** 0.0013
FIN 0.066 0.098 0.0057 0.078 0.141 0.0067
FRA 0.039 0.127 0.0014 0.066 0.354 0.0009
GER 0.067 0.071 0.0020 0.078 0.108 0.0015
GRC -0.059 -0.250 0.0079 -0.085 -0.546 0.0052
HKG 0.003 0.001 0.0038 0.014 0.006 0.0037
ITA -0.078 -0.718 0.0028 -0.131 -1.715 0.0022
JPN 0.457*** 0.244*** 0.0033 0.436*** 0.299*** 0.0026
NLD -0.060 -0.104 0.0009 -0.144* -0.292* 0.0010
NOR 0.154** 0.086** 0.0027 0.328*** 0.187*** 0.0022
PRT 0.047 0.293 0.0029 0.045 0.413 0.0024
SGP 0.306*** 0.133*** 0.0029 0.501*** 0.198*** 0.0036
ESP -0.039 -0.306 0.0017 -0.078 -0.706 0.0015
SWE 0.137** 0.089** 0.0024 0.235*** 0.129*** 0.0024
CHE 0.359*** 0.312*** 0.0013 0.4566*** 0.381*** 0.0013
GBR 0.303*** 0.340*** 0.0009 0.408*** 0.479*** 0.0006
USA 0.190*** 0.209*** 0.0013 -0.026 -0.041 0.0008
ARG 0.086 0.086 0.0208 0.348*** 0.185*** 0.0107
BRA 0.184*** 0.0816*** 0.0224 0.616*** 0.446*** 0.0091
CHL 0.233*** 0.099*** 0.0042 0.312*** 0.168*** 0.0028
COL 0.222*** 0.080*** 0.0093
CZE 0.366*** 0.155*** 0.0060
EGY -0.032 -0.014 0.0077
HUN 0.206*** 0.060** 0.0076
IND 0.071 0.023 0.0060
IDN 0.4863*** 0.2880*** 0.0182 0.629*** 0.466*** 0.0187
ISR 0.243*** 0.094*** 0.0036
JOR 0.1192** 0.0472** 0.0039 0.064 0.021 0.0039
KOR 0.5163*** 0.2174*** 0.0092 0.599*** 0.265*** 0.0115
MYS 0.3459*** 0.1328*** 0.0063 0.467*** 0.183*** 0.0080
MEX 0.4736*** 0.2687*** 0.0067 0.466*** 0.257*** 0.0049
MAR 0.139* 0.050 0.0039
PAK 0.085 0.021 0.0136
PER 0.160* 0.047* 0.0058
PHL 0.3730*** 0.1422*** 0.0073 0.549*** 0.209*** 0.0074
POL 0.347*** 0.118*** 0.0080
RUS -0.020 -0.015 0.0043
ZAF 0.051 0.024 0.0103
THA 0.2454*** 0.0856*** 0.0104 0.296*** 0.114*** 0.0127
TUR 0.3258*** 0.0972*** 0.0253 0.406*** 0.135*** 0.0216
VEN 0.017 0.010 0.0173
see notes to table 3.1A.
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Table 3.2B: Real Exchange Rate Hedging Term: All Countries, decennial
1988-1997 1998-2007
Country ρ(∆q, er) β σer ρ(∆q, er) β σer
AUT -0.038 -0.016 0.0046 0.138 -0.597 0.0023
BEL 0.218** 0.200** 0.0013 -0.090 -0.657 0.0018
CAN 0.256*** 0.226*** 0.0012 0.364*** 0.243*** 0.0011
DNK 0.131 0.092 0.0020 0.262*** 0.160*** 0.0013
FIN 0.022 0.016 0.0045 0.075 0.155 0.0069
FRA 0.050 0.036 0.0020 0.057 0.385 0.0008
GER 0.084 0.058 0.0024 0.062 0.092 0.0015
GRC -0.106 -0.037 0.0103 -0.093 -0.624 0.0055
HKG 0.023 0.011 0.0043 -0.045 -0.015 0.0033
ITA 0.175* 0.101** 0.0039 0.163* -2.633* 0.0017
JPN 0.535*** 0.235*** 0.0043 0.388*** 0.261*** 0.0023
NLD 0.229** 0.251** 0.0008 -0.185** -0.381** 0.0010
NOR 0.040 0.023 0.0030 0.322*** 0.164*** 0.0023
PRT 0.209** 0.124** 0.0033 0.050 0.475 0.0025
SGP 0.084 0.049 0.0020 0.535*** 0.178*** 0.0038
ESP 0.290*** 0.235*** 0.0020 -0.098 -1.061 0.0013
SWE 0.089 0.062 0.0023 0.227** 0.104** 0.0025
CHE 0.323*** 0.292*** 0.0014 0.443*** 0.323*** 0.0011
GBR 0.261*** 0.305*** 0.0012 0.429*** 0.416*** 0.0006
USA 0.248*** 0.218** 0.0019 0.089 0.159 0.0006
ARG 0.032 0.038 0.0299 0.379*** 0.211*** 0.0116
BRA -0.140 -0.040 0.0351 0.686*** 0.529*** 0.0096
CHL 0.178* 0.066* 0.0055 0.316*** 0.160*** 0.0028
IDN 0.293*** 0.080*** 0.0184 0.630*** 0.502*** 0.0180
JOR 0.179** 0.110** 0.0032 0.031 0.006 0.0046
KOR 0.518*** 0.263*** 0.0082 0.510*** 0.178*** 0.0098
MYS 0.254*** 0.111*** 0.0053 0.417*** 0.150*** 0.0074
MEX 0.490*** 0.287*** 0.0099 0.422*** 0.203*** 0.0036
PHL 0.227** 0.094** 0.0078 0.580*** 0.199*** 0.0068
THA 0.183** 0.072** 0.0094 0.293*** 0.098*** 0.0115
TUR 0.155* 0.039* 0.0288 0.501*** 0.176*** 0.0218
see notes to table 3.1A.
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Table 3.2C: Real Exchange Rate Hedging Term: All Countries, quinquennial
1988-1992 1993-1997
Country ρ(∆q, er) β σer ρ(∆q, er) β σer
AUT -0.112 -0.047 0.0077 0.132 0.132 0.0015
BEL 0.228* 0.180* 0.0018 0.210 0.248 0.0007
CAN 0.285** 0.245** 0.0017 0.197 0.185 0.0008
DNK 0.097 0.063 0.0024 0.179 0.140 0.0015
FIN -0.314** -0.143** 0.0043 0.350*** 0.179** 0.0043
FRA 0.051 0.026 0.0028 0.045 0.060 0.0012
GER 0.070 0.043 0.0034 0.111 0.094 0.0014
GRC -0.075 -0.021 0.0175 -0.207 -0.120 0.0033
HKG -0.021 -0.002 0.0034 0.064 0.019 0.0052
ITA 0.098 0.070 0.0034 0.253* 0.125** 0.0044
JPN 0.551*** 0.191*** 0.0049 0.544*** 0.291*** 0.0038
NLD 0.205 0.215 0.0010 0.270** 0.317* 0.0005
NOR -0.113 -0.058 0.0043 0.308** 0.218** 0.0018
PRT 0.297** 0.136** 0.0041 0.163 0.103 0.0024
SGP -0.070 -0.047 0.0015 0.189 0.107* 0.0025
ESP 0.094 0.078 0.0019 0.487*** 0.377*** 0.0021
SWE -0.195 -0.150 0.0024 0.386*** 0.298*** 0.0021
CHE 0.246* 0.211* 0.0016 0.404*** 0.385*** 0.0013
GBR 0.233* 0.253* 0.0016 0.311** 0.408** 0.0008
USA 0.413*** 0.400*** 0.0026 -0.203 -0.185* 0.0012
ARG 0.030 0.042 0.0543 -0.008 -0.002 0.0055
BRA -0.218* -0.062* 0.0612 0.314** 0.100** 0.0096
CHL 0.079 0.028 0.0070 0.332*** 0.145*** 0.0036
IDN -0.002 -0.003 0.0242 0.590*** 0.240*** 0.0121
JOR 0.222* 0.139* 0.0041 0.108 0.060 0.0023
KOR 0.244* 0.093* 0.0070 0.654*** 0.381*** 0.0091
MYS 0.119 0.053 0.0027 0.312** 0.130*** 0.0076
MEX 0.214* 0.111** 0.0087 0.643*** 0.464*** 0.0100
PHL 0.095 0.041 0.0069 0.323** 0.137*** 0.0084
THA 0.073 0.019 0.0063 0.199 0.099** 0.0113
TUR 0.014 0.002 0.0345 0.290** 0.091** 0.0236
see notes to table 3.1A.
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Table 3.2C: continued
1998-2002 2003-2007
Country ρ(∆q, er) β σer ρ(∆q, er) β σer
AUT -0.146 -0.780 0.0037 0.121 0.086 0.0009
BEL -0.102 -0.892 0.0029 0.338*** 0.192*** 0.0008
CAN 0.146 0.075 0.0015 0.652*** 0.558*** 0.0008
DNK 0.286** 0.184** 0.0018 0.147 0.104 0.0007
FIN 0.077 0.190 0.0110 0.036 0.013 0.0028
FRA 0.052 0.405 0.0012 0.343*** 0.314*** 0.0003
GER 0.057 0.072 0.0022 0.226* 0.143** 0.0008
GRC -0.091 -0.735 0.0092 -0.119 -0.027 0.0016
HKG -0.055 -0.012 0.0051 -0.041 -0.029 0.0014
ITA -0.189 -3.399 0.0027 0.487*** 0.289*** 0.0007
JPN 0.370*** 0.276*** 0.0030 0.462*** 0.234*** 0.0017
NLD -0.228* -0.542* 0.0016 0.155 0.116 0.0005
NOR 0.280** 0.131** 0.0027 0.378*** 0.210*** 0.0018
PRT 0.063 0.572 0.0037 0.337*** 0.166*** 0.0012
SGP 0.559*** 0.179*** 0.0068 0.392*** 0.170*** 0.0007
ESP -0.106 -1.454 0.0021 0.267** 0.213*** 0.0006
SWE 0.126 0.050 0.0040 0.439*** 0.322*** 0.0010
CHE 0.476*** 0.323*** 0.0019 0.345*** 0.327*** 0.0004
GBR 0.415*** 0.401*** 0.0008 0.459*** 0.453*** 0.0003
USA -0.015 -0.025 0.0009 0.390*** 0.549*** 0.0003
ARG 0.404*** 0.262*** 0.0167 0.167 0.063 0.0058
BRA 0.700*** 0.581*** 0.0143 0.574*** 0.371*** 0.0042
CHL 0.248* 0.126** 0.0040 0.383*** 0.257*** 0.0013
IDN 0.655*** 0.550*** 0.0312 0.441*** 0.177*** 0.0043
JOR -0.099 -0.028 0.0041 0.181 0.035 0.0051
KOR 0.502*** 0.174*** 0.0169 0.556*** 0.205*** 0.0024
MYS 0.433*** 0.154*** 0.0133 0.286** 0.111** 0.0014
MEX 0.420*** 0.190*** 0.0057 0.468*** 0.255*** 0.0013
PHL 0.601*** 0.211*** 0.0099 0.474*** 0.163*** 0.0033
THA 0.295** 0.102** 0.0196 0.271** 0.074** 0.0033
TUR 0.424*** 0.141*** 0.0327 0.689*** 0.289*** 0.0102
see notes to table 3.1A.
Appendix 89
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics Summary of annual estimated ρ(∆q, er)
country min max std # PV≤.1 country min max std # PV≤.1
Industrial Emerging
AUT -0.33 0.62 0.33 4 ARG -0.37 0.71 0.32 1
BEL -0.30 0.72 0.33 4 BRA -0.57 0.92 0.43 7
CAN -0.23 0.82 0.35 3 CHL -0.19 0.69 0.29 3
DNK -0.25 0.80 0.31 3 COL -0.30 0.85 0.37 1
FIN -0.25 0.46 0.25 0 CZE -0.06 0.68 0.24 2
FRA -0.44 0.60 0.30 5 EGY -0.77 0.80 0.51 6
GER -0.11 0.47 0.16 0 HUN -0.75 0.79 0.50 7
GRC -0.61 0.50 0.33 2 IND -0.50 0.55 0.35 2
HKG -0.82 0.53 0.42 3 IDN -0.38 0.89 0.35 7
ITA -0.43 0.67 0.37 4 ISR -0.53 0.76 0.34 3
JPN -0.37 0.84 0.33 5 JOR -0.45 0.51 0.29 1
NLD -0.66 0.76 0.39 4 KOR -0.04 0.75 0.21 5
NOR -0.21 0.66 0.28 5 MYS -0.24 0.72 0.28 1
PRT -0.11 0.70 0.30 4 MEX 0.04 0.69 0.19 7
SGP -0.31 0.86 0.30 6 MAR -0.20 0.58 0.25 1
ESP -0.38 0.62 0.33 2 PAK -0.33 0.58 0.31 1
SWE -0.25 0.79 0.29 3 PER -0.34 0.70 0.31 2
CHE 0.02 0.79 0.22 4 PHL -0.15 0.91 0.31 7
GBR 0.15 0.81 0.25 5 POL -0.80 0.76 0.44 8
USA -0.73 0.66 0.49 3 RUS -0.74 0.20 0.27 1
ZAF -0.53 0.45 0.26 1
THA -0.36 0.74 0.38 5
TUR -0.61 0.86 0.55 7
VEN -0.50 0.66 0.38 2
The table reports descriptive statistics of annual correlation of exchange rate changes and excess
returns computed from the monthly data for the period 1995-2006.
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Table 3.4A: Domestic Equity Holdings and Real Exchange Rate Hedging,
Cross-Section
Panel A: All countries
κk 88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.14 -0.31 0.07
(1.28) (-1.76) (1.25)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.35 0.25 0.05 0.12 0.33 0.14
(2.79) (2.19) (0.37) (1.04) (2.72) (1.14)
σer 9.83 5.24 17.70
(3.12) (2.46) (2.86)
R2 0.22 0.06 0.43 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.39
Panel B: Industrial countries
88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.03 -0.35 0.00
(0.29) (-1.87) (0.06)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.06 0.16 -0.10 0.11 -0.04 -0.02
(0.32) (1.00) (-0.60) (0.72) (-0.22) (-0.15)
σer 36.45 30.16 14.80
(2.41) (2.72) (0.64)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.16 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.03
Panel C: Emerging countries
88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.11 0.09 0.09
(0.51) (0.50) (0.64)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.18 0.20 0.06 -0.03 0.22 0.17
(1.70) (1.60) (0.71) (-0.28) (1.50) (1.08)
σer 0.60 -2.37 3.44
(0.27) (-1.14) (1.00)
R2 0.27 0.03 0.27 0.06 0.03 0.21 0.22 0.05 0.32
The table reports the results of cross-country OLS regressions of the form µ¯k = α0 + α1κ
k + k
for different country samples and for the time period 1988-2007 and two sub-periods 1988-1997
and 1998-2007. µk denotes demeaned state-average of domestic equity holdings. κk contains state-
specific RER hedging terms listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q) is a correlation between excess
returns and real exchange rate changes. β denotes beta-coefficient in the time-series regression of
real exchange rate changes on excess returns estimated for every state k, it is formally equal to
cov(er,∆q)
σer
. σer denotes a variance of excess retuns. Constants α0 are not reported. T-statistics are
in parenthesis.
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Table 3.5: Domestic Equity Holdings and Real Exchange Rate Hedging,
Panel
All countries
κkt 88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.85) (-0.64) (0.52)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.12) (-1.22) (-0.94) (-1.19) (-1.88) (-1.71)
σer -0.87 -0.53 -0.55
(-3.13) (-2.86) (-1.31)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.012 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02
Industrial countries
88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.50) (-0.19) (0.88)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(-2.44) (-2.70) (-0.44) (-0.57) (-1.43) (-1.434)
σer -2.17 -0.84 -0.25
(-1.99) (-1.10) (-0.18)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Emerging countries
88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.02 0.04 0.00
(1.31) (1.47) (0.11)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(1.55) (1.52) (0.84) (0.72) (0.17) (-0.04)
σer -0.18 -0.29 0.23
(-1.06) (-1.53) (0.97)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
The table reports the results of panel OLS regressions of the form µkt = α0 +α1κ
k
t + 
k
t for different
country samples and for the time period 1988-2007 and two sub-periods 1988-1997 and 1998-2007.
Regressions are estimated using annual data. µkt denotes domestic equity holdings. κ
k
t contains
RER hedging terms listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q) is a correlation between excess returns and
real exchange rate changes. β denotes beta-coefficient in the time-series regression of real exchange
rate changes on excess returns estimated for every state k and each year, it is formally equal to
cov(er,∆q)
σer
. σer denotes a variance of excess retuns. Real exchange rate hedging terms are computed
using monthly data. Constants α0 are not reported. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.5: Domestic Equity Holdings and Real Exchange Rate Hedging,
Panel, continued
EMU countries
κkt 88-07 88-97 98-07
β 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.70) (-0.72) (0.92)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(-1.21) ( -1.38) (-0.74) (-0.89) (-1.06) (-1.07)
σer -1.58 -0.84 -0.31
(-1.12) (-0.92) (-0.14)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Non-EMU countries
88-07 88-97 98-07
β -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(-0.69) (0.38) (-0.11)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.64) (-2.76) (-0.01) (0.00) (-1.25) (-1.24)
σer -3.97 -0.62 -0.05
(-2.02) (-0.33) (-0.04)
R2 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
The table reports the results of panel OLS regressions of the form µkt = α0 +α1κ
k
t + 
k
t for different
country samples and for the time period 1988-2007 and two sub-periods 1988-1997 and 1998-2007.
Regressions are estimated using annual data. µkt denotes domestic equity holdings. κ
k
t contains
RER hedging terms listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q) is a correlation between excess returns and
real exchange rate changes. β denotes beta-coefficient in the time-series regression of real exchange
rate changes on excess returns estimated for every state k and each year, it is formally equal to
cov(er,∆q)
σer
. σer denotes a variance of excess retuns. Real exchange rate hedging terms are computed
using monthly data. Constants α0 are not reported. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.6: Domestic Equity Holdings, Real Exchange Rate Hedging and
Trade Openness, Cross-Section
κk All countries, 88-07
β 0.18 0.15
(1.67) (1.45)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.40 0.35 0.31 0.28
(3.44) (2.87) (2.81) (2.48)
σer 7.89 7.87
(2.58) (2.52)
TOo*100 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(-1.37) (-1.48) (-1.32) (-1.06)
TOr*100 -0.43 -0.26 -0.38 -0.15
(-2.17) (-1.42) (-1.93) (-0.87)
R2 0.07 0.15 0.36 0.35 0.16 0.21 0.49 0.49
The table reports the results of cross-country OLS regressions of the form µ¯k = α0 + α1κ
k + k
for the time period 1988-2007 and the full country sample. µk denotes demeaned state-average
of domestic equity holdings. κk contains state-specific RER hedging terms and trade openness
measures listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q) is a correlation between excess returns and real
exchange rate changes. β denotes beta-coefficient in the time-series regression of real exchange rate
changes on excess returns estimated for every state k, it is formally equal to cov(er,∆q)
σer
. σer denotes
a variance of excess retuns. TOo=
Imp+Exp
GDP
, TOr=TradeFreedom. Constants α0 are not reported.
T-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.7: Domestic Equity Holdings, Real Exchange Rate Hedging and
Financial Openness, Cross-Section
κk All countries (w/o CHE), 88-07
β 0.16 0.13
(1.95) (1.34)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.24
(2.75) (2.39) (2.63) (2.18)
σer 2.10 6.36
(0.55) (2.06)
FO1 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06
(-4.61) (-3.97) (-4.69) (-2.44)
FO2 -0.0048 -0.0036 -0.0045 -0.0025
(-3.71) (-2.71) (-3.44) (-1.89)
R2 0.44 0.34 0.57 0.46 0.51 0.38 0.57 0.54
The table reports the results of cross-country OLS regressions of the form µ¯k = α0+α1κ
k+k for the
time period 1988-2007 and the full country sample. µk denotes demeaned state-average of domestic
equity holdings. κk contains state-specific RER hedging terms and financial openness measures
listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q) is a correlation between excess returns and real exchange rate
changes. β denotes beta-coefficient in the time-series regression of real exchange rate changes on
excess returns estimated for every state k, it is formally equal to cov(er,∆q)
σer
. σer denotes a variance
of excess retuns. FOk1=KAOPEN provided by Chinn and Ito, FO
k
2 = FinancialFreedom from
Heritage Foundation. Constants α0 are not reported. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.10B: Domestic Equity Holdings, Real Exchange Rate Hedging and
Financial Openness, Panel
κkt Industrial countries
β 0.00 0.00
(0.45) (0.99)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(-2.64) (-0.96) (-2.87) (-1.01)
σer -2.09 -0.77
(-1.88) (-0.52)
FO1*100 1.01 1.12 1.01 0.94
(1.36) (1.51) (1.36) (1.26)
FO2*100 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.23) (0.22) (0.29) (0.16)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01
Obs. 380 240 380 240 380 240 380 240
κkt Emerging countries
β 0.02 -0.00
(1.61) (-0.16)
ρ(er,∆q) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1.31) (0.43) (1.24) (0.19)
σer -0.31 0.23
(-1.89) (0.92)
FO1*100 -1.43 -1.41 -1.46 -1.50
(-4.8) (-4.72) (-4.90) (-4.99)
FO2*100 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1.31) (1.33) (1.31) (1.32)
R2 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.02
Obs. 200 120 200 120 200 120 200 120
The table reports the results of panel OLS regressions of the form µ¯t
k = α0 +α1κ
k
t + τt +
δk + kt for the time period 1988-2007 and for different country samples. Regressions are
estimated using annual data. µkt denotes domestic equity holdings. κ
k
t contains RER hedg-
ing terms and financial openness measures, that are listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q)
is a correlation between excess returns and real exchange rate changes. β denotes beta-
coefficient in the time-series regression of real exchange rate changes on excess returns
estimated for every state k and each year, it is formally equal to cov(er,∆q)
σer
. Real ex-
change rate hedging terms are computed using monthly data.FOk,t1 =KAOPEN provided
by Chinn and Ito, FOk,t2 = FinancialFreedom from Heritage Foundation. In specifica-
tions with FOk,t1 the data range from 1988 to 2007 and CHE is excluded and with FO
k,t
2
from 1996 to 2007 due to the data availability. Constants α0 are not reported. T-statistics
are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.10C: Domestic Equity Holdings, Real Exchange Rate Hedging and
Financial Openness, Panel
κkt EMU countries
β 0.00 0.00
(0.74) (1.01)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.10) (-0.71) (-1.22) (-0.73)
σer -1.07 -0.45
(-0.77) (-0.20)
FO1*100 3.61 3.56 3.62 3.46
(3.31) (3.27) (3.31) (3.15)
FO2*100 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06
(0.68) (0.59) (0.80) (0.53)
R2 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
Obs. 200 120 200 120 200 120 380 120
κkt Industrial non-EMU countries
β -0.01 0.01
(-0.35) (0.78)
ρ(er,∆q) -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(-2.28) (-0.57) (-2.41) (-0.59)
σer -4.90 -0.85
(-2.51) (-0.50)
FO1*100 -4.30 -3.86 -4.25 -4.13
(-3.75) (-3.35) (-3.66) (-3.63)
FO2*100 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
(-1.03) (-0.96) (-1.13) (-0.93)
R2 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.01
Obs. 180 120 180 120 180 120 180 120
The table reports the results of panel OLS regressions of the form µ¯t
k = α0 +α1κ
k
t + τt +
δk + kt for the time period 1988-2007 and for different country samples. Regressions are
estimated using annual data. µkt denotes domestic equity holdings. κ
k
t contains RER hedg-
ing terms and financial openness measures, that are listed in the first column. ρ(er,∆q)
is a correlation between excess returns and real exchange rate changes. β denotes beta-
coefficient in the time-series regression of real exchange rate changes on excess returns
estimated for every state k and each year, it is formally equal to cov(er,∆q)
σer
. Real ex-
change rate hedging terms are computed using monthly data.FOk,t1 =KAOPEN provided
by Chinn and Ito, FOk,t2 = FinancialFreedom from Heritage Foundation. In specifica-
tions with FOk,t1 the data range from 1988 to 2007 and CHE is excluded and with FO
k,t
2
from 1996 to 2007 due to the data availability. Constants α0 are not reported. T-statistics
are in parenthesis.
104
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
5
0.
550.
6
0.
650.
7
0.
750.
8
0.
850.
9
0.
951
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 A
ll c
ou
nt
ire
s 
88
−0
7
AU
TBE
L
CA
N
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
NK
O
R
M
YS
M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
5
0.
550.
6
0.
650.
7
0.
750.
8
0.
850.
9
0.
951
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 In
du
st
ria
l 8
8−
07
AU
TBE
L
CA
N
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
82
0.
84
0.
86
0.
880.
9
0.
92
0.
94
0.
96
0.
981
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 E
m
er
gi
ng
 8
8−
07
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS
M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
−
0.
25
−
0.
2
−
0.
15
−
0.
1
−
0.
050
0.
050.
1
0.
15
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 A
ll c
ou
nt
rie
s 
88
−9
7
AU
T
BE
LC
AN
D
N
K
FI
N F
R
A G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS
M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ, demeaned
AU
T
BE
LC
AN
D
N
K
FI
N F
R
A G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS
M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
AU
T
BE
LC
AN
D
N
K
FI
N F
R
A G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS
M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
−
0.
25
−
0.
2
−
0.
15
−
0.
1
−
0.
050
0.
050.
1
0.
15
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 In
du
st
ria
l 8
8−
97
AU
T
BE
LC
AN
D
N
K
FI
N F
R
A G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ, demeaned
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
−
0.
14
−
0.
12
−
0.
1
−
0.
08
−
0.
06
−
0.
04
−
0.
020
0.
02
0.
04
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 E
m
er
gi
ng
 8
8−
97
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS
M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ, demeaned
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
10
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 A
ll c
ou
nt
rie
s 
98
−0
7
AU
TB
EL
CA
N
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A
G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ, demeaned
AU
TB
EL
CA
N
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A
G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
10
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 In
du
st
ria
l 9
8−
07
AU
TB
EL
CA
N
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A
G
ER
G
RC
H
KG
IT
A
JP
N
N
LD
N
O
R
PR
T
SG
P
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
G
BR
US
A c
o
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ, demeaned
0.
25
0.
3
0.
35
0.
4
0.
45
0.
5
0.
55
0.
6
0.
65
0.
7
−
0.
12
−
0.
1
−
0.
08
−
0.
06
−
0.
04
−
0.
020
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
In
fla
tio
n 
He
dg
in
g 
an
d 
Do
m
es
tic
 E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s:
 E
m
er
gi
ng
 9
8−
07
AR
G
BR
A
CH
L
ID
N
KO
R
M
YS M
EX
PH
L
TH
A
TU
R
co
rr
(∆q
,e
r),
ρ
Domestic Equity Holdings, µ, demeaned
F
IG
U
R
E
3:
T
h
es
e
fi
gu
re
s
sh
ow
sc
at
te
r
p
lo
ts
of
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s
of
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
an
d
re
al
ex
ch
an
ge
ra
te
ch
an
ge
s
ag
ai
n
st
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
d
om
es
ti
c
eq
u
it
y
h
ol
d
in
gs
.
Chapter 4
Effects of Financial
Development on Capital Flows
after Financial Liberalization
across US States56
4.1 Introduction
The issue of global financial imbalances have been intensely addressed in
international economic policy and academic discussions over recent years.
Large and growing literature attempts to explain not only the swelling cur-
rent account deficit in the United States of America, but also the decline in
the net foreign asset (NFA) position accompanied by increased holdings of
risky assets and a large increase in debt.
So far, the facts of global imbalances are basically recognized, but there
is still no consensus on the sources and drivers of these imbalances and the
perspectives for their further evolvements. Several theories have been sug-
gested, but none is able to fully explain them. Most recent prominent studies
(Mendoza et al. (2009), Caballero et al. (2008), Song et al. (2010)) provide
a new explanation for both, the changes in NFA positions and the changes
in the portfolio structure across advanced and emerging economies. They
56This chapter follows Stewen (2010b).
105
106 4. REGIONAL FINANCIAL DEREGULATION
show that heterogeneity in the level of domestic financial market develop-
ment across countries may generate both, the large imbalances as well as
the composition of the imbalances. In particular, this heterogeneity starts
to play a significant role as economies commence integration into a interna-
tional economy through capital flows, trade and foreign direct investments.
Development of financial systems differed remarkably across countries
and this is still the case even after the globalization of capital markets has
progressed recently. Moreover, capital market liberalization/integration has
triggered strongly increased capital flows between advanced and emerging
capital markets. According to the above mentioned papers, it is essentially
the interaction between domestic market development and globalization that
has generated global imbalances. The driving mechanism are precaution-
ary savings: due to financial market imperfections, in particular low finan-
cial contract enforcement, financial markets cannot provide full insurance
against idiosyncratic risk, and thus induce people to oversave when faced
with uncertainty about future income. In autarky, financially less developed
countries have higher precautionary savings and lower interest rate than more
developed countries. When economies become financially integrated, interest
rates are equalized. And capital flows from emerging countries to developed
ones, which results in negative NFA positions in advanced economies and
positive NFA in emerging ones. Furthermore, differences in financial market
development are also able to explain the composition of the international
portfolios. Whereas emerging countries demand rather safe assets, i.e. US
bonds, because they have to bear a lot of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk,
countries with well developed financial markets can invest in high-return,
risky assets, i.e. equities.
While the facts and fears of global imbalances are unambiguously obvi-
ous, it is still not clear what the implications of them are supposed to be and
at which costs the adjustments would take place. This chapter suggests to
look at US states and at the liberalization process that US states have passed
through after state banking deregulation in the early 80s. Thus, we draw the
parallels of global imbalances and international capital flows that arose with
globalization to the imbalances within US states and US-wide capital flows
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emerged during and after state banking deregulation in the US. The way
intra- and interstate deregulations have been implemented across US states
offers a great opportunity to use the experience of the United States as a
natural laboratory to study not only the accruement of global imbalances
but also their consequences.
Since 1970s, US states relaxed restrictions that permitted branching both
within and across states. Intra- and interstate branching and de-novo bank-
ing deregulations have taken place gradually across states. Since there is
no fixed chronological order (sequencing) for the deregulations being imple-
mented, there are some states that have accomplished intrastate deregulation
prior to interstate deregulation and others that have proceeded vice versa.
Thus, both banking deregulations and their chronological order provide a
large source of variation across states and time and enable us to differentiate
between two groups of states. Moreover, the time span between intra- and
interstate deregulation varies a lot across states. In this way, we also have
variation in the level of financial development across states at the time of in-
terstate banking deregulation that could be considered as a national financial
liberalization or integration. Here, the level of state's financial development
is suggested to be proxied by its year of intrastate deregulation. To the best
of my knowledge, there is no standard indicators measuring local financial
development of US states. Traditionally, local financial development is cap-
tured by outcome-based measures like banks per capita, mortgage interest
rate, debt to value ratio, mortgage credit to deposit ratio etc. Therefore,
this chapter offers the first rule-based measure of local financial development
of US states.
In this chapter, I explore the interaction between domestic financial de-
velopment and globalization using a US data set. In particular, I examine
how interstate banking deregulation has altered savings, consumption and
net income flows for both, liberalized and non-liberalized states. The nov-
elty lies in the idea to make use of gradual inter- and intrastate banking
deregulation in the US to study adjustments of national imbalances after
financial liberalization. The main contribution of this chapter is to figure
out and document a set of stylized empirical facts emerging from the analy-
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sis of capital flows across US states whose states have already gone through
integration process. The experience of the US is used to highlight how eco-
nomic interactions between countries could evolve as financial borders decline
in importance. This contribution is empirical and seeks to address the fol-
lowing research questions: Can we observe the mechanisms proposed in the
theoretical literature at the interstate level? What is the direction of capital
flows among US states following deregulation?
The answer to the first question is unambiguous yes. I find the predic-
tions of the theoretical model of Mendoza et al. clearly confirmed by the US
data: states with more developed financial markets experienced an increase
in the income/output ratio and a decrease in the income/consumption ratio
following interstate banking deregulation. This results suggest that more de-
veloped states invest rather in productive (risky) assets but also accumulate
foreign debt. Moreover, in less financially developed states savings increased
after interstate banking deregulation indicating positive holdings of riskless
assets.
Mendoza et al. (2009) emphasize that adjustment in NFA positions is
a long-lasting process. To this notion, I find evidence that higher financial
development, in our case the fact of having implemented intrastate deregu-
lation prior to interstate deregulation, has rather long-lasting effects on the
pattern of net capital flows.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an
overview of the recent relevant literature. Section 3 presents three benchmark
models providing their distinguishing features and the predictions they made
with respect to the pattern of net capital flows. In section 4 I focus on the
empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Literature overview
Global imbalances have been analyzed from a number of angles over the last
ten years. Initially, only large US current account deficit and its sustainabil-
ity were addressed by the literature (Dooley et al. (2004), Edwards (2005),
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Cooper (2001)). Lately, academics and policy-makers started to seek for
more fundamental explanations for these imbalances. Some of them (Sum-
mers (2004), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005),
Krugmann (2007)) advance a view that the imbalances are likely to generate
far-ranging financial disturbances. Other indicate that global imbalances are
a pure outcome of diverse influencing factors. Fogli and Perri (2006) argue
that great moderation helps explain large US external imbalances. Cavallo
and Tille (2006), Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci
(2009) propose valuation effects to be a source for the observed imbalances.
Other reasons for these imbalances are suggested to be demographic tran-
sition (Attanasio et al. (2006)), valuation changes of possibly unaccounted
assets (dark matter of Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006), McGrattan and
Prescott (2007)), a global saving glut (Bernanke (2005)), interaction of
structural and cyclical determinants (Bracke et al. (2008)), or differences in
productivity growth combined with financial integration (Chakraborty and
Deckle (2007), Caballero et al. (2008)). However, Engel and Rogers (2006)
conclude that US current account deficits are near their optimal positions
and are just the outcome of optimizing behaviour.
At the heart of this chapter is growing prominent literature that em-
phasizes a tight link between financial market imperfections in fast-growing
emerging economies and rapid process of financial globalization that pro-
duces external imbalances. Already mentioned Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-
Rull (2009) show that financial imperfections affect the demand for assets.
They also underline the role of uncertainty in their framework, that ac-
counts for the emergence of imbalances. In contrast, Caballero et al. (2008)
develop a model with financial imperfections bearing on the country's ability
to supply assets. Whereas in Caballero et al.'s model differential shocks to
productivity growth and to the financial structure generate the imbalances,
the underlying driving force of Mendoza et al.'s model is indeed the interac-
tion of the financial integration and the differences in the levels of financial
development of economies. This mechanism was initially proposed by Willen
(2004) to explain trade imbalances across countries. Prades and Rabitsch
(2007) also show that financial market imperfectionsin their case, specified
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through borrowing and lending constraintsmay generate current financial
imbalances.
A recent theoretical paper by Ghironi and Stebunovs (2008) also high-
lights the role of the interaction between domestic financial development and
globalization in explaining external imbalances. However, it is the first paper,
that actually studies international dimension of intranational deregulation.
The model of Ghironi and Stebunovsas those mentioned beforepredicts
in the steady state higher consumption and output, a real exchange rate
appreciation, a current account deficit and net foreign debt positions for
more developed countries. Nevertheless, their model does not differentiate
between inter- and intrastate deregulation and thus does not really exploit
the implications that this distinction could entail.
The impact of US banking deregulation on macroeconomic factors is
addressed by numerous empirical studies. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
show that intrastate banking deregulation has significantly raised real per
capita output and income growth. The paper of Morgan, Rime and Strahan
(2004) provides evidence that after interstate banking deregulation volatility
of state business cycles has declined and the business cycles of deregulated
states have started to converge.
The more recent literature on banking deregulation emphasizes its role
in risk sharing across US states (Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2007),
Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess (2006)). The paper by Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-
Stewen (2010) (henceforth, HSS) argues that intrastate banking deregulation
has not improved overall interstate risk sharing but it has dampened the de-
pendence of the degree of risk sharing on business cycle. They have found out
that banking deregulation has changed the pattern of risk sharing: income
smoothing through net income flows (or in other words, through capital
markets) has increased but consumption smoothing via credit market (or
savings) has decreased, so that overall risk sharing has not been affected by
banking deregulation. Moreover, the authors have shown that it is indeed in-
trastate deregulation that has changed the pattern of risk sharing. However,
HSS do not provide a concrete mechanism that drives their results.
This chapter is also related to the literature studying local financial de-
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velopment and its implications within a single country. While there is a large
literature on financial development and its implications across countries, the
range of papers focusing on within country differences is very limited. The
most allied study exploring local financial development of US states is a re-
cent papers by Rajan and Ramcharan (2009) and Dehejia and Lleras-Muney
(2003). Rajan and Ramcharan (2009) argue that the distribution of land in
the US has influenced the extent of financial development. During the pe-
riod 1900-1940, counties with high land concentration had fewer banks per
capita, higher interest rates and lower loan to value ratios, which suggests
more restricted access to finance. Unfortunately, to date there is no any
standard indicators measuring financial development of every single state in
the US.
The general set-up of the current chapter have to be separated from the
story of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2006). They argue that capital flows from
developed states with low marginal productivity of capital to less developed
states with high marginal productivity of capital. Hence, allocation of cap-
ital across states is solely determined by levels of total factor productivity.
Moreover, they restrict their analysis to net income flows, without taking
into account the whole portfolio composition.
Moreover, this work is related to studies that investigate the potential
role of small firms in the emergence of global imbalances. Song, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2010) emphasize that imperfections in financial markets work
through small businesses, and in particular their access to financial markets,
so that less financially developed countries with lots of small firms would
accumulate a foreign surplus. The role of small firms access to credit markets
is also addressed by HSS. They show that the effect of banking deregulation
on the pattern of risk sharing is more pronounced among states where small
firms play particularly important role as employer or where the income of
small business owners accounts for a large share of state personal income.
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4.3 Theoretical background
The models of Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (henceforth, MQRR), Ca-
ballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (henceforth, CFG) and Ghironi and Stebunovs
(henceforth, GS) make use of the interaction between domestic financial
development and financial integration when explaining global imbalances.
However, these models differ in the driving mechanisms that cause imbal-
ances. Yet, they provide a useful theoretical framework to study the emer-
gence of global imbalances and predict the development of macroeconomic
variables. This section offers a brief description of the above mentioned
models, their distinguishing features and the predictions which these models
make with respect to some important macroeconomic variables.
The MQRR model
The model proposed by Mendoza et al. (2009) is a multi-country dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets. In this
model, countries that commence financial integration differ only with respect
to their financial development. Mendoza et al. define financial development
as the extent of enforcement of financial contracts among residents by the
law of the country of residence, which is represented by the fraction of indi-
vidual income that the country's residents can divert from creditors. Thus,
financial imperfections directly affect the degree to which individuals can
insure against idiosyncratic risks. That in turn has impact on savings - in
particular, precautionary savings - and followingly, on the demand for as-
sets. Moreover, the authors also introduce two types of uncertainty or risk:
endowment or labor income risk and investment or capital income risk. This
set-up renders possible to distinguish risky from riskless investments, and
thus allows us to study the composition of NFA positions.
The MQRR model predicts that regardless of the nature of uncertainty
endowment, investment or bothin autarky more financially developed coun-
try has higher interest rate and lower asset prices than less financially de-
veloped country. When countries become financially integrated, financially
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more developed country experiences a fall in the interest rate, the demand
for assets and savings, and accumulates negative NFA. In the case of neg-
ative endowment shock, more financially developed country holds zero net
positions in the productive asset, but in the case of investment shock, this
position is positive. However, with both endowment and investment shocks,
the NFA position of a more developed country is not necessarily negative.
The sign of NFA position depends on the importance of the two shocks: only
if the endowment shock is sufficiently large, more developed country will hold
a negative NFA position. In addition, the model suggests that a financially
more developed country experiences large imbalances only if the economy
of the less developed country is relatively large. The model also predicts
that net holdings of risky assets increases with net worth: it is negative
for poorer countries and positive for richer countries. As countries become
wealthier, they invest more in less developed countries because they assign
higher weight on returns and less on risk.
Quantitative analysis reveals that by combining endowment and invest-
ment shocks the model is able to reconcile existing patterns of US inter-
national financial position: more financially developed country accumulates
negative NFA, invests in riskier assets and experiences a fall in the interest
rate relative to autarky. However, it overstates to some extent the adjust-
ment observed in the US economy. Furthermore, the model provides useful
insights into the transitional dynamics from autarky to full financial integra-
tion for several aggregate variables. In particular, NFA in more developed
country decreases slowly and gradually during about 30 years; current ac-
count drops to a deficit and remains there until it converges to zero in about
50 years. Whereas the amount of productive assets increases immediately
after opening up the economy, foreign debt decreases even more resulting
in negative NFA positions. Net factor payments from abroad remain posi-
tive for about five years and become negative afterwards in more developed
country.
114 4. REGIONAL FINANCIAL DEREGULATION
The CFG model
Similarly to Mendoza et al. (2009), Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas have
developed detailed model showing how different levels of financial market
development in different regions, combined with financial market integration,
can yield patterns of global imbalances observed today. In particular, they
adopt the framework of a general equilibrium model with two financially
open regions, one emerging and the other developed, so that safe assets are
only provided in the developed region. Fast growth in the emerging region
and its inability to produce safe assets increases its demand for the safe
assets from the developed region. Thus, the CFG model emphasizes the role
of heterogeneity across countries in the ability to supply financial assets. It
gives a rationale for a decline in real interest rates, for an equilibrium transfer
of capital from the excess savings countries to the low-savings advanced
countries, especially the US, and for an increase in the importance of US
assets in global portfolio.
The CFG model suggests that a permanent shock to the financial devel-
opment of emerging region - e.g. a sharp decline in the protection of property
rights or a crash in a bubble or a considerable loss of informed and intermedi-
ation capital - results in a permanent fall of the interest rate and the current
account deficit in the developed region. This deficit is the counterpart of
the increasing flows from the emerging region. After the shock, households
in the emerging region save more but at the same time have few reliable
local assets, so that they are forced to invest into the safer assets from the
developed region. In addition, the model also sheds light on the important
trends: it provides implications of financial integration of fast growing, less
developed regions. In autarky, the interest rate of a less developed region is
lower than the interest rate of a more developed one. When a less developed
region starts to grow faster and becomes financially integrated, its demand
for financial assets increases. Since the ability of emerging region to gener-
ate safe financial assets does not change, demand for assets from developed
region increases. This entails rising prices of developed region's asset, a drop
in the interest rate and persistent current account deficit.
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The GS model
Ghironi and Stebunovs (2008) provide a model that studies occurrence of
international imbalances as a result of intranational banking deregulation
in the US. They employ a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with local banking competition and endogenous producer entry.
The removal of bank market segmentation is suggested to be a main source
of global imbalances: deregulation of financial market lifts the restriction on
borrowing from banks at a different location and facilitates access to finance
by product market entrants, and thus, increases business creation, which
in turn leads to higher labor demand and higher real wages, inducing ap-
preciation of real exchange rate. The model predicts that without financial
integration lower segmentation of financial markets implies in the long run
higher output and consumption at home and abroad. In the short run, home
consumption decreases as households increase deposits into banks in order
to finance the entry of new firms. Foreign consumption and output fall as
well in the short run.
Opening of the economy, which allows international deposit trading, ini-
tially reduces consumption in both countries to finance increased producer
entry in the deregulated home economy. 'Home' saves more and additionally
borrows from abroad to finance higher investment in new home firms, and
thus, accumulates persistent net foreign debt. In the long run, home and for-
eign consumption increase, where home consumption increases much stronger
than foreign one. Though home current account runs deficit, as we expected,
it is much less persistent comparing to the real evidence from the US. To
increase current account persistence the GS model requires some modifica-
tion: either to treat the banking deregulation as an anticipated rather than
unanticipated event, or to assume that the entry cost depends on the number
of existing firms.
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4.4 Empirical analysis
Theoretical models predicate that more financially developed regions (in my
case, states) will have less precautionary savings and higher interest rate.
After opening up the economies, these regions will experience lower interest
rate and lower demand for assets, capital outflows and negative net foreign
asset positions. But at the same time, they will also have positive net equity
holdings and large negative net bond holdings. Thus, savings will decrease
further and consumption will increase. In less financially developed regions,
interest rate and demand for assets rise, capital flows in and net foreign asset
positions become positive with net equity (bond) holdings being negative
(positive). This section verifies these predictions empirically using the US
data set.
4.4.1 Developed vs. non-developed states
I examine if there were differences in the portfolio composition across liberal-
ized and non-liberalized states prior to interstate banking deregulation. We
can split US states into two groups: the first group, developed one, where
intrastate deregulation has been conducted before interstate deregulation,
and the second group, non-developed one, where intrastate deregulation has
taken place after interstate deregulation. In table 4.1B, states are sorted by
the year they implemented inter- or intrastate deregulation. It becomes clear
that there is a high variability in the timing of both deregulations: on the
one hand, 12 states have already relaxed intrastate branching restrictions
in the early 60s, others have postponed it till the mid 90s, but almost half
of the states have implemented intrastate deregulation in the 80s; on the
other hand, it took much less time for US states to implement interstate
deregulation all over the country, with majority of states having deregulated
in the 80s. Table 4.1A shows that there was no fixed sequencing for the
deregulations being implemented, so that there are 32 states that have ac-
complished intrastate deregulation prior to interstate deregulation, 17 states
that have proceeded vice versa and two states that have implemented both
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deregulations simultaneously.
Thus, we differentiate between two groups of states: the first group in-
cludes states (we will refer to them interchangeably as developed or liber-
alized, or blue) that have already accomplished intrastate deregulation be-
fore they undertake interstate deregulation. Therefore, we assume that these
states have already had developed financial markets before they opened them
for other states. The second group of states (we will refer to them inter-
changeably as non-developed or non-liberalized, or red) has at first imple-
mented interstate deregulation and later on intrastate deregulation, so that
we consider these states as financially underdeveloped at the moment of in-
terstate banking deregulation. Figure 4.1 illustrates the history of intrastate
deregulation and also provides an insight on the allocation of developed and
non-developed states.
Table 4.1C displays descriptive statistics of both deregulations for devel-
oped and non-developed states. Interestingly, the date of intrastate dereg-
ulation across developed states ranges from 1963 till 1990 with standard
deviation of more than ten years. Though interstate deregulation took place
prior to intrastate deregulation across non-developed states, it started later
there than across developed states. This indicates that non-developed states
were generally late deregulators.
4.4.2 Data
We use the data set for the period 1963-2005 compiled by Hoffmann and
Shcherbakova-Stewen (2010). This data set is an updated version of the
data constructed by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996).
In order to test the model inferred hypotheses, I proxy net asset holdings,
savings and consumption because they are not directly observed. In so do-
ing, net asset holdings are captured through the ratio of state-level personal
income (SPI) to gross state product (GSP) (income/output). States with
high income/output ratio are associated with positive net equity holdings.57
57The output/income ratio is an indicator of net capital income flows. If a state accu-
mulates large holdings of productive assets or equities, it experiences positive net capital
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To measure savings (or debt), I use the ratio of SPI over state consumption
(C) (income/consumption). The income/consumption ratio is low for states
with low savings and small bond holdings. Consumption is measured rela-
tive to gross state product (consumption/output). This procedure has two
advantages: First, these approximations are well-established in the empirical
literature.58 Second, conducting in this way renders possible to look at the
whole picture of portfolio composition.59
GSP, SPI and C are turned into per capita variables using population
data by state and converted into 2000 prices using the consumer price index.
Data on inter- and intrastate deregulation is obtained from Demyanyk et
al. (2007), Table 1. The intrastate deregulation dummy Dak,t and interstate
deregulation dummy Dbk,t are zero before deregulation and is one from the
year in which deregulation took place in state k onwards.
I also construct a couple of specific dummies in order to distinguish all
sorts of the effects of interstate and intrastate deregulations on different
groups of states. Dak,t−Dbk,t is a dummy variable that switches on (from 0 to
1) the year of intrastate deregulation and switches off after interstate dereg-
ulation for the developed states. Thus, it measures the temporary effect of
intrastate deregulation before interstate deregulation has been implemented.
For the non-developed states in contrast, this dummy measures the effect of
interstate deregulation before intrastate deregulation has taken place because
the dummy becomes minus one after interstate deregulation and remains so
up to intrastate deregulation.
cs(Dak,t − Dbk,t) is a cumulative sum of Dak,t − Dbk,t dummy. For devel-
oped (non-developed) states, it becomes 1 (-1) from the year of intrastate
(interstate) deregulation, afterwards it increases (decreases) yearly by 1 up
to the year of interstate (intrastate) deregulation and then remains at this
level till the end of the period. Thus, this dummy measures the cumulative
income flows and its gross state product is lower than state income, so that output/income
ratio is smaller than one.
58See e.g. Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Asdrubali et al. (1996), Bertocchi and Canova
(2002) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2006).
59The decomposition is as follows: 1 =
(
output
income
)
·
(
income
consumption
)
·
(
consumption
output
)
.
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or permanent effect of banking deregulations.
Using regional data for the United States yields several benefits. First,
the data for all states are consistent and reliable. Besides, the data range
over more than 40 years and 50 states and offer sufficient scope for cross-
sectional, time-series or panel analysis. Second, conducting research within
US states sheds light on the impact of financial market globalization on the
behavior across countries and the probable adjustment scenarios.
4.4.3 Graphical evidence
Figure 4.2A illustrates that blue (developed) states have higher income/output
ratio after interstate banking deregulation, and for red (non-developed) states
this ratio is rather higher before interstate deregulation. This result suggests
that interstate banking deregulation entails higher net income flows in blue
states and lower ones in red states. Thus, this result corroborates our ex-
pectations with regard to the MQRR model suggesting that more financially
developed states have increased their equity holdings after interstate bank-
ing deregulation and less developed states have seen a decrease in equity
holdings.
Mendoza et al. suggest that financial integration, in our case interstate
deregulation, leads to higher savings in less financially developed states and
to lower savings in more developed states. Our results, shown in the figure
4.2B, are not so clear in this respect. However, it is apparent that blue states
have already had lower savings before interstate deregulation. This outcome
may be explained by the fact that at the moment of interstate deregulation
blue states have conducted intrastate deregulation and the risks within a
state have been diminished so that precautionary savings had already fallen
before interstate deregulation having been implemented. Admittedly, we
should be careful in the attempt to reconcile the MQRR suggestion concern-
ing savings development in the data. The model does not allow to distinguish
between output and income, and thus it is not explicit about the definition
of income. Moreover, our data do not provide a direct measure of savings
and the data on consumption may contain a measurement error, so that
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conclusions should be drawn with caution.
The effect of interstate banking deregulation on consumption (here, con-
sumption over output) is explored in figure 4.2C. Average increase in the
consumption over output ratio is lower in less financially developed states
on average, which is in line with the MQRR hypothesis. For more finan-
cially developed states, however, we can not see any significant change after
interstate banking deregulation.
All three pictures exhibit another striking feature of the effect of inter-
state banking deregulation common for all of them: red states represent a
very homogeneous group with respect to average income over output, income
over consumption and consumption over output before interstate banking
deregulation. For these states, all these three macroeconomic variables vary
around zero. But after opening states for other banks, they become very
heterogeneous. We see that red points always lie along the imaginary verti-
cal line going through zero. In contrast, more developed, blue, states seem
to become more homogeneous with interstate banking deregulation. This
effect is in particular strongly pronounced for the income/consumption and
consumption/output ratios.
Figures 4.3A-F and figure 4.4 provide more complete insights into the
development of net income flows, savings and consumption for both groups
of states. This development proceeded over three stages: before intrastate
deregulation (only for blue states), before interstate deregulation (and af-
ter intrastate deregulation for blue states), after interstate deregulation and
after intrastate deregulation (only for red states). Whereas figures 4.3A-
F illustrate state by state annual average increase of the income/output,
income/consumption and consumption/output ratios in every stage of de-
velopment 60, in figure 4.4 the ratios from figures 4.3A-F are summed up
to an average across developed or non-developed states. The averaging is
carried out both without weights and by weighting with average gross state
60Annual average increase in X for every state in every development stage is calcu-
lated as follows: X¯1blue =
XIntra−X1
Intra
, X¯2blue =
XInter−XIntra
Inter−Intra X¯
3
blue =
XEnd−XInter
End−Inter ,
and X¯1red =
XInter−X1
Inter
,X¯2red =
XIntra−XInter
Intra−Inter , X¯
3
red =
XEnd−XIntra
End−Intra , where [X =
income
output
, incomec
consumption
, consumption
output
].
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product or average population for respective period of time61.
Both figures reveal that in the majority of developed states the in-
come/output and the consumption/output ratios increase after interstate
banking deregulation, which corroborates the suggestions of the MQRR
model. Though the income/consumption ratio, indicating savings, decrease
after intrastate deregulation, which is in line with MQRR, it increases after
interstate deregulation, which dissent from the theory. It is also apparent
that in the developed states the income/output and the consumption/output
ratios decrease after intrastate deregulation. Unfortunately, the models men-
tioned above are silent about the effects of intrastate deregulation on con-
sumption and holdings of productive assets. Overall, average results for
developed states seems to be robust to different weighting methods.
The effect of interstate deregulation on consumption, savings and net
income flows in the non-developed states confirms the suggestions of the
MQRR model: following financial integration, here interstate deregulation,
less developed states decrease their holdings in risky assets, increase savings
and decrease consumption. And again, we do not have any suggestions from
the theory on the effects of intrastate deregulation. Moreover, figures 4.3A-
F do not provide any evidence what states systematically differ from the
majority.
4.4.4 Results from panel OLS regressions
In this section I examine whether the pattern of capital flows - before and
after interstate banking deregulation - differs across states depending on
their degree of financial development. To empirically explore this questions,
I estimate following panel OLS regressions in levels
Xk,t −Xk,Inter = α+ βYk,t + τt + δk + k,t,
61The weights are constructed as average weight over the years before intra, before inter,
after inter and after intra respectively for each state. There is no red bar for developed
states and dark blue bar for non-developed states because developed states do not pass
through the development stage after Intra as a last stage and non-developed states do
not pass through the development stage before Intra as a first stage.
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where Xk,t − Xk,Inter is state k's variable X at time t relative to the time
of interstate banking deregulation with X = NFI, S,C. NFI = incomeoutput ,
S = incomeconsumption , C =
consumption
output . Depending on the parametrization our
regressor Yk,t contains various dummies that capture different effects of in-
terstate banking deregulation. We also control for time- and state-fixed
effects.
The main results are presented in table 4.2. In the period between intra-
and interstate deregulation, income over output and consumption over out-
put increase in the developed states (row 1 and 5) by 3 percentage points.
Moreover, every year after intrastate deregulation (and until interstate dereg-
ulation) increases these variables additionally by 0.05 percentage points (row
5). This is also true for the effect of interstate deregulation in the red states.
These results are consistent with the evidence we obtained from the graphs
analysis and with Mendoza et al. However, there is no temporary effect of
interstate deregulation on income over consumption (savings, here) and the
cumulative effect is falsely signed because we expect savings to fall in the
blue states and to rise in the red states.
However, when included into regressions, both dummies, Dak,t−Dbk,t and
cs(Dak,t−Dbk,t), assume a symmetry of the effect of interstate deregulation on
both groups of states. To control for a possible asymmetry I construct two
different dummies for every group of states and then include them both into
my previous regressions. DaLk,t−DbLk,t is a dummy for liberalized states that
becomes one from the year of intrastate banking deregulation and remains
equal to one till the date of interstate banking deregulation. DaNLk,t−DbNLk,t
is zero before interstate banking deregulation and is minus one from the
year in which interstate deregulation took place in non-developed states, it
switches back to zero after intrastate deregulation. cs(DaLk,t − DbLk,t) and
cs(DaNLk,t −DbNLk,t) are constructed analogously to cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t). We see
that only income over output and consumption over output in developed
states are temporary affected (rows 2 and 6). Permanent effect of banking
deregulation is significant for the whole pattern of capital flows across de-
veloped countries and for savings and consumption in non-developed ones
(rows 4 and 6).
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To control for group-fixed effect, i.e. for being either developed or non-
developed state, we add a liberalized dummyDL or non-liberalized dummy
DNL. The results are presented in table 4.3. Being red or blue state has sig-
nificant impact on NFI and C in both groups (rows 1 and 2). When adding
DL and DNL individually (rows 3 and 4), they appear correctly signed in all
specifications, but only significant for NFI and C in non-developed states.
and nearly always significant: having abolished restrictions on intrastate
banking prior to interstate one induces higher NFI and C, and lower S.
Moreover, results given in rows 5-8 provide an insight whether the impor-
tance of belonging to the certain group of states increases over time. For this
purpose I include one of the trended dummies (DNL ∗ t or DL ∗ t). Being
developed or non-developed state becomes more important over time for the
effect of banking deregulation on NFI and C.
Table 4.4 examines whether being a developed or a non-developed state
had long lasting or just temporary effects on capital flows following the reg-
ulatory change in both groups of states. I differentiate between permanent
effect (PE) and temporary effect (TE) dummies for each group of states.
Permanent effect dummy becomes one starting in the year of interstate bank-
ing deregulation and remains one up to the end of the period. Row 1 suggests
that only permanent effect of interstate deregulation on savings in more de-
veloped states is statistically significant: being a developed state decreases
average savings rate by 0.015-0.017 in the long run. Moreover, this effect
remains significant with the same order of magnitude throughout all spec-
ifications. Temporary effect dummy is constructed for either one, three or
five years. It becomes one starting in the year of interstate deregulation and
remains equal to one for one, three or five years respectively, TE1, TE3,
TE5. It is obvious that temporary effects are never significant in these spec-
ifications. The permanent effect on interstate deregulation on net income
flows is never significant in the first four rows of table 4.4. However, if I
control for industrial structure, i.e. for oil or agricultural states, or for the
initial level of output in a state, permanent effect becomes highly significant
and correctly signed (rows 5 and 7). This result may be explained by the
differences in industries' access to capital markets: e.g. oil industries are
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usually listed on stock exchange, so that states, that are rich on oil and oil-
producing enterprises, would most likely have very high output over income
(or very low income over output) ratios compared to the average US state.
4.5 Conclusion
We study the pattern of capital income flows across US states. Recent liter-
ature on global imbalances has emphasized the particular role of interaction
between domestic financial development and financial integration for the oc-
currence of international financial imbalances. So far, the models trying to
explain global imbalances have been applied only to international capital
flows between emerging and industrial countries. The model of Mendoza
et al. (2009) suggests that whereas in more developed countries holdings
of risky assets and consumption increase and savings decrease after financial
integration, less financially developed countries experience a fall in consump-
tion and holdings of productive assets and rise in the savings rate. In this
chapter, we have verified the predictions of this model at intranational level
using the data for US states. We use the state-level ratio of personal income
to output and personal income to consumption as measures for net capital
inflows and savings, respectively. We then examined the implications of in-
terstate banking deregulation on differently financially developed US states,
where the stage of financial development depended on the implementation
of intrastate deregulation prior to interstate deregulation. We find strong
support for the model predictions in the data, so that we can conclude that
implications of financial integration for heterogeneous financial markets seem
to be alike at international and intranational level.
Thus, our evidence shows that studying intranational dimension of imbal-
ances may be very useful in providing further insights into the development
of current global imbalances, their duration and their impact on growth,
volatility and other important macroeconomic variables.
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Table 4.1A: US inter- and intrastate banking deregulations by state.
Developed Intra Inter Non-Developed Intra Inter
Alaska 1963 1982 Massachusetts 1984 1983
Arizona 1963 1986 Kentucky 1990 1984
California 1963 1987 Florida 1988 1985
Delaware 1963 1988 Illinois 1988 1986
District of Columbia 1963 1985 Indiana 1989 1986
Idaho 1963 1985 Michigan 1987 1986
Maryland 1963 1985 Minnesota 1993 1986
Nevada 1963 1985 Missouri 1990 1986
North Carolina 1963 1985 Louisiana 1988 1987
Rhode Island 1963 1984 Oklahoma 1988 1987
South Carolina 1963 1986 Texas 1988 1987
South Dakota 1963 1988 Wisconsin 1990 1987
Vermont 1970 1988 Wyoming 1988 1987
Maine 1975 1978 Colorado 1991 1988
New York 1976 1982 Arkansas 1994 1989
New Jersey 1977 1986 New Mexico 1991 1989
Virginia 1978 1985 Iowa 1997 1991
Ohio 1979 1985
Connecticut 1980 1986 Intra=Inter
Alabama 1981 1987 New Hampshire 1987 1987
Utah 1981 1984 Tennessee 1985 1985
Pennsylvania 1982 1986
Georgia 1983 1985
Nebraska 1985 1990
Oregon 1985 1986
Washington 1985 1987
Hawaii 1986 1995
Mississippi 1986 1988
Kansas 1987 1992
North Dakota 1987 1991
West Virginia 1987 1988
Montana 1990 1993
Table 4.1B: US inter- and intrastate banking deregulations by state.
state Intrastate deregulation state Interstate deregulation
Alaska 1963 Maine 1978
Arizona 1963 Alaska 1982
California 1963 New York 1982
Delaware 1963 Connecticut 1983
District of Columbia 1963 Massachusetts 1983
Idaho 1963 Kentucky 1984
Maryland 1963 Rhode Island 1984
Nevada 1963 Utah 1984
North Carolina 1963 District of Columbia 1985
Rhode Island 1963 Florida 1985
South Carolina 1963 Georgia 1985
South Dakota 1963 Idaho 1985
Vermont 1970 Maryland 1985
Maine 1975 Nevada 1985
New York 1976 North Carolina 1985
New Jersey 1977 Ohio 1985
Virginia 1978 Tennessee 1985
Ohio 1979 Virginia 1985
Connecticut 1980 Arizona 1986
Alabama 1981 Illinois 1986
Utah 1981 Indiana 1986
Pennsylvania 1982 Michigan 1986
Georgia 1983 Minnesota 1986
Massachusetts 1984 Missouri 1986
Nebraska 1985 New Jersey 1986
Oregon 1985 Oregon 1986
Tennessee 1985 Pennsylvania 1986
Washington 1985 South Carolina 1986
Hawaii 1986 Alabama 1987
Mississippi 1986 California 1987
Kansas 1987 Louisiana 1987
Michigan 1987 New Hampshire 1987
New Hampshire 1987 Oklahoma 1987
North Dakota 1987 Texas 1987
West Virginia 1987 Washington 1987
Florida 1988 Wisconsin 1987
Illinois 1988 Wyoming 1987
Louisiana 1988 Colorado 1988
Oklahoma 1988 Delaware 1988
Texas 1988 Mississippi 1988
Wyoming 1988 South Dakota 1988
Indiana 1989 Vermont 1988
Kentucky 1990 West Virginia 1988
Missouri 1990 Arkansas 1989
Montana 1990 New Mexico 1989
Wisconsin 1990 Nebraska 1990
Colorado 1991 Iowa 1991
New Mexico 1991 North Dakota 1991
Minnesota 1993 Kansas 1992
Arkansas 1994 Montana 1993
Iowa 1997 Hawaii 1995
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Table 4.1C: US inter- and intrastate banking deregulations: Descriptive
statistics.
Min Max Mean Median Std
Developed Intrastate 1963 1990 1975 1978 10.15
Interstate 1978 1995 1986 1986 3.34
Non-developed Intrastate 1984 1997 1990 1989 3.00
Interstate 1983 1991 1987 1987 1.90
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Table 4.2: Effects of interstate banking deregulation
Table reports results of the OLS regressions, where regressors are given in the left
column. Regressand is Xk,t − Xk,Inter, where X is NFI, S and C respectively.
NFI = incomeoutput , S =
income
consumption , C =
consumption
output . cs is cumulative sum. DX is a
dummy for being X state, with X = [L,NL] = [Liberalized,Non − Liberalized].
Dak,t is a dummy for intrastate deregulation, D
b
k,t is a dummy for interstate deregu-
lation. t is trend. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
NFI S C
(1) 1 -0.0073 (-5.2161) 0.0059 (2.3479) -0.0130 (-6.4051)
Dak,t −Dbk,t 0.0366 (11.4496) 0.0005 (0.0788) 0.0359 (7.7389)
(2) 1 -0.0096 (-6.5509) 0.0068 (2.5455) -0.0159 (-7.5234)
DaLk,t −DbLk,t 0.0443 (12.6122) -0.0023 (-0.3610) 0.0459 (8.9974)
DaNLk,t −DbNLk,t -0.0056 (-0.6397) 0.0157 (0.9782) -0.0191 (-1.4923)
(3) 1 -0.0063 (-4.0923) 0.0017 (0.6335) -0.0126 (-5.6793)
cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t) 0.0009 (5.7622) 0.0009 (3.2023) 0.0010 (4.4330)
(4) 1 -0.0064 (-3.7375) 0.0057 (1.8863) -0.0155 (-6.2904)
cs(DaLk,t −DbLk,t) 0.0010 (5.4545) 0.0006 (1.9693) 0.0013 (5.0996)
cs(DaNLk,t −DbNLk,t) 0.0008 (0.6500) 0.0070 (3.3875) -0.0034 (-2.0383)
(5) 1 -0.0088 (-5.7787) 0.0022 (0.7805) -0.0150 (-6.7470)
Dak,t −Dbk,t 0.0341 (10.1387) -0.0058 (-0.9560) 0.0326 (6.6905)
cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t) 0.0004 (2.4774) 0.0010 (3.3409) 0.0005 (2.1935)
(6) 1 -0.0115 (-6.6466) 0.0068 (2.1689) -0.0209 (-8.2857)
DaLk,t −DbLk,t 0.0418 (11.4305) -0.0095 (-1.4357) 0.0434 (8.1678)
DaNLk,t −DbNLk,t -0.0069 (-0.7516) -0.0036 (-0.2170) -0.0128 (-0.9635)
cs(DaLk,t −DbLk,t) 0.0005 (2.5759) 0.0007 (2.2745) 0.0008 (2.9826)
cs(DaNLk,t −DbNLk,t) -0.0003 (-0.2375) 0.0074 (3.4400) -0.0043 (-2.4924)
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Table 4.3: Effects of interstate banking deregulation, group-fixed effects
Table reports results of the OLS regressions, where regressors are given in the left
column. Regressand is Xk,t − Xk,Inter, where X is NFI, S and C respectively.
NFI = incomeoutput , S =
income
consumption , C =
consumption
output . cs is cumulative sum. DX is a
dummy for being X state, with X = [L,NL] = [Liberalized,Non − Liberalized].
Dak,t is a dummy for intrastate deregulation, D
b
k,t is a dummy for interstate deregu-
lation. t is trend. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
NFI S C
(1) 1 -0.0129 (-5.8655) 0.0045 (1.1467) -0.0207 (-6.5415)
DL 0.0175 (6.2790) 0.0024 (0.4924) 0.0205 (5.1522)
(2) 1 0.0051 (3.1162) 0.0071 (2.4128) 0.0001 (0.0599)
DNL -0.0212 (-7.4712) -0.0031 (-0.6183) -0.0237 (-5.8138)
(3) 1 -0.0106 (-4.8599) 0.0056 (1.4138) -0.0184 (-5.8403)
Dak,t −Dbk,t 0.0330 (9.4386) -0.0037 (-0.5837) 0.0305 (6.0098)
cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t) 0.0003 (1.6585) 0.0012 (3.5203) 0.0003 (1.2109)
DL 0.0037 (1.1169) -0.0074 (-1.2168) 0.0075 (1.5361)
(4) 1 -0.0042 (-1.8925) -0.0005 (-0.1305) -0.0090 (-2.7941)
Dak,t −Dbk,t 0.0315 (9.0725) -0.0043 (-0.6871) 0.0293 (5.8173)
cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t) 0.0002 (0.9814) 0.0012 (3.4056) 0.0002 (0.8675)
DNL -0.0095 (-2.8631) 0.0055 (0.9165) -0.0123 (-2.5363)
(5) 1 -0.0048 (-2.5827) 0.0039 (1.1966) -0.0123 (-4.5914)
DL ∗ t 0.0002 (2.2224) 0.0001 (0.9076) 0.0003 (2.4452)
(6) 1 0.0005 (0.3105) 0.0070 (2.5268) -0.0037 (-1.6431)
DNL ∗ t -0.0003 (-3.1120) -0.0001 (-0.6969) -0.0006 (-3.6406)
(7) 1 -0.0088 (-4.6769) 0.0053 (1.5759) -0.0161 (-5.9351)
Dak,t −Dbk,t 0.0340 (9.9662) -0.0076 (-1.2261) 0.0332 (6.7137)
cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t) 0.0004 (1.9484) 0.0014 (3.6058) 0.0004 (1.2101)
DL ∗ t -0.0000 (-0.0834) -0.0004 (-1.6290) 0.0001 (0.7260)
(8) 1 -0.0110 (-5.4434) 0.0005 (0.1420) -0.0142 (-4.8231)
Dak,t −Dbk,t 0.0353 (10.2601) -0.0049 (-0.7887) 0.0322 (6.4476)
cs(Dak,t −Dbk,t) 0.0005 (2.9291) 0.0011 (3.3346) 0.0005 (1.8445)
DNL ∗ t 0.0002 (1.6442) 0.0001 (0.6824) -0.0001 (-0.4137)
Table 4.4: Permanent and temporary effects of interstate banking deregulation
Table reports results of the OLS Regressions, where regressors are given in the left column.
Regressand is Xk,t−Xk,Inter, where X is NFI, S and C respectively. NFI = incomeoutput , S =
income
consumption , C =
consumption
output . cs is cumulative sum. PEX is a permanent effect of being X
state after interstate deregulation up to the end of the period and TE1X/TE3X/TE5X are
temporary effects of beingX state after interstate deregulation for 1/3/5 years respectively,
with X = [L,NL] = [Liberalized,Non− Liberalized]. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
NFI S C
(1) 1 -0.0022 (-1.1779) 0.0076 (2.3555) -0.0075 (-2.8589)
PEL 0.0017 (0.4524) -0.0165 (-2.5317) -0.0057 (-1.0881)
PENL -0.0009 (-0.2507) 0.0095 (1.5186) 0.0039 (0.7674)
(2) 1 -0.0022 (-1.1865) 0.0077 (2.3816) -0.0075 (-2.8682)
PEL 0.0018 (0.4818) -0.0172 (-2.6048) -0.0055 (-1.0359)
TE1L 0.0020 (0.1762) -0.0064 (-0.3267) 0.0073 (0.4596)
PENL -0.0011 (-0.2985) 0.0104 (1.6292) 0.0035 (0.6720)
TE1NL 0.0029 (0.1967) -0.0163 (-0.6206) 0.0036 (0.1705)
(3) 1 -0.0021 (-1.1709) 0.0077 (2.3956) -0.0075 (-2.8588)
PEL 0.0016 (0.4306) -0.0173 (-2.6150) -0.0058 (-1.0748)
TE3L -0.0001 (-0.0132) -0.0074 (-0.6334) 0.0053 (0.5599)
PENL -0.0008 (-0.2188) 0.0111 (1.7009) 0.0035 (0.6580)
TE3NL -0.0007 (-0.0823) -0.0088 (-0.5718) -0.0019 (-0.1550)
(4) 1 -0.0021 (-1.1492) 0.0078 (2.4063) -0.0075 (-2.8602)
PEL 0.0014 (0.3828) -0.0172 (-2.6154) -0.0058 (-1.0854)
TE5L 0.0000 (0.0062) -0.0105 (-1.1180) 0.0075 (0.9918)
PENL -0.0005 (-0.1220) 0.0119 (1.7960) 0.0031 (0.5731)
TE5NL -0.0035 (-0.5125) -0.0046 (-0.3820) -0.0048 (-0.4870)
(5) 1 -0.0037 (-2.0601) -0.0012 (-0.3485) -0.0021 (-0.8092)
PEL 0.0142 (3.9596) -0.0235 (-3.5517) 0.0118 (2.2707)
PEL ∗Doil -0.1830 (-14.0438) 0.1237 (5.1501) -0.2691 (-14.2729)
PENL -0.0165 (-4.7826) 0.0183 (2.8835) -0.0166 (-3.3214)
PENL ∗Doil 0.2006 (16.1977) -0.1349 (-5.9118) 0.2839 (15.8432)
Doil 0.0051 (0.9603) 0.0817 (8.3603) -0.0593 (-7.7269)
(6) 1 0.0035 (1.7712) 0.0106 (3.0329) -0.0038 (-1.3488)
PEL -0.0019 (-0.4777) -0.0302 (-4.3065) 0.0031 (0.5517)
PEL ∗Dagr 0.0204 (2.0208) 0.0730 (4.1344) -0.0464 (-3.2321)
PENL -0.0026 (-0.6817) 0.0249 (3.6831) -0.0124 (-2.2548)
PENL ∗Dagr 0.0093 (0.9882) -0.0943 (-5.7232) 0.0979 (7.3090)
Dagr -0.0327 (-6.8323) -0.0169 (-2.0088) -0.0214 (-3.1334)
(5) 1 -0.1052 (-11.7403) -0.0358 (-2.3611) -0.0579 (-4.4416)
PEL 0.0638 (3.5308) 0.2388 (7.8075) 0.0091 (0.3467)
PEL ∗GSP63 -0.4195 (-3.3757) -1.6967 (-8.0621) -0.1355 (-0.7499)
PENL 0.0457 (2.9176) -0.3376 (-12.7165) 0.1472 (6.4576)
PENL ∗GSP63 -0.3533 (-3.3421) 2.3420 (13.0828) -0.9880 (-6.4277)
GSP63 0.7304 (11.7040) 0.2950 (2.7915) 0.3607 (3.9745)
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Annual average increase in the income/output ratio before and after interstate bank-
ing deregulation
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FIGURE 4.2A: This figure displays average increase in X per year for every state be-
fore and after interstate banking deregulation, where [X = incomeoutput ]. Average increase
in X is calculated as X¯bblue =
XInter−XIntra
Inter−Intra , X¯
a
blue =
XEnd−XInter
End−Inter , X¯
b
red =
XInter−X1
Inter ,
X¯ared =
XIntra−XInter
Intra−Inter , where superscripts b and a denote an increase before and after
interstate deregulation. Subscript red stands for non-developed red states and blue
for developed blue ones. A cyan star represents an average increase of X over the
blue states. A magenta star represents an average increase of X over the red states.
Appendix 133
Annual average increase in the income/consumption ratio before and after interstate
banking deregulation
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FIGURE 4.2B: This figure displays average increase in X per year for every state
before and after interstate banking deregulation, where [X = incomeconsumption ]. Average
increase in X is calculated as X¯bblue =
XInter−XIntra
Inter−Intra , X¯
a
blue =
XEnd−XInter
End−Inter , X¯
b
red =
XInter−X1
Inter , X¯
a
red =
XIntra−XInter
Intra−Inter , where superscripts b and a denote an increase
before and after interstate deregulation. Subscript red stands for non-developed red
states and blue for developed blue ones. A cyan star represents an average increase
of X over the blue states. A magenta star represents an average increase of X over
the red states.
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Annual average increase in the consumption/output ratio before and after interstate
banking deregulation
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FIGURE 4.2C: This figure displays average increase in X per year for every state
before and after interstate banking deregulation, where [X = consumptionoutput ]. Average
increase in X is calculated as X¯bblue =
XInter−XIntra
Inter−Intra , X¯
a
blue =
XEnd−XInter
End−Inter , X¯
b
red =
XInter−X1
Inter , X¯
a
red =
XIntra−XInter
Intra−Inter , where superscripts b and a denote an increase
before and after interstate deregulation. Subscript red stands for non-developed red
states and blue for developed blue ones. A cyan star represents an average increase
of X over the blue states. A magenta star represents an average increase of X over
the red states.
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FIGURE 4.4: These figures display annual average increase in X av-
eraged over all state in every development stage calculated as follows:
X¯1blue =
XIntra−X1
Intra , X¯
2
blue =
XInter−XIntra
Inter−Intra X¯
3
blue =
XEnd−XInter
End−Inter , and
X¯2red =
XInter−X1
Inter ,X¯
3
red =
XIntra−XInter
Intra−Inter , X¯
4
red =
XEnd−XIntra
End−Intra , where
[X = incomeoutput ,
incomec
consumption ,
consumption
output ]. The averaging is carried out both
without weights and by weighting with average gross state product or av-
erage population for respective period of time. Superscripts 1, 2, 3, 4 stand
for the respective stage of development: before intrastate deregulation, be-
fore interstate deregulation, after interstate deregulation and after intrastate
deregulation. Subscript red stands for non-developed red states and blue for
developed blue ones.

Chapter 5
Summary
In this thesis I have presented three self-contained essays on empirical issues
in intranational economics and international fiance. My essays contribute to
the existing literature on consumption risk sharing, US banking deregulation
and international portfolio allocations. The main results of this thesis can
be summarized as follows.
Chapter two provides new insights on the risk sharing pattern and its
features across US states. We show that consumption risk sharing among
US states is procyclical: it increases in booms and decreases in recessions.
This result is mainly driven by the credit market channel of risk sharing be-
cause consumption smoothing is strongly procyclical and more than offsets
the negative effect of business cycle on income smoothing. Further, we seek
for the sources for the observed pattern of risk sharing. We find that business
cycle fluctuations in risk sharing are more pronounced in states where small
firms play more important role. However, our results suggest that banking
deregulation in the US have had a strong impact on risk sharing and its de-
pendence on the business cycle. First, banking deregulation has changed the
pattern of risk sharing. What is more important, it has almost eliminated the
effect of the business cycle on risk sharing being strongest in the states with
many small firms. Therefore, our results corroborate empirical evidence of
significant positive effects of banking deregulation on the real economy. This
finding is especially important for the current discussion about upcoming
reforms in banking sector after the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
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Diversifying portfolio holdings can increase risk sharing and thus con-
tributes to higher welfare through smoothed consumption. However, it is
well-established fact that investors hold mainly domestic assets and do not
make use of international diversification benefits. In chapter three I ad-
dress this issue by exploring potential determinants of home bias. In so
doing, I focus on real exchange rate hedging motive and calculate correla-
tion coefficients between real exchange rate changes and excess returns for a
comprehensive number of countries. These correlations are always positive
and significant for the majority of countries. However, the only exception
are EMU-countries that exhibit not significant correlation coefficients. In the
next step, I show that estimated RER hedging term helps to explain existing
home bias. In the longrun, a higher correlation of RER changes with excess
returns implies higher holdings of domestic equity for emerging countries.
Moreover, countries that are more open to trade, are more concerned about
hedging RER fluctuatios.
Current global imbalances have forced researchers to seek for possible ex-
planations for them. A growing literature suggests the financial integration
of financially unequally developed countries to be the source of these im-
balances. Chapter four examines implications of the interaction between
financial development and financial integration for capital flows at intrana-
tional level. Unique experience of US states in intra- and interstate dereg-
ulations offers a natural experiment to study this question. At the moment
of interstate banking deregulation, that can be regarded as financial integra-
tion of US states, not all states have implemented intrastate deregulation so
that their degree of financial development differed a lot. Though theoretical
models were constructed to explain international pattern of capital flows,
my results confirm its predictions at intrastate level. That allows us to es-
tablish stylized facts of capital flow movements due to financial integration
of heterogeneously developed countries.
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